

Contemptus Dei: St Augustine on the disorder of Pride in Society, and its Remedies

INTRODUCTION

Status quaestionis

The comparative neglect of St. Augustine's doctrine concerning *superbia* (pride) — a truly remarkable lacuna, given the latter's obvious significance in his vision of universal history — was noted by William M. Green as long ago as 1949¹. Writing in *The University of California Publications in Classical Philology*, Dr. Green set out to establish both the paramount importance of *superbia* in the economy of Augustine's thought and the corresponding need for a thorough and systematic study of not only the content but also the sources of his teaching². Faced by a theme of such complexity, no scholar could hope, in twenty-five pages, to produce anything beyond a bare survey of salient features, accompanied by some suggestions as to source-material. Within this narrow compass, however, Dr. Green was able, by a judicious selection of texts, to achieve complete success alike in documenting, and in demonstrating the need of just the sort of study that he proposed. The relevance of his observations, no less timely today than at their first appearance, may perhaps serve to justify the brief critique which follows — especially in view of the fact that the gap to which Green drew attention so many years ago has still not yet been completely filled.

1. WILLIAM M. GREEN, *Initium Omnis Peccati Superbia : Augustine on Pride as the First Sin*. *University of California Publications in Classical Philology*, XIII, 13, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949, 407-431.

2. *Ibid.* p. 407 : « The thought seems to warrant a more detailed study than has yet appeared (1) of Augustine's teaching on pride (2) of his sources for this teaching, and (3) of its significance in Augustine's thought. »

Regarding the sources of St. Augustine's doctrine of *superbia*, our author maintains that these chiefly comprise the Bible, Origen, Plotinus and Ambrose³. Turning to classical Greek literature, he argues that in many respects ὕβρις, closely resembles the pride denounced by Hebrew writers. At the same time — according to Dr. Green — the former vice was never intended to represent an attitude of disobedience to the gods⁴. In illustrating his own position here, he selects and comments briefly upon a number of extracts from ancient Greek drama and philosophy. These are designed to undergird Dr. Green's estimate of the comparative significance or status of pride and humility within Greek moral speculation generally. The consensus of such speculation being in his eyes sharply opposed to both Hebrew and Christian piety, he infers that classical theories about pride and humility offer but a partial parallel to Augustine's doctrine. This conclusion follows logically enough upon Dr. Green's apparent belief that ὕβρις meant no more, even in tragedy, than an « excess overstepping the bounds of decent behaviour »⁵.

For the present writer, on the contrary, ὕβρις embodied the Hellenes' most deeply-felt source of moral evil precisely because it often did involve an at least implicit note of disobedience to the Divine Will⁶. In support of this viewpoint, which seems amply justified by the available evidence, it will perhaps be considered sufficient for our purposes to refer once again to the examples chosen by Dr. Green himself from the Greek theatre⁷. If we interpret these aright, the basic meaning of ὕβρις,

3. *Ibid.* p. 416 and fn. 46.

4. *Ibid.* p. 417 and fn. 51.

5. *Ibid.* p. 417 and fn. 47.

6. S. H. BUTCHER, *Some Aspects Of The Greek Genius*, p. 107 : « (Hybris is) ...want of reverence and ... of self-knowledge ... the expression of a self-centred will recognizing no power outside itself, and knowing no law but its own impulses ... This Insolence in the Greek tragedy is the deepest source of moral evil. » Consult also J. J. FRAENKEL, *Hybris*, dissert. Utrecht, 1941, and C. DEL GRANDE, *Hybris*, Naples, 1947, where this concept is discussed in Greek literature generally, as well as E. R. DODDS, *The Greeks And The Irrational*, pp. 31, 48 ; p. 52, fn. 13. For textual refs. in Greek authors see e.g. HESIOD, *Opera et Dies*, 133-36 : 143-46 ; SOLON (*Diog. Laert.* I, 59) ; THEOGNIS, *eleg.* 151-54 ; PINDAR, *Ol.* XIII, 10 ; HEROD. *Hist.* VIII, 77 ; THUC. *Hist.* III, 39 ; EURIP. *Frag.* 440-41 : also fn. 10, below.

7. In AESCHYLUS' *Prometheus Vinculus*, for example, the hero's punishment results in the main, it would seem, from disobedience to the will of Zeus that nothing be done to hinder his intention of destroying the human race. By stealing fire, etc., Prometheus on his own admission acted in direct defiance of the Divine command ... *Aeschyl's Tragoediae*, *ibid.* *Script. Classic. Bibl. Oxoniensis*, rec. G. Murray, vv. 231-35. Cf. FRAENKEL, *op. cit.* p. 27 ; « Prometheus, de grenzen van zijn gezag overschrijdend, doet inbreuk op het recht van Zeus, den vertegenwoordiger van orde en κόσμος. » Cf. *ibid.* p. 65, and G. M. A. GRUBE, *The Drama Of Euripides*, Introduction, p. 4 : (in Aeschylus) « Zeus, the tyrannical despot, becomes the great, just and beneficent ruler of Olympus ; punishment was then due, in part at least, to the sin of pride... »

together with that of its correlative ὑπερηφάνια⁸, does not differ materially from his own interpretation of Augustine's concept of *superbia*. Our opinion appears all the more probable because of the fact that the latter word occurs as a frequent translation of ὑπερηφάνια in the current or extant Latin theological literature of Augustine's own day⁹.

Thus no synthesis emerges from Dr. Green's comparison of classical and Augustinian teaching about pride. He has failed — it would seem — to indicate the two elements characteristic alike of that doctrine and of at least the earlier Greek tradition. The first of these is a conviction that the fundamental cause of impiety lies in man's will to affront the Divine omnipotence by rising above his own station. The second element is a conviction — equally explicit — that the vice in question always provokes Divine anger and therefore Divine punishment¹⁰. Not only has Dr. Green ignored or at any rate minimized this common substratum of belief, but, what is more, he nowhere even adverts to the various principles and postulates which St. Augustine's own teaching assumes, and upon a knowledge of which its adequate exposition must therefore depend¹¹.

Meanwhile — and we record the fact as something in the nature of an anticlimax — a Latin dissertation dealing *ex professo* with Augustine's concept of pride had already been written some nine years previous to

8. Here the problem is twofold : first to determine precisely the nature and extent of classical influences upon St. Augustine's teaching, and secondly, to assess his own interpretation of the Graeco-Roman tradition relative to ὕβρις, ὑπερηφάνια, and *superbia*. As we shall see later, his failure generally to take serious account of this tradition results from a profound conviction that no awareness either of humility (conceived as a moral ideal) or of the innate malice of pride is possible without access and a receptive attitude to the teaching of Christ. Whatever might be found in some later classical writers and philosophers, Augustine as an apologist had to deal with two undoubted facts. In the first place, the cult of self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) which appears in PLATO (*Phil.* 67) and is formulated by ARISTOTLE (e.g. *Eth. Nic.* 1097^b, II. 5-21) continued to find acceptance among all the philosophical circles of his own day. The second fact was the lack of any doctrine (common to the classical outlook as a whole) that could be reconciled with Christian belief. It remains equally incontrovertible that, as we have shewn, elements present in St. Augustine's concept of pride also exist in such Graeco-Roman notions as ὕβρις, *superbia*, etc.

9. RUFINUS, for instance, so employs *superbia* in translating from ST. BASIL the GREAT (*homilia* XII, 11 ; PG 31, 408 : « ὁ παῖς οὐκ οἶδεν ὑπερηφανίαν »). Cf. PG *ibid.* (RUFINUS' translation of this Homily) 1773 : « ...*puer nescit superbiam*... » Rufinus (340-410 AD), a priest, theologian and translator of Greek ecclesiastical literature, divided his time largely between Aquileia, Rome and the East ; he was a contemporary of Augustine and known to him (see *de grat. Christ. et de pecc. orig.* II, 3, 3). Augustine furthermore used his translation of some of the sermons of St. Gregory Nazianzen (P. COURCELLE, *Les Lettres grecques en Occident*, p. 189, and fns. 4, 5).

10. HESIOD, *Opera et Dies*, vv. 7-8 ; HEROD. I, 32 ; EURIP. *Troiad.* vv. 612-13 ; XEN. *Hist. graec.* VI, 4, 23-24.

11. *Vide supra*, fns. 6, 7, 10.

Green's own article¹². Still later, as if to complete and crown the labours of his Cistercian predecessor in the field, a Jesuit, Pierre Adnès, published *La Doctrine de l'humilité chez S. Augustin*¹³. To date, despite our personal efforts and the kindly offices of *Études Augustiniennes*, it has proved impossible to secure a copy of either treatise. Useful and scholarly studies devoted to kindred subjects like « vainglory », « self-love », etc. continue, as a matter of course, to swell the current literature¹⁴. The majority of these, however, are in French or German : what is more, they necessarily fail, by reason of their piecemeal and occasional character, to provide an adequate account of the topic in question. To our knowledge indeed, no unified and systematic analysis of pride and humility — themes ultimately inseparable within Augustine's thought — has yet appeared in any language. Here is a fact that gives ever-increasing point to Dr. Green's challenge. In spite of inevitable omissions and sometimes tendentious views, his work still deserves consideration both because of its own qualities and because it highlights a problem (long overdue for further research) on which he himself first focused public attention. The present article is offered as a modest (and introductory) contribution to the advancement of such research.

Basic Notions : Being, Order, Society

St. Augustine's doctrine of pride can be understood and expounded only within the framework of his own particular notion of « society ». Elucidation of this cardinal concept will appear below at the appropriate point. Suffice it here to say that for him, « society » means an ascending and progressively more complex series of units which, at least on a preliminary basis, we may list as follows :

- a) the rational creature
- b) the family
- c) the state, or body civic
- d) the human race
- e) the Society of God (*civitas Dei*)
- f) the Catholic Church
- g) the Devil's Society (*civitas diaboli*).

12. C. A. OBERSTAR, *Sancti Aurelii Augustini Doctrina de Vitio capitali Superbiae* (it was published in 1940 in Ljubljana).

13. This work appeared (1953) in Toulouse, France. Together with it we should here mention a thesis by J. MUSINSKY, *The Humility Of Christ In The Thought Of St. Augustine*, Gregorian University, Rome, 1947, which to date has seemingly not been published.

14. E.g. for 'pride' (*orgueil*) consult *Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique*, Paris, Letouzey, 1931, vol. 11, pp. 1410-34. 'Vainglory' (*gloire, vaine gloire*) is discussed in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité*, fasc. XXXIX-XL, Paris, 1965, pp. 494-509 ; and for 'self-love' (*amour-propre*) see *ibid.* vol. 1, Paris, 1937, pp. 533-44. 'Humility' (*humilité*) is treated in *Rev. d'Apolog. et de Mystique*, Sept. 1952, pp. 208-23 ; *ibid.* no. 121 (1955), pp. 28-46, and *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité*, 1968, cols. 1135-88.

According to Augustine, universal history commences at the moment when the world was created from nothingness. This event might be properly said to mark the beginning of time, as distinct from eternity¹⁵. In the case of (a) above, the creative process involves a « conversion » from self to Creator¹⁶ and a « formation » in harmony with the order of each¹⁷. *Ordo* (order) is again one of Augustine's key-terms, as our title suggests, and all that will follow therefore presupposes a knowledge of what it connotes^{17a}.

A study of the texts would indicate that *ordo* seems to bear at times an objective, « dynamic » or active sense, and sometimes a subjective, « static » or passive sense. In fact, of course, the two uses are strictly co-relative, the first always implying the second. Let us illustrate from Augustine himself who writes : (*Deus*) *naturas essentialium gradibus ordinavit*¹⁸. This passage stresses the role of God as the *Agent* and

15. *De civ. Dei* XI, 6 ; *PL* 41, 322 : « ...procul dubio non est mundus factus in tempore, sed cum tempore... » Cf. *de Gen. ad litt. imp.* 3, 8 ; *PL* 34, 223 ; *de Gen. c. Man.* I, 2, 3 ; *PL* 34, 175.

16. *De duab. an.* 8, 10 ; *PL* 42, 102 : « ...converti autem ad Deum nemo, nisi ab hoc mundo se avertat, potest. » Augustine also uses this word in the sense of 'turning' to creatures as the climax and term of a previous 'aversion' from God. *De civ. Dei* XII, 6 ; *PL* 41, 353 : « (angeli) ...ab illo (Deo) aversi ad se ipsos conversi sunt... » For the Biblical background here see e.g. *Isaias* 46, 8 ; *Luke* 17, 4 ; *Acts* 26, 18, and also A. H. DIRKSEN, *The New Testament Notion Of Metanoia*. The inter-related ideas of « rebirth » (παλιγγενεσία), « renewal » (ἀνακαινώσις) and « moral change » or « reformation » (μετάνοια) are all involved in « conversion » as understood by St. Paul, Augustine's chief source : *Rom.* 12, 2 ; *II Corinth.* 3, 18 ; *Ephes.* 4, 22-24 ; *Coloss.* 3, 10. The classical Greek concepts of μετάνοια and ἐπιστροφή are discussed in *Goett. Gelehrte Anzeigen* 175, 1915, 589 ff. as well as in W. JAEGER, *Paidéia*, II, 295 ff., 417, ff., and A. D. NOCK, *Conversion*, pp. 179 ff. ; 296. For Plotinian parallels cf. *Enn.* V, 1, 1 ; also *ibid.* III, 7, 11.

17. *De Gen. ad litt.* I, 9, 15 ; *PL* 34, 252.

17a. « Order » (τάξις, *ordo*) is a leading principle not merely in the Platonic and neo-Platonic philosophical schools, but in Graeco-Roman thought as a whole. There can be little doubt that Augustine's own doctrine owes much in its expression and colouring to this source. He himself states, however, that he found it in Scripture (cf. *de lib. arb.* II, 11, 30-31), and his criticism of prevailing classical notions of « fate » and « fortune » shows how profoundly he modified the pagan view in his interpretation of the notion of Divine Providence as the supreme cause and order in the universe (*de civ. Dei* V, 1-11). That form of « fatalism » illustrated by the frequent resort to astrology is condemned. Every concatenation of causes which appears to influence or determine a given event operates under the ultimate will of God. CICERO, VARRO (TESELLE, *op. cit.* p. 47 and refs.) and PLOTINUS would seem to have been the sources whence our author derived his understanding of the classical concept of order. Cf. *CIC. de div.* I, 125 ; see also *de nat. deor.* II, 36-51. For PLOTINUS, cf. *Enn.* IV, 3, 16. Porphyry is also a possible source : cf. W. THEILER, *Porphyrios und Augustinus, Schriften der Koenigsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft*, X, 1, Halle, 1933, pp. 17, ff. But there is no need to elaborate this hypothesis in view of the evidence favouring Augustine's use of Cicero, Varro and Plotinus. Finally, it is also useful to consult P. A. SCHUBERT: *Augustins Lex-Aeterna-Lehre*, Münster i.W., 1924, pp. 21-23, 40-43.

18. *De civ. Dei* XII, 2 ; *PL* 41, 350.

Giver in the operation, and is thus an example of the « dynamic » sense^{18a}. The second, or passive use, lays emphasis upon the *recipient* in the transaction, and what is received : *iustum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima*¹⁹. Meanwhile, both senses appear to be simultaneously present in St. Augustine's phrase : *ordo rerum* (universal order), that is, a hierarchy of relationships embracing the entire created universe from the lowest level of inanimate being to the immortal angelic spirits, as representing the highest rank among rational essences²⁰. The word *ordinatio* also occurs in his works, where it denotes either the Divine act of « ordering » all creation or the act whereby intellectual creatures themselves conform to their own « order ». *Inordinatio*, (*perversio*, *corruptio*) on the other hand signifies for him either an attempted violation of such order or the condition of « disorder » resulting therefrom²¹. St. Augustine uses the phrase *ordo noster (suus)*, « individual human order », to designate the order prescribed for man within himself as a composite creature, in his use of temporal goods, in dealing with fellow men, and finally, in his relation to God²². As Plotinus and the neo-Platonists generally had done, so too Augustine distinguishes between the intelligible world (*omne intelligibile*) and the world of sense and matter (*omne sensibile*). To the first belong purely spiritual beings, i.e. the angels and the human soul, while the second includes the body as the seat of physical life in creatures generally²³. Thus in the Bishop's thought we find a cosmic structure which rising from the inanimate through life to intelligence, finds its apex in God the Creator : First, and highest Essence, Life, and Wisdom (*prima vita, prima sapientia, prima essentia*²⁴). To terminate this part of our discussion, we may remark that the notions of « order » and « disorder » as mutually opposed « tendencies » in respect of being, clearly indicate that for Augustine, these key-words designate 'dynamisms', i.e. forces in motion^{24a}. Rather than an aggregation of relatively stable metaphysical essences, he therefore views the created world as the theatre of a perpetual clash, an unending tension between

18a. *De ord.* I, 10, 28 ; *PL* 32, 991 : « Ordo est per quem aguntur omnia quae Deus constituit. » Cf. *DIOG. LAERT.* VII, 149 ; and *CIC. de div.* I, 55, 125 ; *PLOTINUS, Enn.* III, 1, 1.

19. *De lib. arb.* I, 6, 15 ; *PL* 32, 1229.

20. *De ord.* I, 1, 1 ; *PL* 32, 977 ; *de mus.* VI, 14, 46 ; *ibid.* col. 1187. *De act. cum Fel. Man.* II, 4 ; *PL* 42, 538. Cf. *ep.* 140, 2, 4 ; *PL* 33, 539 ; *de civ. Dei* XI, 16 ; *PL* 41, 331.

21. *De mor.* II, 5, 7-6, 8 ; *PL* 32, 1347-48.

22. See fn. 20, above, second ref. (*ad fin.*).

23. *De ord.* II, 19, 51 ; *PL* 32, 1019 ; *Retr.* I, 3, 2 ; *ibid.* col. 588. Cf. *de mor.* I, 12, 20 ; *ibid.* col. 1320.

24. *De vera rel.* 31, 57 ; *PL* 34, 147.

24a. *De div. quaest.* 83, 35 ; *PL* 40, 23 « ... amor motus quidam est, neque ullus amor nisi ad aliquid ». Cf. *enarr. in ps.* 122, 1 ; *PL* 37, 1629 : « Omnis amor aut ascendit aut descendit. » *Ep.* 155, 4, 13 ; *PL* 33, 671-72 ; *enarr. in ps.* 31, 11, 5 ; *PL* 36, 260. For *amor* as a force or power see below, fn. 245 (last two refs.).

contrary and irreconcilable principles. Of these the most important in our author's thought include being and non-being, the eternal and the temporal, the spiritual and the physical, immutability and the mutable, unity and plurality. For him, then, the fact of creation itself argues the existence of an omnipresent hierarchy comprising creatures so variously disposed that even human reason can recognize them as 'superior' or 'inferior', etc. according to their individual 'modes'. Finally, within the structure of *ordo* (as adapted by Augustine from classical sources), we wish to emphasize one of its major characteristics — the concept of 'governance', no less deeply rooted in the permanent tradition of Graeco-Roman philosophy²⁵.

We next consider the general attributes of being, the universal substrate of reality (and therefore of order), as found in God, Himself the Author of all that is. According to St. Augustine these include unity and simplicity, changelessness, eternity, truth and goodness. With regard to the nature of being in creatures, things both *are* and *are not*, since while they have been created by God, they are not *what* He is²⁶. Thus the Bishop ascribes to creatures a sort of mutability — the result of their creation from nothingness²⁷. Now « being » and « ontological goodness » are reciprocal terms : this goodness furthermore includes the endowments of « mode, « species », and « order »²⁸. Order, which in its widest sense presupposes mode and species, or form, now emerges as a fitting arrangement or disposition of things equal and unequal whereby each is assigned its proper place²⁹. As such, *ordo* expresses and is actually commensurate with the degree of unity, and therefore of being, intelligibility, beauty, and goodness possible for creatures. « Disorder » is formally opposed to « order » because it connotes disunity

25. The following are some basic refs : PLATO, *Phaed.* 80^a ; ARISTOTLE, *Polit.* I, 1254^b ; PLOTINUS, *Enn.* I, 1, 4 ; CICERO, *de offic.* I, XXIII, 79 ; SENECA, the Philosopher, *ep. moral.* 114, 23-24. St. Augustine's own understanding and adaptation of this concept are summarized in his *Enarratio in psalmum* 145, 5 ; *PL* 37, 1887 : « rationalis anima... legem accepit, haerere superiori, regere inferiorem. » Cf. *de act. cum Fel. Man.* II, 4 ; *PL* 42, 538 : « ... animam habentem liberum arbitrium, sub se ipso et super caetera collocavit ; ut si serviret superiori, dominaretur inferiori... »

26. *Conf.* VII, 11, 17 ; *PL* 32, 742 : « Et inspexi caetera infra te, et vidi nec omnino esse, nec omnino non esse : esse quidem, quoniam abs te sunt ; non esse autem, quoniam id quod es non sunt. »

27. *De nat. bon.* 1 ; *PL* 42, 551 : « ... si solus ipse (Deus) incommutabilis, omnia quae fecit, quia ex nihilo fecit, mutabilia sunt. »

28. *De doct. chr.* I, 32, 35 ; *PL* 34, 32 : « Quia enim bonus est (Deus), sumus ». *De civ. Dei* V, 11 ; *PL* 41, 153 : « ... (Deus) a quo est omnis species, omnis ordo... »

29. *De nat. bon.* 8 ; *PL* 42, 554 : « Caetera... quae sunt facta de nihilo... pro modo et specie... ordinata sunt ». *De mor.* II, 6 ; 8-9 ; *PL* 32, 1348-49, and especially *de civ. Dei* XIX, 13, 1 ; *PL* 41, 640 : « Ordo ad convenientiam quamdam quod ordinat redigit... concordia partium imitantur unitatem... »

and complexity, a « tendency » to non-being, unintelligibility, ugliness and — in one word — evil³⁰.

As already stated, Augustine teaches that God's creative act implies both formation and conversion. Things begin to exist, that is, when they receive a « form ». Now formation involves a reduction to unity³¹. This again involves not only resemblance between the component parts of creatures but upon the latter's likeness to God and their participation in the Word, Who by His conversion to the Father is also the Father's perfect Image³². All these conditions of existence are fulfilled when creatures imitate the Word by turning to Him, and in so doing, receive a form — the principle of unity, being and singularity. The formation of rational essences (angelic and human) further includes « illumination », since their perfection demands that they be given the light of wisdom and virtue³³.

Ultimately, « order » originates within the Triune Godhead Itself, for the Holy Ghost unites the Father and the Son in a self-subsistent Love which is both the Model and Source of all creaturely order and love³⁴. The inclination of lower creatures to seek their proper place might be called « weight » or « gravity », and — in the case of rational beings — love, or the will, upon which not merely man's appetitive life but the entire domain of his intellect is based³⁵. Reason is also required to discern the hierarchy of ends postulated by order. The order of

30. *De vera rel.* 30, 55 ; *PL* 34, 146. *De Gen. ad litt. imp.* 16, 59 ; *PL* 34, 243 : « ... tanto est pulchrius corpus, quanto similioribus inter se partibus suis constat. » *De mor.* II, 6, 8 ; *PL* 32, 1348 : « Quidquid corrumpitur, eo tendit ut non sit. Iam vestrum est considerare quo cogat corruptio, ut possitis invenire summum malum : nam id est quo corruptio perducere nititur ».

31. *De Gen. c. Man.* I, 12, 18 ; *PL* 34, 181 : « Omnis forma ad unitatis regulam cogitur. »

32. *De vera rel.* 30, 55 ; *PL* 34, 146. *De Gen. ad litt. imp.* 16, 57 ; *PL* 34, 242 : « Quapropter etiam similitudo Dei, per quam facta sunt omnia, proprie dicitur similitudo, quia non participatione alicuius similitudinis similis est, sed ipsa est prima similitudo, cuius participatione similia sunt, quaecumque per illam fecit Deus. » See also *de vera rel.* 36, 66 ; *PL* 34, 151-52.

33. *De Gen. ad litt.* I, 4, 9 ; *PL* 34, 249 ; *de Trin.* XV, 7, 11 ; *PL* 42, 1065 : « Quapropter singulus quisque homo, qui non secundum omnia quae ad naturam pertinent eius, sed secundum solam mentem imago Dei dicitur, una persona est, et imago est Trinitatis in mente. » *De Gen. ad litt.* I, 5, 10 ; *PL* 34, 250 : « Formatur autem conversa (creatura spiritualis) ad incommutabile lumen Sapientiae, Verbum Dei. »

34. *De Trin.* VI, 10, 12 ; *PL* 42, 932.

35. *Enarr. in ps.* 29, *enarr.* 2, 10 ; *PL* 36, 222 : « Pondus...est impetus quidam cuiusque rei velut onantis ad locum suum...Pondus (est) motus quasi spontaneus, sine anima, sine sensu...Locum enim suum quaerit, ordinari quaerit. » Cf. *Conf.* XIII, 9, 10 ; *PL* 32, 848-49 : *de civ. Dei* XI, 28 ; *PL* 41, 342 : « Ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur, quocumque fertur. » For a similar doctrine in *Plotinus*, see *Enn.* IV, 8, 2. *De mus.* VI, 11, 29 ; *PL* 32, 1179 : « Delectatio quippe quasi pondus est animae. Delectatio ergo ordinat animam. » The dominant influence of the will (even in intellectual operations) is noted in *de Trin.* IX, 12, 18 ; *PL* 42, 972.

moral finality dominates all others, because in no matter how many orders things participate, if they are not rightly ordered towards their end, i.e. their appointed place — which, in man's case, is God — they are not ordered at all³⁶. Now within man himself there exists a dual order, whose immediate ends comprise soul and body. For the soul it is proper to contemplate wisdom, using the « superior » reason. If, however, the whole man pursues sensory objects alone, by means of the « inferior » reason, he « de-forms » the image of the Trinity in his own soul. But through repentance, through the Wisdom that is Christ and through theocentric love, the sinner may « re-form » himself to the same Divine image³⁷.

We now turn to St. Augustine's notion of order in society³⁸ — the more immediate context of our problem. One of his preferred terms to designate both any given secular state and the two great mystical Societies is *civitas*³⁹, a word that with him retains much of its Graeco-Roman flavour. To this, however, he adds the idea of a community transcending space and time in its foundation, membership and destiny. But the « state » as understood by him is not merely a *civitas* : he also calls it

36. *De ord.* I, 9, 27 ; *PL* 32, 990 : « Ordo est quem si tenuerimus in vita, perducet ad Deum ; et quem nisi tenuerimus in vita, non pervenimus ad Deum. » Cf. the *rectissimus finis* postulated as man's Final End in *de mor.* II, 13, 28 ; *PL* 32, 1357.

37. *De Trin.* XII, 4, 4 ; *PL* 42, 1000. Cf. PLOTINUS' similar distinction in *Enn.* V, 3, 2. For « de-formation » see *de Trin.* VII, 3, 5 ; *PL* 42, 938 : and for « re-formation », i.e. « conversion » to Christ, the Wisdom of God, *ibid.* VII, 3, 4-5 : *ibid.* cols. 937-38 ; also below, fn. 221.

38. P. 230, above.

39. Three major meanings of '*civitas*' may be distinguished : first, a body of citizens considered collectively as members of a political organisation : *Cic. de republ.* VI, 13, 13 ; *M. Tull. Cic. Scripta quae manserunt omnia, Bibliotheca Teubneriana*, vol. 121, p. 127, 11. 2-4 : « ...concilia coetusque hominum iure sociati, quae civitates appellantur. » Cf. *de civ. Dei* I, 15, 2 ; *PL* 41, 29 : « ...aliud civitas non (est) quam concors hominum multitudo. » Secondly, the word signifies a 'state' or 'community', i.e. a unit of political association organized in accordance with some distinctive principle of authority and order : *Caes. bell. gall.* I, 12 ; *C. Iul. Caes. Comm.* ed. A. Klotz, *Bibliotheca Teubneriana*, I, 8, 11. 7-8 : « ...omnis civitas Helvetia in quattuor partes vel pagos divisa est. » Cf. *de civ. Dei* XIX, 21, 2 ; *PL* 41, 649 : « ...iniustum esse ut homines hominibus dominantibus serviant ; quam tamen iniustitiam nisi sequatur imperiosa civitas... non eam posse provinciis imperare. » In A.D. 212, by enacting the *Constitutio Antoniniana*, Caracalla extended Roman citizenship to all the *peregrini* in the Roman Empire, the *dediticii* being alone excepted. For *dediticii*, consult PAULY-WISSOWA, *Real-Encyclopaedie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Stuttgart, 1933, IV^a, cols. 2359-2363 ; for *peregrinus* see *ibid.* XIX^a, cols. 639-655. Finally, *civitas* connotes 'citizenship' : *The Cambridge Ancient History*, VII, 415 : The *caput* of a Roman citizen was the sum of the rights which he enjoyed in virtue of his birth. These ... (were) defined as 'citizenship'... (*civitas*), etc. » See also S. KATZ, *The Decline of Rome*, pp. 29-30, 141. But in the two great mystical Societies, 'citizenship' depends upon a deliberate act of free will ultimately involving the acceptance or rejection of Divine grace : *de cat. rud.* 19, 31 ; *PL* 40, 333 : « ...duae... civitates ...nunc permixtae corporibus, sed voluntatibus separatae... »

a *societas*⁴⁰, viz. a « fellowship » or « society ». In analysing Roman political theory, Augustine encounters the view that justice is the specifying principle of a commonwealth. This opinion he denies : since true justice cannot exist where God does not receive His due, pagan Rome and its people *are not*⁴¹. To avoid the difficulty, thus created, of refusing to accept the historical « givenness » of Rome as a genuine state, our author proposes love as the constitutive bond of a society⁴². And because such love makes a community not only one, but also distinct from all others, it follows that there are as many societies as there are collective loves. Again, to know the object of a people's love is to know that people itself⁴³. In fact, however, only two basic loves exist⁴⁴ : the love of God, characterizing the Society of God : and the self-love characteristic of the Devil's Society⁴⁵. God is thus the Final End (no less than the First Principle) of a hierarchy of loves embracing a man's relationships with material objects, his fellows and his Maker.

40. *De civ. Dei* XV, 1, 1 ; *PL* 41, 437 : « ...quas etiam mystice appellamus civitates duas, hoc est duas societates hominum... » Cf. *Cic. de republ.* I, 32, 49 ; *de republica*, *Bibliotheca Teubneriana*, it. rec. K. Ziegler, Leipzig, 1929, 12 ; p. 29, ll. 23-24 : « quid est enim civitas nisi iuris societas ? »

41. *De civ. Dei* XIX, 21, 1 ; *PL* 41, 648 : « Breviter enim rem publicam definit (Scipio) esse rem populi... Populum enim esse definiuit coetum multitudinis, iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatum. » Cf. *Cic. de republ.* I, 25-39 ; *Bibliotheca Teubneriana*, it. rec. K. Ziegler, Leipzig, 1929, 23, 11. 62-63, 24, 11. 1-2. *De civ. Dei* XIX, 21, 1 ; *PL* 41, 648-49 : « ...ubi non est vera iustitia... non potest esse... populus... et si non populus, nec res populi, sed qualiscumque multitudinis, quae populi nomine digna non est. »

42. *Ibid.* XIX, 24 ; *ibid.* col. 655 : « Populus est coetus multitudinis rationalis, rerum quas diligit concordia communione sociatus. » Belief in love as the commanding energy and mainspring of man's intellectual life (no less than of his emotions) can be traced back as far as PLATO : cf. *Leges* X, 904^e.

43. *De doct. chr.* I, 29, 30 ; *PL* 34, 30 ; *de civ. Dei* XIX, 24 ; *PL* 41, 655 : « ...ut videatur qualis quisque populus sit, illa sunt intuenda, quae diligit. » *Enarr. in ps.* 64, 2 ; *PL* 36, 773 : « Interroget ergo se quisque quid amet, et inveniet unde sit civis. »

44. These two loves, reduced to their simplest form, can be defined as the love of what is good and, as its contrary, the love of evil. And because each individual represents all mankind as a homogeneous element thereof (*de civ. Dei* IV, 3 ; *PL* 41, 114), and so, in a sense the two Societies comprising it, the two basic loves may even occur in one and the same person : *ibid.* XI, 28 ; *PL* 41, 341-42 : « Est enim et amor, quo amator et quod amandum non est : et istum amorem odit in se, qui illum diligit, quo id amator quod amandum est. Possunt enim ambo esse in uno homine... » For the homogeneity of the human race cf. *de civ. Dei* XII, 9, 2 ; *PL* 41, 357 : « Ex uno quippe homine, quem primum Deus condidit, genus humanum sumpsit exordium... » The classical concept of two basic, mutually exclusive loves is found in PLATO, *Phaedr.* 246^b ; 256^{b-d}, and PLOTINUS : *Enn.* III, 5, 1 ; 2-3.

45. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 28 ; *PL* 41, 436 : « Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, coelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui. » Man's *contemptus sui* is based upon true self-knowledge : of himself, he *is* and *has* nothing, except his sins. His being and all other blessings come from God : *enarr. in ps.* 70, *serm.* I, 1 ; *PL* 36, 874 ; *serm.* 137, 4, 4 ; *PL* 38, 756.

This explains Augustine's definition of love as *ordo amoris* (the order of love)⁴⁶.

Accepting the above, we can perhaps more readily appreciate that the ultimate framework of our central inquiry, in transcending the merely local and particular, is actually co-extensive with the span of universal history itself. Now while the angels live in the eternal world, they were created—like man—in time. Viewed against the background of its origins, «history» is thus in essence a temporal thrust, a linear prolongation of «society» on the march to eternity. Mankind is Adam (its progenitor and prototype) «writ large»^{46a}: human experience merely repeats and generalizes his own. So envisaged, our problem ranges from the earliest beginnings, nature and effects of pride among the angels and in the persons of the first man and his wife to include its consequences for the human race at large. These topics, in the order given, are the subject-matter of four sections, a fifth (and final one) being devoted to the remedies for pride.

THE ORIGIN AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIDE WITHIN THE ANGELIC CREATION

Basic Definitions

Due both to the digressive character of his own expository procedure as well as to the far-reaching complexity of the notion itself, few of the definitions of pride offered by Augustine immediately suggest the amplitude of meaning that he attaches to this vice. For the above reasons, we shall follow him as he describes its appearance, first in the ranks of the angelic society, and then in the persons of Eve and Adam. Now in discussing the Biblical doctrine of pride, St. Augustine introduces one particular verse so frequently that his comments upon it seem indicated as the initial subject-matter of our study. In the text which he himself used, the verse reads: *initium omnis peccati superbia*⁴⁷ (of all sin, pride

46. *De civ. Dei* XV, 22; *PL* 41, 467: «Unde mihi videtur, quod definitio brevis et vera virtutis, Ordo est amoris.» Cf. *ibid.* col. 467: «Nam et amor ipse ordinate amandus est, quo bene amatur quod amandum est, ut sit in nobis virtus qua vivitur bene.» *De div. quaest.* 83, 35, 1; *PL* 40, 23: «Nihil enim aliud est amare, quam propter se ipsam rem aliquam appetere.»

46a. Cf. *enarr. in ps.* 95, 15; *PL* 37, 1236.

47. *Ecclus.* 10, 15. All available evidence would indicate that the text here used by St. Augustine corresponds to the Latin version or versions of the Bible translated from the Septuagint and current in his day. *De civ. Dei* XVIII, 43; *PL* 41, 603: «Ex hac Septuaginta interpretatione etiam in Latinam linguam interpretatam est, quod ecclesiae Latinae tenent.» Cf. *de doct. chr.* II, 15, 22; *PL* 34, 46. Some of these old texts have been collected in P. SABATIER, *Bibliorum Sacrorum latinae*

is the beginning). While, as we shall see, our author extracts many varied meanings from the above passage, he is especially concerned to establish the primacy of pride in universal history, since it was the first sin both of angels and of men⁴⁸. Further to illustrate the foregoing definition, Augustine compares it with St. Paul's aphorism : the love of money is a root from which every kind of evil springs. The vice in question (*avaritia*) may be understood either literally in its usual sense or interpreted more broadly as a disordered desire to win superiority over others⁴⁹. The malice involved lies in the fact that by placing creature before Creator, the « avaricious » man offends against Divine justice⁵⁰. Let us note that the whole trend of St. Augustine's argument here is to define the root of all evils in terms of « avarice » precisely because inordinate appetite precedes every offence against God's justice. For our author, therefore, such a vice is, in both nature and effects, actually equivalent to pride, which as « the beginning of all sin » must necessarily be reckoned the « source » (*caput*) of « avarice » itself⁵¹.

In comparing these two sins, Augustine goes on to state that the mainspring of « avaricious » self-love is a desire to « surpass » or « excel » others⁵². Elsewhere in the same work he incorporates this aspect

versiones antiquae seu Velus Italica, III. An excellent modern edition has been published by A. JUELICHER, *Itala, Das Neue Testament in altlateinischer Uebersetzung*, I, II. The original Hebrew version, always excluded from the Jewish canon, was only rediscovered at the end of the last century and critically edited by R. SMEND in 1906 : *Die Weisheit des Jesus Sirach, hebraeisch und deutsch*. This book was left untouched by JEROME in his revision of the Old Testament ; see his preface : (PL 29, 427-28) « porro in... libro... Ecclesiastico... calamo temperavi ». The fact however remains that Augustine's text is not supported by the original Hebrew, which appears to mean : « the overflow or excess (*miquerveh*) of pride is sin ». For the Greek MSS, see H. B. SWETE, *The Old Testament In Greek According to The Septuagint*, II, 663, where, among other readings, « ἀρχὴ ὑπερηφανίας ἀμαρτία » is attested. A good introduction and general background to the present topic may be found in A. ROBERT, A. TRICOT, *Guide to The Bible* (2 vols.), especially I, pp. 637-41 ; 643-52 ; 674. For invaluable help as regards translations, etc. in the above, I was, and remain, indebted both to the Rev. R. MacKenzie, S.J., D.S.S., Professor of Old Testament Scripture at the Jesuit Seminary, Toronto, Ont., Canada, and the Rev. J.-P. Audet, O.P., Professor of Sacred Scripture at the Dominican House of Studies, Ottawa, Ont., Canada (1958).

48. *De civ. Dei* XII, 1, 2 ; PL 41, 349. *Ibid.* XXII, 24 ; *ibid.* col. 784.

49. *De Gen. ad litt.* XI, 15, 19 ; PL 34, 436-37 : « Merito initium omnis peccati superbiam Scriptura definivit, dicens : *initium omnis peccati superbia*. Cui testimonio non inconvenienter aptatur etiam illud quod Apostolus ait, *Radix omnium malorum est avaritia*, si avaritiam generalem intelligamus, quo quisque appetit aliquid amplius quam oportet, propter excellentiam suam, et quendam propriae rei amorem... (illae generalis avaritiae) superbia caput est... » For the Scriptural ref. see I *Tim.* 6, 10.

50. *De civ. Dei* XII, 8 ; PL 41, 355 : « Neque enim auri vitium est avaritia, sed hominis perverse amantis aurum iustitia derelicta, quae incomparabiliter auro debuit anteponi. » Cf. *enarr. in ps.* 136, 13 ; PL 37, 1769.

51. See above, fn. 49.

52. The ' avaricious ' man seeks everything *propter excellentiam* (fn. 49, above).

of pride into a formal definition : *amor excellentiae propriae*⁵³. The term *excellencia* appears to retain in his thought its classical meaning of « pre-eminence », « superlative achievement »⁵⁴. As such, this disposition clearly cannot be accounted a vice. Rather, its moral quality will vary from case to case in direct relationship with the ultimate cause, motive or object involved. But as regards *superbia*, the language of the two separate passages just compared leaves no doubt about the nature of the appetite at stake : *propriae rei amor* ; *amor excellentiae propriae*. These definitions, then, confirm the fact that the « love » or « will » characterizing Satan and his angels is above all else a « love of self ». Now the « excellence » activating the pride of the wicked angels could not have expressed itself as a desire for goods or possessions in any material sense. For Augustine declares, in accordance with the account of creation given by the *Book of Genesis*, that the angels were created before all things⁵⁵. Nor, on the other hand, could the object desired have been evil in itself, since the angels were endowed with the wisdom and goodness befitting the relative perfection of their nature⁵⁶. It follows that the « excellence » sought by them must have been concerned with a spiritual good. St. Augustine himself in fact states that this « excellence » was beatitude — a good in its own right because to achieve true happiness is to win permanent peace and repose — ends proper to every creature possessed of reason⁵⁸. The object being such, the disorder necessarily lay in these angels' « wills » (*voluntates*) or « lusts » (*cupiditates*). They indeed aspired to happiness, but they attempted to achieve it by inordinate love or « avarice ». Now this love was disordered precisely because it sought the angelic excellence through the self alone. In effect, therefore, Satan and his followers willed to place « private » and individual good, i.e. personal happiness and well-being, before the Good That is Common to all (*superior communis omnium beatificum bonum*) and in Whom these benefits can alone be obtained and preserved.

By so acting, the apostate angels virtually exalted the status of a creature, understood as a self-contained and independent principle of being, to the level of its Creator. In other words, they strove to secure beatitude through the exercise of their own unaided power (*potestas*). The disorder thus involved was a violation of love viewed as justice, a virtue which demands that each receive his due in accordance with

53. *De Gen. ad litt.* XI, 14, 18 ; *PL* 34, 436.

54. Cf. *Cic. Topica* II, 13, 55.

55. *De Gen. ad litt.* V, 19, 37 ; *PL* 34, 334 ; *de civ. Dei* XI, 32 ; *PL* 41, 345.

56. Augustine speaks of their *certissima veritas* : *ibid.* XII, 1, 2 ; *ibid.* col. 349 : « Beatitudinis igitur illorum (of the good angels) causa est adhaerere Deo ; quocirca istorum (of the bad angels) miseriae causa ex contrario est intelligenda, quod est non adhaerere Deo. » Cf. *ibid.* XII, 6 (*ad init.*) *ibid.* col. 353.

58. *De Trin.* XIII, 20, 25 ; *PL* 42, 1034 : « Beatos esse se velle, omnium hominum est, »

the hierarchy of being and goodness. This order the wicked angels subverted by contempt for a Power more exalted and more just than themselves. The desire for power here in question (*perversus amor potestatis suae*⁵⁹) is, be it noted, a strictly logical consequent of the characteristics of Augustinian pride so far noted. For the ability to become one's own source of being, or one's own law and judge of moral behaviour, depends in the last resort upon « liberty », viz. complete personal independence allied with an irresponsible power of choice and action.

Satan and his pride, although but a special instance of the wicked angels in general, merit closer attention, and for two reasons. To begin with, he was the first in both time and rank of the angelic creation to reveal in his own person the consequences of this vice upon the rational creature. Secondly, it was his temptation of Eve which paved the way for the fall of Adam, the father of the human race⁶⁰. All the principal marks and aspects of *superbia* already noted are discernible to a pre-eminent degree in the Devil. His spiritual degradation occurred as the result of a « turning away » from God to his own self⁶¹. For he prized the pleasures of a despotic rule over others far above creaturely subjection to His Maker. An imitation of God's omnipotence was in fact the most characteristic feature of the pride that he exhibited⁶². To conclude, and in summary, Satan's perverse love of self equates with 'pride' precisely because its first moment comprises an « aversion » of the will from God to self, and therefore from good to evil, and from « order » to « disorder » in the latter's most complete and formal sense⁶³. For pride, which is the beginning of all sin, is also the beginning of an evil will, since an evil will preceded the first sin⁶⁴.

A primary Problem : To explain the Appearance of Disorder within the original Perfection of angelic Nature

We have discussed the nature and object of pride as manifest in Satan and the other fallen angels. At this point, two questions suggest themselves as worthy of consideration. In the first place, given a Creator of supreme goodness and power, and given also the original perfection of the angelic nature, how does St. Augustine explain even the possibility

59. *De civ. Dei* XII, 8 ; *PL* 41, 356.

60. *Ibid.* XIV, 11, 2-14 ; *ibid.* cols. 419-22.

61. *Ibid.* XIV, 11, 2 ; *ibid.* col. 419 : « ...superbus ille angelus... a Deo ad semetipsum conversus... »

62. *Enarr. in ps.* 70, *serm.* 27, *PL* 36, 896 : « ...imitari Deum voluit (diabolus), sed perverse ; non esse sub illius potestate, sed habere contra illum potestatem. »

63. See below, fn. 77.

64. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 13 ; *PL* 41, 420.

of disorder among the Devil's followers ? Secondly, if we assume for the sake of the argument that such disorder was not merely possible but that it in fact occurred, why — according to Augustine — did their primary and characteristic vice take the form of pride ? Let us begin with the second question, because the solution to it is implicit in what has already been established. For once we grant, with Augustine himself, that the immediate object or end coveted by the Devil and his fellow-angels was innocent, it follows that the disorder involved lay, and could of necessity only have lain in their mode of desire. Now the essential perversity of this desire is defined by the fact that its object was a spiritual good sought apart from and independently of God in the exclusive interests of self. But this vice is identical with the disorder of pride which, as we have just seen, Augustine qualifies precisely as « a love of personal excellence ». In the light of what has preceded, his reply to our second query would clearly be that assuming the conditions of their creation as he describes them, the wicked angels sinned through pride because they could have sinned in no other way.

This solution however still leaves unresolved the first and greater of the two problems raised above, that is, how it was possible for the angels to commit sin of any kind. The answer here lies in a reconsideration of the elements necessary for the performance of a moral act, i.e. an act which can be qualified as either in order or disorder with regard to some particular end, and ultimately to God as Final End. These ingredients of the moral act are, as we have previously seen, reason and the will, or love. Now St. Augustine's doctrine of the will can be summarized in two statements of fact, the first of which is that it controls and directs the entire domain of cognition no less than the affective life in general⁶⁵. Secondly, the will is by definition free⁶⁶. As Augustine views the problem, this « freedom » of moral choice and responsibility was given to rational creatures that they might gain a merited reward, or suffer punishment, according as their will — with Divine help — remained firm, or wavered. But there was a second reason for the gift, namely that the Creator might shew both the immense evil which flows from pride and the even greater good that flows from His grace⁶⁷. This, then, is Augustine's answer to our first question : it was possible for the angels to sin — and the Devil and his followers did in fact sin — because like all intellectual beings they had the power of free will, i.e. the power of choosing between good and evil. Our author's account of angelic pride thus once more underlines the all-important role of volition in the exercise of the moral act ; for without the will there can be no

65. See above, fn. 35.

66. *De duab. an.* 10, 14 ; *PL* 42, 104 : « Voluntas est animi motus, *cogente nullo, ad aliquid vel non amittendum, vel adipiscendum* (italics added). » As regards the bearing of this definition upon Augustine's view of original sin, see *Retr.* I, 15, 3.

67. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 26-27 ; *PL* 41, 434-35.

choice, and without choice in turn there is no moral responsibility. But his description suggests yet another and more searching question. This may be put as follow : granted that the wicked angels' pride was the inevitable outcome of an evil will (*mala uoluntas*), how does he explain the cause of such a will in creatures naturally good and created by a God of infinite goodness ? To this query Augustine replies that their evil will has no external cause ; it was, in other words, made evil by itself. The will becomes evil when, abandoning what is above, it turns to something inferior — that is, to an object of sense. Thus the evil lies in the actual « aversion », and not in the term of the movement. For such an object, however lowly, is nevertheless endowed with a relative goodness within its own order by reason of the very fact that it exists. Hence to try to discover the cause of an evil will is like trying to see darkness or hear silence. Things of this sort are known not through sensation but rather through the lack of sensory data : silence, for example, has no positive content ; it can only be defined as the absence of sound. The cause of the rebel spirits' « aversion » and of the evil will which produced it lies in their ontological instability : of this phenomenon the ultimate explanation is the fact that all things have been created from nothing⁶⁸.

THE ORIGIN AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIDE IN EVE AND ADAM

Basic Definitions

We next discuss the origin and nature of *superbia* as it appeared in the persons of Eve and Adam, the progenitors of the human race. For our author also attributes their loss of Paradise to this vice, thus equating it with the first or « original » sin among mankind⁶⁹. And here he introduces yet another basic definition of pride : *perversae celsitudinis appetitus*⁷⁰. Augustine further develops this notion of perverse grandeur by qualifying it as an act or movement wherein the soul « deserts » and « separates » itself from the Source of creaturely being and goodness. The purpose of such a movement is that the soul may in some fashion become both its own principle of power and final end. Far otherwise, however, is the consequence of a direct challenge to the Divine sovereignty, which actually results in « a fall to the depths of self » (*inclinatio ad se*

68. *Ibid.* XII, 6-7 ; *ibid.* cols. 353-55.

69. See above, fn. 48.

70. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 13, 1 ; *PL* 41, 420. Cf. *ibid.* XI, 33 ; *ibid.* col. 346 (*ad fin.*) : *Conf.* II, 6, 13 ; *PL* 32, 680 : « ...superbia celsitudinem imitatur ; cum tu sis unus super omnia Deus excelsus. »

ipsum). And this is so because by revolting from their Maker, men lose the true loftiness which union with Him, than Whom nothing is higher, can alone ensure⁷¹.

In exploring the marks of original human pride, we may observe that just as with the fallen angels, so too the happiness at which Adam aimed was related to a spiritual good, namely his own « excellence ». What was this excellence, and how — if at all — did it differ from that of the angels ? To reply in brief, it was beatitude. Now Adam had been commanded by God under pain of the loss of his conditional immortality to abstain from the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil⁷². According to Augustine, this prohibition was laid upon the first man not because the food could be considered evil *per se*, but as a reminder that like every creature, he was naturally subject to the Creator, and must therefore respect His power and conform to His law⁷³. But the serpent, through Eve, successfully tempted the guilty couple, persuading them to eat of the forbidden fruit. In this they made the bad choice of an object innocent *per se*, for what evil can be imputed to a desire consonant — both as regards object sought and degree of appetition involved — with a creature's modality ? But it was in the very act of proudly rejecting the Divine command, expressive of God's sovereign authority, that our first parents first betrayed a secret itch to acquire the Divine status which Satan had so cunningly offered them⁷⁴. A current proverb states that knowledge is power ; to Augustine also, Adam's pursuit of knowledge disclosed much more than mere intellectual curiosity. For behind this seemingly guileless desire lay a disordered lust for personal pre-eminence proceeding from and inextricably bound up with his refusal to accept the reality of Divine power and the order of justice⁷⁵. Such an attitude Augustine qualifies by the words *contemptus (Dei)*⁷⁶ — a technical phrase which significantly re-appears in the most elaborate and explicit of his formal definitions of the Devil's Society⁷⁷. Now Adam's

71. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 13, 1 ; *PL* 41, 421.

72. *Ibid.* XIV, 12 ; *ibid.* col. 420.

73. *De Gen. ad litt.* VIII, 6, 12 ; *PL* 34, 377.

74. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 13, 2 ; *PL* 41, 421-22.

75. *De Gen. ad litt.* VIII, 6, 12 ; *PL* 34, 377 : « ...primum ...et maximum vitium tumoris ad ruinam sua potestate velle uti, cuius vitii nomen est inobedientia. » Cf. *ep.* 118, 15 ; *PL* 33, 439. In St. Augustine's thought, the order of justice equates with the order of original human nature : *de civ. Dei* XIX, 4, 4 ; *PL* 41, 629 : « ...fit in ipso homine quidem iustus ordo naturae, ut anima subdatur Deo et animae caro, ac per hoc Deo et anima et caro... » For *tumor*, see below, fns. 86-89.

76. *In ep. Iohan. ad Parth. tr.* 4, 3 ; *PL* 35, 2006-07 : « ...contempsit Adam ...praeceptum Dei ...veluti in potestate sua esse cupiens et nolens subdi voluntati Dei... »

77. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 28 ; *PL* 41, 436 : « Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo ; terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, coelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui ». The correlatives *contemnere*, *contemptus*, belong to the vocabulary utilized by Augustine to describe the *summum bonum*, for which

contempt manifested itself externally in an act of disobedience to a specific prohibition. Does this entitle us to interpret the Bishop as teaching that disobedience is always and everywhere the result of pride? The answer would here seem to be in the negative. For Adam's audacious challenge to God's supremacy (like that of Satan), constitutes a special case, wherein disobedience = the overt and intentional rejection — arising from a morbid obsession with self-aggrandizement — of any and all imaginable precepts. As Augustine himself puts it : *praecedit ergo in voluntate hominis appetitus quidam propriae potestatis, ut fiat inobediens per superbiam*⁷⁸.

The anatomy of power has never failed to attract the attention and interest of thinkers who, from a purely speculative or scientific viewpoint, seek to understand man and his past by analysing the hidden springs of human conduct. A similar comment would be in order about those who desire to influence their contemporaries from religious, moral or philanthropic motives. Augustine quite definitely belongs in the second camp, despite both a marked flair for psychological delineation and an extraordinary sense of the continuity of purpose and function in basic socio-political structures widely separated by space, time and cultural dissimilarities. In all of these our author sees the power-principle at work, just as it has been since the first beginnings of recorded history. But what constitutes the ultimate goal or ambition of *homo terrenus* in his restless pursuit of self-sovereignty and lordship over others? St. Augustine finds the clue to this puzzle in the Serpent's deceitful promise : *eritis sicut dii*⁷⁹. Yet no rational creature can *become* God, i.e. assume the Divine nature either by an attempted transference or exchange of personal identities and attributes or simply by a « unilateral » act of apotheosis. It is, however, possible for a creature to *imitate* God, and this the Devil did, but perversely — that is, by seeking to oppose his own powers to the Divine supremacy⁸⁰.

The notion of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ was known in ancient Greek moral philosophy at least as early as Plato⁸¹, and Augustine himself pays express tribute to what he considers an outstanding instance of the very real achievements made in this field by the « Platonists »⁸². At the same time, his own understanding of the concept is derived, in the main, from the Biblical doctrine of creation. Now the *Book of Genesis* declares that Adam was created in both the « image » and the « likeness » of

see I. T. ESCHMANN : *A Thomistic Glossary of The Principle Of The Pre-eminence Of A Common Good*, in *Mediaeval Studies*, V, Toronto, 1943, pp. 124-36.

78. *De pecc. mer. et rem.* III, 19, 35 ; *PL* 44, 170.

79. See above, fn. 74. Cf. *enarr. in ps.* 118, *serm.* 9, 1 ; *PL* 37, 1522-23.

80. *Fn.* 62, above.

81. *Theaetet.* 176^b ; *republ.* 500^c, 613^a ; *leg.* IV, 716^{a-d} ; *Tim.* 90^d. Cf. PLOTINUS, *Enn.* V, 4, 1.

82. *De civ. Dei* VIII, 8 ; *PL* 41, 232-33.

God⁸³. For his part, man preserves this likeness by remaining freely united, though charity, with his Maker. Augustine compares the rational soul, in this relationship, to wax, since it is (so to speak) « signed » by the seal of the Divine image, as by the imprint of a ring⁸⁴. To vary the metaphor, it participates, as far as may be, in the Immutable Light which irradiates every phase and activity of its being : *fit Deo similis quantum datum est, dum illustrandum illi atque illuminandum se subiicit*. But through pride, the life-line of charity is severed. As an invisible and intelligible essence, the soul (even in disorder) still resembles, in these respects, the Divine nature. But mistaking, in wayward presumption, mere resemblance for actual identity, it henceforth wills to live like God — or rather, to *be* God, Who is alone without pride because He has no master⁸⁵.

In the *de Genesi ad litteram* St. Augustine, relating primal disobedience to a perverted desire for power, equates both with what he calls *vitium tumoris* (the vice of puffed-up pride⁸⁶). What further dimension of meaning and context of reference does he envisage by such a determination ? It would appear that this picturesque metaphor, which has survived the centuries, was originally derived from the vocabulary of medicine ; in any case, many parallels can be cited among classical Latin authors⁸⁷. Its use in Augustine is probably intended to suggest (a) a comparison between pride and an organism bloated by disease⁸⁸, and (b) — as a corollary of (a) — an inference that swollen pride pre-eminently typifies both the emptiness of non-being and total alienation from the God Who dwells within the soul and conscience of the humble⁸⁹.

We remarked earlier, apropos of collective loves, that only two such basic drives exist, namely the love of God, characterizing the Society

83. *Gen.* I, 26.

84. *Enarr. in ps.* 70, *serm.* 2, 6 ; *PL* 36, 895-896 and especially : « ... Ergo quisquis vult esse similis Deo... ei cohaerendo signetur tanquam ex annulo cera, illi affixus habeat imaginem eius... »

85. *De mor.* I, 12, 20 ; *PL* 32, 1320 : *Conf.* X, 36, 58 ; *PL* 32, 804 : « ... Domine, qui solus sine typho dominaris, quia solus verus Dominus es qui non habes dominum... »

86. *Fn.* 75, above.

87. *Cic. Tusc. disp.* III, 12, 26 ; *Scripta quae manserunt omnia, Bibliotheca Teubneriana*, XIII^a, fasc. 44, 331, l. 5 : « cum tumor animi resedisset... » Cf. also *SEN. Thyest.* 519 ; *tragédies* (Budé), II, 109, l. 519 : « ... ponatur omnis ira et ex animo tumor erasus abeat. » Cf. *de ira* I, 20, 1 ; *opera quae supersunt, Bibliotheca Teubneriana*, I, 68, ll. 15-19 : « Ne illud quidem iudicandum est, aliquid iram ad magnitudinem animi conferre ; non est enim illa magnitudo ; tumor est ; nec corporibus copia utiosi umoris intentis morbus incrementum est, sed pestilens abundantia. »

88. *Serm.* 380, 2 ; *PL* 39, 1676 : « Est enim superbia, non magnitudo, sed tumor. » Cf. *serm.* 87, 10, 12 ; *PL* 38, 537 : « Distat autem inter magnitudinem et tumorem ; utrumque grande est : sed non utrumque sanum est. Differantur ergo, inquit, isti superbi ; aliqua soliditate sanandi sunt. »

89. *De mus.* VI, 13, 40 ; *PL* 32, 1184-85.

of God, and the self-love characteristic of its secular counterpart. Not surprisingly, therefore, this fact can also be verified in the case of Satan, the Ruler of the Earth-born Society (*societas terrigena*). For in the first place it was by self-love that the Devil fell. Secondly, this same ruinous love (*damnosus amor*) governs and directs his every act. Such appetite is called by Augustine « privative », because depriving both angel and man of the Common Good, it impels them to seek their own good within the unaided resources of creaturely nature. But perverse self-love is also « separative », inasmuch as it alienates the proud alike from God and neighbour⁹⁰.

The Guilt and Complexity of original human Pride

The problem now arises as to whether this love precedes (and produces) the alienation just mentioned, or whether the reverse is the case. The point here at issue cannot be dismissed as a mere verbal quibble, because we shall discover that in the final analysis, the gravity and the uniqueness of pride depend precisely on the formal character of the « aversion » from God which this sin implies. For Augustine the question is settled by the explicit testimony of Sacred Scripture, where we are told that the beginning of pride is to « revolt » (*apostatare*)⁹¹ against the Divine prerogatives. Stated in terms of his favourite metaphor, the angelic « apostasy » appears as a defection from the Immutable Light, sole Source of wisdom and truth. Rejecting this, the Devil and his victims aspired to shine with their own light, only to experience the darkened mind and corrupt heart bequeathed by Adam in turn as a dual legacy to mankind⁹². The repercussions for human society and history of the Satanic rebellion and of « original » sin will form a major theme in our section dealing with the effects of *superbia*.

Instead of original *sin* (*peccatum*), as described above, we might more accurately speak of original *sins* (*peccata*), for the first transgression — angelic⁹³ and human — exhibits a subtle complexity. It is of course true, and Scripture recalls the fact, that (one) sin entered into the world by one man ; nevertheless, just a single tree has many branches, so this vice, though one and the same, consists of many parts. To begin with, and predominantly, we must name pride, because the first man took pleasure in the thought of his own power rather than God's omni-

90. *De Gen. ad litt.* XI, 15, 19 ; *PL* 34, 436.

91. *Ecclus.* 10, 14. *Enarr. in ps.* 112, 1 ; *PL* 37, 1471 : « Quid autem superbiae malitia deterius, quae propositum non vult habere, nec Deum ? Nam scriptum est, *initium superbiae hominis, apostatare a Deo.* » Cf. *de Trin.* XII, 9, 14 ; *PL* 42, 1005 ; *de mus.* VI, 16, 53 ; *PL* 32, 1190.

92. *Ep.* 140, 22, 55 (*ad init.*) ; *PL* 33, 561. *Enarr. 2 in ps.* 18, 15 ; *PL* 36, 163 ; *de lib. arb.* III, 24, 72 (*ad fin.*) ; *PL* 32, 1307.

93. *De civ. Dei* XII, 1, 2 ; *PL* 41, 349.

potence. Again, we can detect an element of sacrilege, since Adam withheld belief and trust in his Maker. Homicide, too, was involved, because he knowingly hastened his own death. In permitting the integrity of his mind to be corrupted by the Serpent's promise, Adam also committed spiritual fornication. He was moreover a thief, as having appropriated forbidden food. Last, but not least, avarice (i.e. the desire to amass a superfluity of goods), formed an essential part of the complex unity peculiar to this sin⁹⁴.

Summary

Let us summarize Augustine's analysis of primal pride by recalling the fact that the disorder concerned is above all a perversion of moral freedom and responsibility. For the picture presented above is neither that of a nature attracted to some material good nor again of an appetite governed by an *object*. On the contrary, the gratuitous malice of pride originates from a *subject* obsessed by the desire to gain complete emancipation from God's exclusive proprietary rights together with absolute sovereignty over fellow-creatures, i.e. to become an unlimited centre of personal liberty, a free and self-directing agent. Thus we may note that while *superbia* (among mankind, at least) resides and operates, within a psycho-physical habitat, and constantly moves amid the world of sense, it is rooted and centred in the domain of the purely spiritual. Herein, to conclude, lies its basic perversity ; for matter (unless quickened by reason and will), cannot exercise moral options, and is hence free from even the slightest liability to evil.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIDE WITHIN THE EARTH-BORN SOCIETY

We next investigate the symptoms of this malady apparent in mankind after the Fall. Now Adam, through generation, bequeathed his nature to the entire human race. But while there exists a general similarity between our first ancestor's pride and that of his descendants, a number of important differences must also be noted. The first is that his sin could have assumed no other form than that of inordinate desire for a spiritual good. This situation has, however, undergone a radical change, because fallen man has lost the wisdom which Adam once

94. *Ench.* 45 ; *PL* 40, 254.

enjoyed⁹⁵. He is therefore capable of erroneously choosing as an end what should rather be ordered as a means toward a higher end in the hierarchy of being, goodness and beatitude. Prominent among Augustine's examples of such a mistaken choice of material means as ends is « money » (*pecunia*), or wealth taken in the concrete. We shall see that, unlike himself, Adam's issue are exposed to avarice, understood in its narrower sense.

Avaritia

Augustine distinguishes two interrelated forms of *avaritia*: the first, as a vicious disposition which refuses to share or hold in common, is the root of all evils⁹⁶, thus possessing surely more than casual resemblance to the key-vice condemned alike by Ambrose⁹⁷, Cicero⁹⁸ and Seneca⁹⁹. The second, which springs from pride, the beginning of sin and the worm of riches¹⁰⁰, can be described as the attitude of a man who makes himself his own centre and end; by preferring the part to the whole, he commits a sort of spiritual fornication leading to the total rejection of his Creator¹⁰¹. The link between these two expressions of one and the same disorder is the misuse of materiality and lesser goods (*frui*) in ministering to a self-love which seeks either to dethrone God or to make of Him a merely instrumental principle (*uti*)¹⁰². What could therefore be more fitting than that as a punishment commensurate with the enormity of this covetous self-centredness, satiety should remain for ever beyond its reach? : « at first you desired a farm; then it was an estate which you longed for. You wished to shut out your neighbours: having done so you aimed at other neighbours' possessions, and extended your covetousness until you had reached the shore. From there you lusted after the islands; after the earth has become your own possession, it is perchance your ambition to seize upon heaven also ». The social and moral, or rather immoral, environment engendered by such depravity resembles nothing so much as a dangerous and storm-tossed sea, wherein the big fish, i.e. those who enjoy much power and relative suc-

95. *De don. pers.* II, 27; *PL* 45, 1009.

96. *Fn.* 49, above.

97. *De offic. min.* I, 137; *PL* 16, 68.

98. *De offic.* I, VII, 20-24, ed. H. A. Holden, p. 10, ll. 20-33; p. 11, ll. 1-26.

99. *Ep. moral.* XC, 3-6, *Script. Classic. Bibl. Oxoniensis*, II, pp. 332-33.

100. *Serm.* 61, 8, 9-9, 10; *PL* 38, 412-13.

101. See above, *fn.* 94; *Conf.* II, 6, 14 (*ad init.*); *PL* 32, 681.

102. AUGUSTINE distinguishes between *frui*, the use of a thing in and for itself: *de doct. chr.* I, 4, 4 (*ad init.*); *PL* 34, 20, and *uti*, to use one thing for another's sake, i.e. as a means to an end. Ultimately, God is the only End (*ibid.* I, 22, 20-21; *ibid.* cols. 26-27). For a detailed discussion of the *frui/uti* principle in our author's thought, see *Fruitio Dei* in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité*, V, 1964, cols. 1547-52.

cess, prey voraciously upon weaker and more vulnerable victims, including even members of their own family circles, and so-called friends. « But when a fish has devoured a smaller one, it is in turn devoured by a greater than itself »¹⁰³.

We have already seen that avarice in a more generalized sense is indistinguishable from pride, the greatest danger in riches. The problem here at stake is to determine why St. Augustine chooses and insists on pride and avarice as constituting precisely those vices which offer the greatest moral threat in the acquisition of wealth and private property. Instead of attempting to answer and solve this query by a deductive approach, let us rather seek a reply at the inductive level. We accordingly offer in translation two basic texts, where Augustine contrasts the effects of material prosperity as they appear in two very different sorts of men. The first passage reads as follows : « Is not this happiness, to have sons free from danger, beautiful daughters, barns full of corn, cattle in abundance, every wall, and every hedge, intact, no disturbance and shouting in the streets, but rather peace and quiet, with plenty of all things in house and in city ? Is not this then happiness ? Or ought the just to avoid it ? Or do you not find the house of the just also abounding with all these things, full of this happiness ? Was not Abraham's house rich in gold, silver, children, servants, cattle ? ...What do we say ? Is this not happiness ? Agreed, but yet it is on the left hand. What is on the left hand ? That which is temporal, mortal, of the body. I do not wish you to shun it ; only, you should not think it to be on the right hand. God, eternity, the years of God that do not fail... Let us use the left for time... the right for eternity »¹⁰⁴. With the latter passage we shall now compare another describing the relationship of a *dives* to his material environment within an entirely different moral situation... this « rich man feels anxiety and fear ; he wastes away with discontent ; he is aflame with avarice, never free from worries, always ill at ease, panting from the ceaseless strife of his enemies, adding to his patrimony... by these miseries, and by these additions also accumulating the bitterest cares »¹⁰⁵.

What light do our two texts throw on the present discussion ? The first like the second brings into immediate juxtaposition its essential data by confronting *man* with the lure of great *wealth*. To the worldling¹⁰⁶, at least, riches, especially in their visible, quasi-symbolic form of

103. *Enarr. in ps.* 64, 9 ; *PL* 36, 780-81. In Christian literature this vivid metaphor of 'fish' devouring 'fish' in the stormy sea of human life can be traced at least as far back as IRENAEUS : *ad haer.* V, 24, 2 (*ad fin.*) ; *PG* 7, 1187.

104. *Enarr. in ps.* 143, 18 (vers. 12-14) ; *PL* 37, 1867-68 ; cf. also *ibid.* 51, 14 ; *PL* 36, 609-10. For St. Augustine's figurative contrast between the left hand and the right hand see below, fn. 110.

105. *De civ. Dei* IV, 3 ; *PL* 41, 114.

106. An inimitable portrait of one of these occurs in *serm.* 32, 20, 20 (*ad init.*) ; *PL* 38, 20.

unlimited gold and silver, represent by far the most prestigious and therefore enviable expression of the power at which the opulent often aim. Now the varied objects comprising the realm of matter, in themselves undeniably good, may be sought from a diversity of motives and desires. As Augustine sees it, everything will depend upon the quality of the respective 'desires' or 'loves' by which such objects are pursued, and the final end or ultimate goal to which they are referred. The mention of 'love' thus adds an entirely new dimension of meaning to the problem: at this point, we have clearly reached the crux of the contrast here in evidence. For St. Augustine tells us that as a man's *love* is, so is *he*¹⁰⁷; that equation being granted, the whole question turns on the nature of the two fundamental forms of appetite exemplified in the parables before us. Now love issues in action: « *da mihi vacantem amorem et nihil operantem*¹⁰⁸! » It is the ends chosen which determine and define the morality of human acts¹⁰⁹. Himself born in time, man's ultimate purpose and destiny can only find fulfilment in the Eternal; but there are some men so immersed in material interests and concerns as to lose sight of eternity and its prior claims. The antithesis which these two respective attitudes suggest is often, as here, portrayed by Augustine in terms of a distinction between the general pre-eminence of the right hand (*dextera*) and the lesser dignity not, to say, pejorative connotation, of its opposite (*sinistra*).¹¹⁰ Let us now apply this imagery to the rich man of our first text. As there depicted, he neither shuns nor covets, but rather thankfully accepts the unmerited gifts that God bestows upon him: a healthy, flourishing family, together with abundant gold, silver, slaves and cattle. Free from the restlessness which avarice engenders, he enjoys the benefits of peace and quiet both at home and in his own community. By this attitude of detachment, the rich man here in question shews that he recognizes and respects the limit separating

107. *In ep. Iohan. ad Parth. tr.* 2, 2, 14; *PL* 35, 1997: « ... talis est quisque, qualis eius dilectio est. »

108. *Enarr. in ps.* 31, *enarr.* 2, 5; *PL* 36, 260.

109. *De mor.* II, 13, 28; *PL* 32, 1337: « vana (est) continentia ista (Manichaeorum), nisi ad aliquem rectissimum finem certa ratione referatur. » Cf. *c. Iul. Pel.* IV, 3, 21; *PL* 44, 749: « Noveris itaque, non officiis, sed finibus a vitiis discernendas esse virtutes. »

110. Although doubtless conscious of the principle of dexterity, and aware of prevailing Graeco-Roman prejudices, St. Augustine finds his sources for this distinction in Sacred Scripture: See *Locut. in Hept.* I (Ib. 49); *PL* 34, 492-93: « *Renuntiate mihi ut redeam in dextram aut sinistram* (Gen. 24, 49) ». Cf. also *enarr. in ps.* 137, 14; *PL* 37, 1782; *de symb.* 7, 7; *PL* 40, 658. For a few brief but suggestive comments about what we have called « the pre-eminence of the right hand » see R. B. ONIANS, *The Origins Of European Thought*, p. 97 and fn. 10; p. 198, fn. 1 (2nd para.); also consult *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie chrétienne et de Liturgie*, vol. III/2, cols. 1548-49. Augustine also elicits from Scripture an intimate connexion between the *dextera Dei* and the notions of justice, judgement, reward and condemnation. His perhaps most formal and explicit statement of this relationship occurs at *In Ioan. ev. tr.* 31, 7, 11 (*ad fin.*); *PL* 35, 1642.

the human from the Divine, the transient from the eternal. Expressed in the terms of our metaphor, his constant care is to keep all that is temporal, mortal and bodily on the *left* hand ; and God, Whose years do not fail, on the *right*. As a result, he acquires a happiness strictly commensurate with his loving acceptance and use of Divine gifts. And this happiness, however relative, is already both token and pledge of the eternal felicity which awaits the members of God's Society.

What of our second rich man ? The crucial flaw in his character is immediately pin-pointed for us by the significant phrase... « *cupiditate flagrans* » : « he is aflame with covetousness ». As we do not wish, at the moment, to anticipate our later analysis of « cupidity », suffice it to note here that the present passage emphatically confirms the key-notes of perpetual frustration, anxiety and misery inseparable from the disordered pursuit of means as ends, which pride essentially is. To conclude : by his insatiable avarice — a privative love that typically prefers the part to the whole, the transient to the eternal, and ultimately, the self to God — the rich man in this text has proved beyond doubt the fact of his membership in the Devil's Society.

Dominandi libido

One problem, previously raised, but not answered in full, remains for solution : why it is pride which, in St. Augustine's eyes, constitutes the gravest moral danger to ownership. Briefly stated, the answer is that in its generic sense of a ' capital ' vice, avarice expresses and ministers in a unique manner to self-centred love. For what is more calculated to enhance the ' excellence ' of proud men than the unlimited possession of riches, including private property and the other external evidence of material welfare which avarice characteristically seeks ? But this is not all. Pride resembles a coin : it has two sides or aspects. One of these is avarice, which conduces to the autarky at which, by an inner compulsive dynamism, the disordered love of self ever aims¹¹¹. The other major aspect or expression of pride is, of course, autarky (*dominandi libido*¹¹²). Here, again, what means or instrument could be considered more necessary and efficacious in the task of attempting to achieve such power, than wealth ? To summarize : regardless of the viewpoint from which, or the context within which, we study wealth and ownership

111. The concept of αὐτάρκεια, ' self-sufficiency ', was elaborated by ARISTOTLE to describe the sage's ideal of a plenitude of good fortune and happiness, i.e. the complete possession of both interior and exterior blessings. The more important refs. follow : *Rhet.* 1360 b 24-25 ; *Polit.* 1253 a 1 ; *Eth. Nic.* 1095 b 26 ; 1097 b ff ; 1100 b 2-3 ; *Polit.* 1280 b 34-35.

112. *De civ. Dei* I, *prae fat* ; *PL* 41, 14 : « ... ipsa ei (terrenae civitati) dominandi libido dominatur... » Compare SALLUST, *Cat.* 2, 1. 8 ; *Cat. Coniur. Bibliotheca Teubneriana* p. 3, ll. 8-9.

generally, the final judgment imposed upon us by St. Augustine appears everywhere invariable : the besetting sin which threatens it is, and can only be, pride.

Now the disordered love we have been describing not merely defines an essential mark or feature of avarice but also provides an illuminating solution to the problem of why it was after the Fall that material things first became associated with the self-centred appetition typical of all pride. For once man's original endowment of perfect charity and serene wisdom had been lost, he was henceforth exposed to the constant and powerful pressure of temptations to seek out whatever his clouded judgement and warped will deemed compatible with individual « excellence ». Perverse desire or « love » thus forms the major part of a heritage received by the entire human race from Adam. And what is more, it constitutes one of the dual « roots » or origins of the whole ganut of lawlessness and sin observable in the annals of man's history¹¹³. This fact is in itself a further consequence of his first offence, and as such will be treated fully in our next section. From the same viewpoint, it is the *diversity* of human failings that marks the second major difference between Adam's pride and the relationship of pride to sin in general among his descendants. This feature affects not only the immediate cause, and degree of malice, but also the matter or object of the various vices in question.

Initium omnis peccati

Within the present context of reference, our author quotes and comments upon a passage in *Ecclesiasticus* : pride is the beginning of all sin¹¹⁴. Now we have already remarked that this statement can be historically verified in the case of both Satan and our first parents. Here, however, Augustine appears to be affirming a different, and more general note of pride : every sin by its nature involves the transgression of, or disobedience to, a specific precept, and must therefore imply some degree of « aversion » from God¹¹⁵. But sins of « ignorance » and « infirmity » are so-called because in them an object is mistakenly — or through weakness and repeated habit — chosen in such a way that, unlike pride, where the movement from God is *primary* and deliberate, « aversion »

¹¹³. *De civ. Dei* XXII, 22, 1 ; *PL* 41, 784.

¹¹⁴. *In Iohan. ev. tr.* 25, 15-16 ; *PL* 35, 1603-04. *De mus.* VI, 13, 40 ; *PL* 32, 1184 : « Generalis amor actionis, quae avertit a vero, a superbia profiscitur... Recte itaque scriptum est in sanctis Libris... *Initium omnis peccati superbia...* » With the meaning of *actio* here, i.e. a disordered use of the temporal world, Augustine contrasts the virtuous use of material things : *de Trin.* XII, 14, 22 ; *PL* 42, 1009. He also distinguishes *actio*, as a virtue, from *contemplatio, qua vacatur et videtur Deus* (*de cons. ev.* I, 5, 8 ; *PL* 34, 1045-46).

¹¹⁵. *De lib. arb.* I, 6, 35 ; *PL* 32, 1240 : « ... omnia peccata hoc uno genere (continentur) cum quisque avertitur a divinis vereque manentibus, et ad mutabilia atque incerta convertitur. » Cf. *ep.* 140, 23, 56 ; *PL* 33, 561.

takes place rather as an unpremeditated *consequence*¹¹⁶. This, then, is one, and a fundamental, sense in which Augustine qualifies *superbia* as « the beginning of all sin ». But he also seems to intend a second and wider sense wherein it may be described as a 'beginning'. For there is no vice that cannot arise from pride : what is more, offences which do so originate become worse in respect of their malice¹¹⁷. Conversely — incredible though it might appear — this same vice can follow in the wake of great virtues, including even humility¹¹⁸. These reasons doubtless explain St. Augustine's affirmation : pride is the first sin of those who turn from God, as it remains the last to be abandoned by penitent souls returning to Him : nothing so impedes perfection¹¹⁹. Thus, although a special sin in its own right as also a general vice, *superbia* represents only one in a series of moral lapses to which Adam's progeny have always been liable since the Fall. But no man lives alone : this truth is strikingly evident in our author's teaching wherein the notion of « society » occupies a paramount position. We must now accordingly undertake a study of the nature and marks of pride within society as he understands it.

Amor sui

In contrasting the mystical Societies of God and of Satan, Augustine makes the initial point that it is *superbia* and *humilitas*¹²⁰ which differentiate these two leaders and the Societies themselves. In his analysis of the latter, he states and comments upon a series of antithetical definitions which reveal pride as a vice of many-sided nature whose presence affects every category of human (and angelic) order. These antitheses have in common the fact that they deal with pride as a perversion of *ordo amoris*, i.e. an ordered love of both persons and things which in Augustine's eyes, constitutes the briefest formula for virtue¹²¹. Thus it becomes once more evident that the basis of the distinction made by him between the Heavenly and the Earthly Societies lies not in their natures — for both are good — but in their contrary desires or loves. The love of God expresses itself in submission to His Will, in mutual love and service on behalf of all by all in Him and for His sake, and in adherence to the order of truth wherein men were created and alone truly live and are. The

116. *Enarr. in ps.* 118, *serm.* 9, 1 ; *PL* 37, 1522 : « Aliud est quippe mandata Dei per infirmitatem vel ignorantiam non implere : aliud ab eis per superbiam declinare... »

117. *De nat. et gr.* 29, 33 ; *PL* 44, 263.

118. *Enarr. in ps.* 58, 5 ; *PL* 36, 709 ; *de sanct. virg.* 32, 32 ; *PL* 40, 414 ; *ibid.* 43, 44 ; *ibid.* col. 422.

119. *Enarr. in ps.* 18, 14 ; *PL* 36, 156 ; *ibid.* 58, *serm.* 2, 5 ; *ibid.* col. 709 ; *de Trin.* XIII, 17, 22 ; *PL* 42, 1031.

120. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 13, 1 ; *PL* 41, 421 ; cf. *ibid.* I, *praeefat. ibid.* col. 14.

121. See above, fn. 46.

self-love of the proud on the other hand chiefly seeks personal exaltation, perverse power, and a life separated from the life, the love, and the good of all. Now what is true alike of individual members and of the families comprising these two Societies applies equally to the latter as totalities, since the very measure of their existence as such depends ultimately, according to Augustine, upon participation by the members of each in a common love. So it is that the two loves uniting these two Societies — the one of God, the other of Satan and self — merely reflect in a heightened degree the moral quality of their two collective wills. Thus the one love is holy, the other unholy; the one social, the other «privative» or individualist. The one is concerned with the common utility for the sake of the Heavenly Society, whereas the other reduces even the common weal to its own designs because of a proud lust for domination. The one is subject to God; the other aspires to be His rival. The one is tranquil, while the other is tempestuous; the one is peaceful, the other quarrelsome. One prefers truthfulness to deceitful praise, the other is avid of praise; one is friendly, the other jealous. The one wishes for its neighbour what it would for itself, the other desires to tyrannize over its neighbour; the one seeks its neighbour's good, the other its own¹²².

We wish here to draw attention to the fact that among all the examples of disordered love mentioned in the above texts, self-love (*amor sui*) occupies the first and principal place. Now this is not the result of casual choice on St. Augustine's part. It is, rather, deducible both from what has been stated about his doctrine concerning the significance of love in moral and social life and from the fact that he directly and completely opposes disordered self-love to love of God. For just as the latter — charity (*caritas*) — represents at once the highest possible expression and the ultimate end of ordered human desire, so too perverse self-love specifies the final term no less than the primary impetus of that act of the will whereby a rational creature «turns from» God¹²³.

Cupiditas

To charity, understood in this context of reference, Augustine also opposes «cupidity» (*cupiditas*). This vice constitutes a formal embodiment or synthesis within his thought of all the characteristics of self-love. In this connexion we again advert to the Bishop's cardinal distinction between the use of a thing as a means to some higher end (*uti*) and its use as an end-in-itself (*frui*). This distinction is incorporated by him into a text wherein he defines cupidity as a movement of the soul towards self, neighbour, and inanimate matter regarded exclusively as ends-in-themselves. Again, St. Augustine's notion of cupidity applies with

122. *De Gen. ad litt.* XI, 15, 20; *PL* 34, 437.

123. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 28; *PL* 41, 436.

equal relevance to the present discussion of pride viewed as a perverse form of love, and as such immediately and directly opposed to the ordered love of God which charity in essence is. It follows, accordingly, that there can exist no middle term between these two contrary wills or loves. In other words, cupidity reigns supreme where the love of God is not found. Creatures may and indeed should be loved; but if they are cherished in and for themselves, instead of being subordinated to God, then for such an appetite — as Augustine views it — there is no other name than « cupidity »¹²⁴.

Contemptus Dei

The disordered love defining pride is further described by him as « contempt for God » (*contemptus Dei*¹²⁵). The latter phrase requires some attention at this point because the particular notion of self-love implied thereby complements what has already been established about Augustine's doctrine regarding the nature of sin and especially of pride as the origin of all sin. It in fact contains the secret of this doctrine, for it clearly shows that he does not condemn the love typical of the Earthly Society as being a simple lack or defect, a failure to love God motivated principally or even solely by excessive pre-occupation with material things. What evidently causes the malice of this vice in Augustine's eyes is that as understood by him, it involves a primary and deliberate refusal to love God based precisely upon a rejection of His own nature, attributes, and exclusive claims upon rational creatures, the concern of the proud with lesser things following only as an effect and corollary of such refusal. Hence the concept of disordered self-love both clarifies and completes St. Augustine's doctrine about « aversion » from God by explaining its essence in terms of a decision to withhold that which alone lies supremely within man's power to offer or deny. The moral and psychological implications of this attitude stem from the all-important fact that the nature of love is not reducible to mere desire or appetite. Rather, it includes an act of benevolence and disinterested generosity — a gift, so to speak, whose bestowal or refusal marks the plenitude of the personal liberty, moral initiative and essential freedom of choice which belong to creatures made in the Divine image and likeness. Thus what constitutes the malice and essential perversity of the self-love of pride is the fact that it not only encloses, so to speak, the self

124. *De doct. chr.* III, 10, 16; *PL* 34, 72: « ... cupiditatem (voco) ... motum animi ad fruendum se et proximo et quolibet corpore non propter Deum. » Cf. *de civ. Dei* XIV, 7, 2; *PL* 41, 410; *Ench.* 117, 31 (*ad fin.*); *PL* 40, 287: « Regnat carnalis cupiditas, ubi non est Dei charitas »; *de Trin.* IX, 8, 13; *PL* 42, 967-968. Thus defined, 'cupidity' is identical with 'avarice', as we have analysed it: *de lib. arb.* III, 17, 48; *PL* 32, 1294-95.

125. See above, fn. 77.

within the self but also involves a corresponding rejection of the Divine love — a love which to Augustine affords the clearest sign and proof of man's eminent dignity in God's eyes¹²⁶. Now this attitude represents a striking development from Augustine's earlier thought, and may well owe something to St. Paul, whose analysis of the « self-love » inherent in « avarice » plays a prominent part in the Augustinian doctrine of pride. It remains nevertheless true that much of our author's formal speculation upon the nature of love retains an undoubted classical flavour, and in particular, a Platonic or neo-Platonic flavour. This, for example, is the source from which he derived his understanding of philosophy as a love of wisdom because wisdom can alone assure man the possession of happiness as its perfect and eternal reward¹²⁷. Thus envisaged, Augustine's particular position here might be qualified as both eudemonistic and anthropocentric : it expresses to a marked degree the appetitive and acquisitive aspects of love embodied in the traditional definition of the good as that which all things desire¹²⁸. The transition in his thought regarding love — partial as it was — may well have been the fruit of an ever-deepening conviction about the nature of pride as above all else a perverse exercise of moral liberty whereby the rational creature refuses to reciprocate the gift that God has initially bestowed upon him. At this point, then, we appear to have reached the term of Augustine's speculation concerning ordered love — a good not merely desired (and rightly desired) by all, but also an expression of self-giving in its highest and most perfect form¹²⁹.

Vita secundum carnem... hominem acta

Among the numerous and varied texts (and contexts) wherein St. Augustine refers to or discusses pride, we wish to focus particular attention upon one remarkable passage not yet mentioned. In it, our author, as often, utilizes a metaphor and a vocabulary borrowed from St. Paul to oppose the principles of governance that determine the ultimate terms or 'ends' to which the two great Societies of universal history are respectively ordered. The passage in question is concerned, that is to say, with the relationships implied on the one hand by personal order (i.e. body, soul, God), and on the other by the universal order as it applies

126. *Conf.* I, 5, 5 ; *PL* 32, 663 : « Quid tibi sum ipse, ut amari te iubeas a me, et nisi faciam irascaris mihi... ? »

127. *Serm.* 150, 3, 4 ; *PL* 38, 809. With this contrast *serm.* 141, 1, 1 (*PL* 38, 776), where Augustine says that some pagan philosophers indeed saw the Truth from afar, but were unable to find the way thither.

128. J. ROHMER, *La Finalité Morale de Saint Augustin à Duns Scot*, p. 8 ; ARISTOTLE, *Eth. Nic.* 1094^a.

129. *Enarr. in ps.* 55, 17 ; *PL* 36, 658.

to rational creatures. The basic text states that whereas the Heavenly Society lives « according to the spirit » or « according to God » (*secundum spiritum, Deum*), the Earth-born Society lives « according to the flesh », or « according to man » (*secundum carnem, hominem*¹³⁰). What is the precise sense of these two formulae ? To elucidate them we must recall that from Augustine's standpoint, the distinction between order and disorder depends, in the final analysis, upon the principles of « governance » operating in a society or societies. Thus to the extent that (at each successive level of being), the higher principle commands and controls the lower, it can be predicated that a society both *is* and *is true*, the criterion of the truth here at stake being furnished by conformity to the archetypal Forms subsisting within the Divine mind¹³¹. When, however, this relationship is violated, or inverted, so that as a result the ultimate ordination of the society is not to God, then there remains only one conclusion to be drawn. That society is *not*, because it is *not true*. Otherwise expressed, such a community is ontologically unstable — i.e. it has a marked tendency to non-being (*nihilo propinquare*¹³²).

Now we have previously noted Augustine's debt to St. Paul in his development of the respective notions of the « outward » (or « old ») man, and the « inner » (or « new ») man¹³³. Here it is the use of the very term « man » (*homo*) itself, together with the two components of human nature — « flesh » (*caro*) and « spirit » (*spiritus*) — that he has borrowed from the Pauline epistles. These expressions are of primary importance for the ensuing exposition, and we shall therefore begin

130. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 2, 1-4, 1 ; *PL* 41, 403-08.

131. *De div. quaest.* 83, 46, 2 ; *PL* 40, 30 : « ... non solum sunt ideae, sed ipsae verae sunt... quarum participatione fit ut sit quidquid est, quomodo est. » Augustine tributes being to God and at things in such a way that the Creator possesses it by identity and absolute plenitude of essence while creatures possess it only by way of an inferior and deficient mode. The resulting relationship between things and God is described by our author as « participation » (see above, fn 32). Now while the verb *participare* means « to have » or « receive », his use of it is not intended to suggest that creatures receive a « part », so to speak, of the Divine essence itself. Rather, it designates a mode of being (*modus*) based upon « resemblance » — resemblance, that is, to the Divine Ideas. For every creature which comes forth from God must necessarily imitate or represent Him in some manner, and especially man, made after His own image and likeness. As we have said, the Ideas or Forms are the Divine essence viewed as Intellect, the models according to which God creates. Their existence follows from the universal creative activity of the Divine Wisdom which « knows » each creature, i.e. has a true idea of all that it is. Plotinus taught a doctrine of participation to which Augustine appears largely indebted : it included the belief that all things have a measure of unity, being and goodness derived from participation in the good ; similitude as the mode of such participation also plays a major role in Plotinus' thought : cf. *Enn.* I, 7, 1-2. See further *de div. quaest.* 83, 46 ; *de civ. Dei* XIX, 3 ; and for the probable roots of Augustine's doctrine, G. LUCK, *Der Akademiker Antiochos* ; A. SOLIGNAC, *Analyse et sources de la question 'De ideis'*, in *Aug. Mag.* I, p. 315.

132. See above, fn. 71.

133. *II Cor.* 4, 16.

by investigating Augustine's interpretation of them in his doctrine of pride.

In St. Paul and the Scriptures generally the word *caro* is often used by itself to designate « natural » (i.e. « fallen, corrupt ») human nature (*homo exterior, vetus homo*) regarded as a totality, « flesh » (a part) being then equivalent to « man » (as a whole). Other senses are also distinguished, but the Apostle supplies a clue or key to the full meaning of both words in a text from *Galatians*¹³⁴ wherein he enumerates the effects of corrupt nature. For here are specified not only such obvious and familiar examples of physical vice and disorder as fornication and drunkenness, but also envies, jealousies, and contentions, which originate in the spirit or soul rather than the body considered as a separate entity. It thus appears evident that by *homo* — for which, according to the particular context, he may use *caro* — St. Paul understands the whole of fallen human nature. Judged by this criterion, the Stoics, who place man's highest good in the soul, do not live any less « according to the flesh » (*secundum carnem*) than the Epicureans, for whom man's supreme good lies in pleasure. These conclusions are confirmed by two of the verses already cited from the *Epistle to the Galatians*. For here St. Paul attributes to the flesh those vices that rule the Devil. He says in fact that enmities, contentions, jealousies, anger, and quarrels are the works of the flesh, whereas the origin of all these evils is pride — a vice which rules over Satan who has no flesh. Now since Satan has all these vices but no flesh, they can only be works of the flesh in the sense that they are works of man. It was then not because of the flesh, but because of man's desire to live according to himself, that is, « according to man » (*secundum hominem*), that he imitated the Devil. For the Devil wished to live according to himself when he refused to remain in the truth. Hence, when he told a lie, it was not of God's doing but rather his own, for Satan is not merely a liar but the father of lies. Now when a man lives « according to man » and not « according to God » (*secundum Deum*) he resembles the Devil. And because he resembles the Devil, he lives according to falsehood. This does not of course mean that man himself is a lie, since God, Who created him, could not be the Creator of a lie. But it is a lie not to live as a man was created to live, i.e. to do the will of God rather than his own. There is however a second sense in which every sin can be called a lie. For when we choose to sin, what we want is either to acquire some good or to get rid of something bad. Now the lie consists in this, that what is done for our good turns out to be bad, or what we do to make things better, ends by actually making them worse. The paradox can be explained only by the fact that the happiness of man comes not from himself but from God. To live for or according to oneself is therefore not only a sin but also a lie, since by so doing one makes impossible the acquisition of happiness, which all men desire. When therefore it is said that two

¹³⁴. *Gal.* 5, 17-21.

contrary and opposing Societies arose because some men live according to the flesh and others according to the spirit, it could equally well be affirmed that they arose because some live according to man while others live according to God¹³⁵.

Now the criterion and standard of truth to which St. Augustine appeals throughout the passage we have been considering implicates the order of being in its widest sense, for it describes the conformity of the rational creature in all respects to its Creator. But this same criterion also involves the order of wisdom, for man's attainment of the truth, as thus understood, necessarily requires the exercise of both intellect and appetite. And so when a man orders his life to the God Who said, I am... truth (*ego sum veritas*) his actions mirror the Divine Will rather than his own. Such a life thereby most perfectly exemplifies the mother-virtue of obedience which essentially consists in the surrender of self-will to God¹³⁶.

Here then, in summary, is the Heavenly Society as Augustine sees it : a society whose bond of union — and therefore being — arises from a common love of God, whose life is lived according to truth because it imitates and participates in the Divine Truth. And this life, for no other reason than that it is ordered, through justice, to God, expresses itself in and by the virtue of obedience. The Society of Satan, on the other hand, manifests a love that is perverse precisely because its object is self instead of God. This love reproduces and so to speak prolongs within universal history the proud disobedience and the empty falsehood of non-being integral to both Satan's and Adam's pride. As such, it is evidently subversive of all human order. The following section will present a detailed study of *superbia* in its effects upon that order not only as regards the individual, but also within the context of society at large.

THE DISORDER OF PRIDE IN ITS EFFECTS UPON SOCIETY

Within the angelic Creation

The vice of pride was the immediate cause of a diminution of being — the irreducible substrate of all reality — among the fallen angels and

135. For further analysis of St. Paul's use of the antithetical terms *caro/spiritus* consult F. PRAT, *La Théologie de Saint Paul*, II, pp. 60-63 ; 80-90 ; 487-89.

136. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 12 ; *PL* 41, 420 : « ... obedientia commendata est in praecepto, quae virtus in creatura rationali mater quodammodo est omnium custosque virtutum... » Cf. *de bon. coni.* 24, 32 ; *PL* 40, 395 (*ad init.*).

their leader¹³⁷. A further consequence is linked with the fact that the process of « formation » implies « illumination », i.e. the angelic acquisition of being is indivisibly connected with that of wisdom. Hence the wicked angels incurred a simultaneous loss of this endowment also¹³⁸. Yet a third effect depends upon the premise that the happiness of intellectual creatures is preserved solely by union with God. Accordingly, when Satan and the other rebel spirits turned in proud separation from Him, they forfeited their original happiness¹³⁹. Thus among the apostate angels, the very nature of their desires was transformed into an appetite revealing all the centrifugal and « privative » tendencies inherent in disorder¹⁴⁰.

The vice of pride was to prove, for Adam and Eve also, the greatest disaster that could have conceivably befallen any rational creature: loss of the continuous presence of God, and therefore loss of the loving, face-to-face association with Him which had been the measure of their former beatitude. This event further marks the first appearance of prayer, understood in a narrower sense. Now the significance of prayer within Augustine's thought can hardly be exaggerated, because according to him it constitutes an *indefectible* instrument on the lips of those who work out their salvation within a moral climate of « responsibility in love ».^{140a}

Within the Persons of Eve and Adam

Adam's wilful rupture of his former union with God also produced a diminution of being. While this « aversion » could never indeed reach the term of absolute non-being (*omnino non esse*), it nevertheless entailed a movement or « tendency » toward nothingness¹⁴¹. Now Adam, like all his descendants, was a composite creature consisting of both a body and a soul. Let us therefore begin our present study by examining the repercussions of pride upon personal order within man.

137. *De civ. Dei* XII, 6 ; *PL* 41, 353.

138. Fn. 33, above, last ref : *de civ. Dei* XII, 1, 2 ; *PL* 41, 349.

139. See above, fn. 57.

140. *De civ. Dei* XII, 1, 2 ; *PL* 41, 349 : « ...alii ...habentes studia partium pro individua charitate... » (*studia partium* is a perhaps conscious echo of SALLUST, *Iugurth.* LXXIII, 4).

140a. The following texts clearly indicate that Adam, since he had no need to pray, did not in fact do so : *de nat. et gr.* 53, 62 ; *PL* 44, 277 ; *c. Iul. op. imp.* VI, 15 ; *PL* 45, 1534-35 ; *Enarr. in ps.* 29, 16-18 ; *PL* 36, 224-25. By « prayer, understood in a narrower sense » we mean prayers of petition to obtain grace, freedom from pain and distress, etc. — all quite inapplicable to Adam, who *vivebat fruens Deo* (*de civ. Dei* XIV, 26 ; *PL* 41, 434). Insofar, however, as an attitude of humble and thankful dependence involves an attitude bespeaking prayer, Adam undoubtedly had this — at least in the beginning. A discussion of prayer as an « indefectible weapon » for those who use it within a moral climate of loving responsibility will be found in our Epilogue.

141. Fn. 71, above.

a) Psycho-physical Being (Disease, Death) : Loss of Paradise

We have already seen that the first overt expression of Adam's pride was an act of formal disobedience to the Divine command forbidding him to touch the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Had the primal couple respected this, the only prohibition binding upon them in the Garden, they could have gained an immortality (like that of the angels) without the interruption of death. For their body, although animal and hence liable to death if abandoned by the soul — principle and source of all physical life — was originally free from every seed of corruption¹⁴². In short, they need never have died except as a penalty for the disorder of disobedience. Hence it was not because of a law within Adam's nature, but rather as a just punishment for his refusal to heed God's prohibition that he received, so to speak, a sentence of death¹⁴³. Such, then, was the character and gravity of his offence, which so impaired human nature that what had been first imposed on our first parents as a penal condition became an inescapable sequela in their issue. Mankind has therefore inherited from Adam not his first nature, but that which it became after his disobedience and punishment. As thus vitiated, all men suffer from a « natural » (and powerful) tendency to disorder, whose first and most immediate result is the necessity of dying a physical death¹⁴⁴. In this way was fulfilled the Divine warning addressed to the first man in Paradise : « if ever thou eatest of this (i.e. the tree of knowledge of good and evil), thy doom is death. »

But the forfeiture of immortality — a gift conditionally offered and therefore in no way intrinsic to Adam's nature — was not the only effect of pride upon man's bodily order. Or rather, to state the case more accurately, this effect itself implied a whole series of secondary consequences. Specifically, the latter included the first appearance in man of the ravages of disease, which among Adam's offspring have become so numerous and so severe that their cure sometimes causes more pain than the original complaints themselves. Among these varied consequences Augustine also mentions physical distress and debility of various kinds, emphasizing in particular such familiar but universally dreaded trials of endurance as hunger and thirst¹⁴⁵. But even a life comparatively free from illness and affliction must eventually culminate in old age. Here is a further direct result of Adam's sin, and one which preparing as it does the loss of the body's former conditional incorruptibility, can only lead to its decay and final separation from the soul in death.

142. *De civ. Dei* XIII, 3 ; *PL* 41, 378 ; *ibid.* XIII, 23 ; *ibid.* col. 396 ; *ibid.* XIV, 26 ; *ibid.* col. 434.

143. *Ibid.* XIII, 12 ; *ibid.* col. 386.

144. *Op. imp. c. Iul.* IV, 104 ; *PL* 45, 1401 ; *de civ. Dei* XIV, 1 ; *PL* 41, 403.

145. *Ibid.* XXII, 22, 3 ; *ibid.* cols. 785-86.

Now since our first parents, by an individual and deliberate act of pride, each contributed to the totality of this sin, it was but just that they should also discover its effects as individuals. Accordingly for Eve in the first place — and for all women because of her — continuous and multiplied sorrow and anguish were to become her lot, particularly in connexion with child-birth. Secondly, Eve was henceforth to know her spouse in a sense hitherto unexperienced, as a master whose domination became all the more irksome in that it resulted from the disorder of pride rather than from original human nature¹⁴⁶. Adam, who had hitherto without fatigue cultivated and kept the garden of Paradise, was to endure unremitting toil : the same fate awaited his entire issue. Only by the sweat of his brow could he henceforth hope to support his family through an arduous and insecure livelihood. In suffering the final and irreversible penalty of expulsion from their garden of pleasure, and from the immediate presence and friendship of God, both Adam and Eve were to acquire by a bitter and ironic experience that knowledge of good and evil whose possession they had both so inordinately coveted¹⁴⁷.

b) Intellect (Ignorance, Error)

Still further effects of pride began to appear within the subhuman corporeal world in relation to man and his status as a rational creature. In the first place, the earth and its produce were henceforth accursed for Adam as a direct result of his sin. Then again, reptiles and creatures in general, which he himself had named, rose in rebellion against him. Finally, because of Adam's pride, the entire animal kingdom was also driven from Paradise, and like their erstwhile master became henceforth doomed to death¹⁴⁸.

In relation to the intellectual life of the first man and his wife, the major consequence of pride that St. Augustine distinguishes is « ignorance » (*ignorantia*). With this he also habitually associates a certain liability to error (*error*) as well as a difficulty in acquiring truth. Although strictly compatible and consistent with a nature created in a state of primal innocence, these disabilities were nevertheless a joint expression or prolongation of their first sin, for Adam and Eve had in fact been totally exempt therefrom¹⁴⁹.

146. *De Gen. ad litt.* XI, 30, 39 ; 37, 50 ; *PL* 34, 445 ; 450.

147. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 26 ; *PL* 41, 434 : « Non lassitudo fatigabat otiosum... » *de Gen. ad litt.* XI, 18, 24 ; 38 ; *PL* 34, 438-39 ; cf. *de civ. Dei* XIV, 15, 1-2 ; *PL* 41, 422-23.

148. *De Gen. c. Man.* I, 13, 19 ; *PL* 34, 182 ; *de Gen. ad litt.* III, 18, 27-28 ; *PL* 34, 290-91 ; *op. imp. c. Iul.* V, 1 ; *PL* 45, 1432.

149. *De lib. arb.* III, 18, 52 ; *PL* 32, 1296. In *ench.* 24 (*PL* 40, 244), this *ignorantia rerum agendarum* is called *error*, i.e. *falsi pro vero approbatio* (*c. Acad.* I, 4, 11 ; *ibid.* col. 912) ; *de nat. et gr.* 67, 81 ; *PL* 44, 287-88 ; *retr.* I, 9, 6 ; *PL* 32, 598.

In Adam's progeny there accordingly remains a mere « spark » (*scintilla*) of the reason that had once been the highest principle and activity of human nature. Mankind is now engulfed, as it were, in a veritable abyss of ignorance and intellectual darkness from which every error flows. Infancy suffices to prove with what ignorance of the truth men enter upon life, just as adolescence reveals the full measure of human folly¹⁵⁰.

c) Violation of original Justice (Concupiscence, Disobedience)

Adam and Eve had furthermore been originally endowed with the virtue of justice¹⁵¹. The first and most evident effect of its disappearance in them was the violation of the primary personal order whereby body obeys soul, the latter in turn obeying God. The spirit's untroubled mastery of the flesh was now succeeded by a revolt of the lower principle against the higher — a revolt to which St. Augustine gives the name of *concupiscentia*; it is because of this flaw that from the viewpoint of the psychological order in man, concupiscence can be virtually identified with the first sin itself¹⁵².

d) Impairment of Free Will

As regards the first sin, we have already pointed out that it involved a misuse of free will. We saw further that Adam's act of disobedience was preceded by an evil will (*voluntas mala*). This introduces for consideration an aspect of pride which, as St. Augustine sees it, both includes and explains the two data just mentioned, since, according to him, the guilt of every sin — whether angelic or human — is solely attributable to a free and deliberate act of the will. Now this evil will — the cause of Adam's pride — formed no part of his original endowment. On the contrary, he possessed in the beginning a « good » or « upright » will (*bona voluntas*) — that is to say, a liberty of moral choice and action consisting in the personal power to choose the good and to avoid the commission of sin. But Augustine states that as a consequence of his abuse of this gift, Adam lost the ability to exercise the freedom of choice which he had once enjoyed. Henceforth he retained « liberty » only in the sense that he could choose evil by an independent act of this own will, freedom to make a decisive choice of the good and to persevere in it being now beyond merely human capacity¹⁵³. But as this point the problem arises as to how real freedom of moral choice can be any

150. *De civ. Dei* XXII, 24, 2 ; *PL* 41, 789 ; *ibid.* XXII, 22, 1 ; *ibid.* cols. 784-85.

151. *De pecc. mer. et rem.* II, 23, 37 ; *PL* 44, 173.

152. *Op. imp. c. Iul.* VI, 41 ; *PL* 45, 1605 ; *enarr. in ps.* 102, 5 ; *PL* 37, 1319 ; *ibid.* 118, *serm.* 3, 1 ; *ibid.* col. 1507 ; *op. imp. c. Iul.* I, 47 ; *PL* 45, 1068-69. See B. STOECKLE, *Die Lehre von der erbsuendlichen Koncupiscentz in ihrer Bedeutung fuer das christliche Leibethos*, especially pp. 69-72 ; 158 ff.

153. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 15, 2 ; *PL* 41, 483.

longer said to exist in a situation where man is incapable of opting for the good in the above sense. We have already seen that freedom of the will is the keystone of Augustine's explanation of the nature of evil and in particular of human sin and disorder. Yet we find him no less emphatically and repeatedly affirming that Adam's fall led to the loss of true moral liberty. The answer to the problem here before us can only be solved by a careful study of the relevant textual evidence.

Let us begin by noting Augustine's acceptance of the simile, originated by Julian, the defender of Pelagianism, according to which Adam's will (*voluntas*), because it was at first equally free (*libera*) to choose either good or evil, might be compared with a scales whose two plates maintain a state of perfect equilibrium¹⁵⁴. But in failing to elect the good, Adam renounced his « free will » (*liberum arbitrium*) which was originally all the more truly « free » (*liberius*) in not having become a captive to sin¹⁵⁵. The two meanings here attached to « free » (*liber*) by Augustine bring out the ambiguity of the Latin adjective as he variously employs it. For besides designating « freedom to do good and evil », *liber* also describes that absolute perfection of freedom (*libertas*) wherein sin is impossible, i.e. the confirmation of the will by Divine grace in its choice of good¹⁵⁶. As predicated of fallen man, *libertas* denotes the right use of the *liberum arbitrium*, which though always exercised freely, is not always exercised for the good¹⁵⁷, and is therefore not in such cases « free » with the freedom of liberty » (*libertas*). This fact results from the change in human nature initiated by Adam's fall. For man no longer has the same freedom to choose good or evil that his first parents once enjoyed. Here Augustine rejects Julian's extension of the figure of speech mentioned above : human free will remains henceforth exposed to a ceaseless and powerful tendency or inclination to evil caused by concupiscence. Now in declaring, as Augustine does, that man since Adam possesses of himself only an evil will and the capacity to produce the works of evil, namely falsehood and sin¹⁵⁸, he is once more voicing the conviction, integral to his teaching as a whole, that all good, and so every right use of free will, comes from God. Hence in forfeiting such free will man has lost or rather refused what is literally a « gratuitous » and unmerited gift of God¹⁵⁹. He has in other words forfeited his original endowment of Divine grace — a quality without which no individual act can be called good in any sense. This does not however mean that he has lost all grace, since, as

154. *Op. imp. c. Iul.* III, 117 ; *PL* 45, 1297.

155. *De corr. et gr.* II, 32 ; *PL* 44, 936.

156. *Ibid.* 12, 33 ; *ibid.* col. 936.

157. *De gr. et lib. arb.* 15, 31 ; *PL* 44, 899 : « semper est autem in nobis voluntas libera, sed non semper est bona. »

158. *In Iohan. ev. tr.* 5, 1 ; *PL* 35, 1414.

159. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 1 ; *PL* 41, 403 ; *serm.* 156, 5 ; *PL* 38, 852.

St. Augustine affirms, every man receives sufficient grace for salvation if he wills to accept it¹⁶⁰.

To resume what has preceded : in abandoning the true and original liberty of his « free will », Adam lost the first liberty that consists in the capacity to resist temptation and to persevere in virtue (*posse non peccare*). He did not, however, lose that freedom of choice without which no-one could even discern good from evil and in whose absence the acceptance of grace would be impossible. But after the Fall, human nature did indeed begin to experience a familiarity with vice which hardened into a binding habit of sin : this habit Augustine does not hesitate to describe both as an *obligatio* and a *necessitas*¹⁶¹. But the 'necessity' or 'constraint' here in question is relative, not absolute, since it springs from a conflict within the will, or rather between the sinner's two wills¹⁶². Thus the very fact of the struggle itself serves to demonstrate man's relatively unimpaired freedom of moral choice — i.e. freedom to co-operate with God in receiving grace — for unless a real choice remained perceptible, no conflict could ensue. Expressions like the two just quoted above are not of common occurrence even in St. Augustine's most impassioned rhetorical strictures upon human depravity : they surely reflect the pressure of anti-Pelagian controversy and the ever-present memory of earlier personal failures rather than the calm and judicious precision of the theologian. Such occasional extravagances of language therefore demand rectification within the total context of our author's thought. For present purposes, the latter may be conveniently summarized by his own statement that it is the presence of God which alone bestows the light of wisdom and of justice. Once Adam had forfeited the virtues and the order that justice implies, no unaided power of man could restore the innocence and the integrity which had been his prior to the Fall¹⁶³.

Within the Earth-Born Society

According to Augustine's doctrine, the immediate source of all human sins is to be found within the dual inheritance of error and perverse love received from Adam. We have already examined the ignorance and error that issued from original pride and subsequently became the

160. *De Gen. c. Man.* I, 3, 6 ; *PL* 34, 176 : « Quod omnes homines possunt (se convertere ad Dei praecepta implenda), si velint. » See below, fn. 244.

161. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 1 ; *PL* 41, 403 ; *de nat. et gr.* 66, 79 ; *PL* 44, 286.

162. Cf. fn. 44, above (*de civ. Dei* XI, 28) ; *Conf.* VIII, 9, 21 ; *PL* 32, 759 : « Non igitur monstrum partim velle, partim nolle ? sed aegritudo animi est, quia non totus assurgit veritate sublevatus, consuetudinis praegravatus. Et ideo sunt duae voluntates... »

163. *De Gen. ad litt.* VIII, 12, 26 ; *PL* 34, 383 ; *de civ. Dei* XIV, 27 ; *PL* 41, 435. See below, fn. 171.

cause of yet other vices. It now remains to analyse the results of disordered love as Augustine describes them. These results are so vast as to include the entire spectrum of licence and lust : wars, violence, discord, strife, fraud, robbery, perfidy, pride, envy, ambition, murder, the sins of the flesh, sins against religion and neighbour, the injustice of the law courts — in short, all the wickedness and misery which fill the world¹⁶⁴. Before summarizing these consequences, however, we shall be obliged to glance at the foundation and earlier historical development of the Satanic Society, for the latter also exists in time. In fact the full significance of both Societies—and therefore of pride and humility—in Augustine's thought can only be grasped by an awareness of his interpretation of human history and the sense of Providence and destiny underlying it.

a) Cain, Nemrod, The Jews, Romulus and Remus

Just as pride caused the fall of Adam and Eve, so too it brought about the ruin of Cain, the founder of the Earthy Society. Now it was envy — always a consequence of pride — which led to the murder of Abel by his brother¹⁶⁵. In withholding himself from the gift that he sacrificed to the Creator he exhibited the perverse passion for power distinctive of the Satanic Society whose prototype he was. For the god or gods of the « Society of Man » is he or they who will secure purely temporal victories and peace for it. And insofar as this Society offers worship to such a deity or deities, its sole motive is love of glory and lust for domination rather than respect for the claims of true piety or justice. In brief, the proud would merely « use » God — provided of course that they even believe in Him — so as to « enjoy » the world and amass material fortunes in furtherance of their own greater glory and self-esteem (i.e. « excellence »).

The *Book of Genesis* recalls that Babylon was founded by the giant Nemrod, a hunter of men, who used violence and tyranny as means of intimidating and terrorizing others in order to subject them to his authority. From that foundation his purpose was to build a highway to heaven, so to speak, against the Lord. The tower that he and his followers raised against God is to Augustine type and symbol of the impious pride which characteristically ever seeks a false and perverse grandeur¹⁶⁶. Babylon was the capital of Assyria, an empire that came to the end of its nearly thirteen hundred and five years' domination while Rome was still in the process of birth¹⁶⁷. Augustine consid-

164. *Ibid.* XXII, 22, 1 ; *ibid.* col. 784.

165. *Enarr. in ps.* 58, *enarr.* 2, 5 ; *PL* 36, 709 ; *de civ. Dei* XV, 5 ; *PL* 41, 441 ; *ibid.* XV, 7, 1 ; *ibid.* cols. 443-44.

166. *Ibid.* XVI, 4 ; *ibid.* col. 483 : « Erigebat ergo cum suis populis turrem contra Deum, qua est imple significata superbia. »

167. *Ibid.* XVIII, 21 ; *ibid.* col. 577.

ers that among the many realms into which human society has been divided for the sake of greed or profit, Assyria (and Rome) so far surpass the rest that in comparison with them, all other kingdoms and kings are mere appendages¹⁶⁸. Reasons inseparably connected with the Assyrian Empire's pre-eminence of power and prevailing desire for conquest explain why it exhibits the *imperium* of the « Godless Society » in its most complete and characteristic form¹⁶⁹.

During the historical period extending from the Fall to the promulgation of the Mosaic Law, the ignorance bequeathed by the first man to his descendants retained the form of a complete moral insensitivity and unawareness. Now the existence of sin among these earlier generations of men was not any the less a fact because of their unawareness of it. Man indeed sinned, but the true nature of his sin was, so to speak, hidden from him, and this all the more because of the absence of any Divine legislation relative thereto. With the giving of the Law, men began to appreciate both the fact of sin and the reasons for its prohibition¹⁷⁰. Nevertheless fallen human nature underwent no change, for while the misuse of free will was enough to cause the first sin, a mere desire on the part of Adam's descendants could never suffice to restore their original rectitude¹⁷¹. And even the Hebrew nation which, in the Mosaic Law, had been favoured with the privilege of a special revelation from God Himself, sinned gravely because of pride. For by a kind of nationalistic and religious arrogance which elevates self-righteousness above truth, they continued to assert the exclusive claims of Israel to be the Chosen People even after the advent of Christ¹⁷².

The latter event — as sacred history records it — took place within the geographical confines of the Roman Empire. Now much, indeed, the greater part, of what St. Augustine has to say regarding the « secular » state assumes the form of a direct comparison between the vices of one selected historical example and those characteristic of the Devil's Society at large. Not unnaturally — when more or less local and contemporaneous data are required — he will draw freely upon his knowledge of Rome and the Romans as portrayed by Latin authors themselves¹⁷³.

168. *Ibid.* XVIII, 2, 1; *ibid.* col. 560.

169. *Ibid.* XVI, 17; *ibid.* col. 497.

170. *De div. quaest. ad Simpl.* I, 1, 4; *PL* 40, 104.

171. *Retr.* I, 9, 6; *PL* 32, 598: « ...quia sponte homo, id est libero arbitrio, cadere potuit, non etiam surgere. »

172. *Serm.* 175, 1, 1; *PL* 38, 945; *enarr. in ps.* 138, 8; *PL* 37, 1789.

173. *De civ. Dei* XVIII, 2; *PL* 41, 561. St. Augustine's two chief historical sources were Livy and Sallust. He nowhere mentions Tacitus nor can any quotations from or even references to that author be verified beyond doubt in his writings. Tacitus' criticism of Roman morals and institutions belongs in the main to the period following the birth of Christ, so that his work was not well adapted to St. Augustine's purpose. Livy is only twice mentioned by name (*de civ. Dei* II, 24; *ibid.* III, 7) although Augustine uses him more extensively than Sallust (cf.

It has been previously noted that the Earthly Society was founded by the fratricide of Abel. St. Augustine — in view of this fact — feels no surprise that many centuries later in the foundation of Rome, the copy should have corresponded to the original. The Roman Empire is indeed called by him the second Babylon because in his view it replaced Babylon in time if not in place as the capital or earthly centre (*caput*) of the Society of Men, which, like Assyria, was to dominate so many peoples. Nevertheless its true archetype was the Society of Cain.

In Augustine's account of the beginnings of Rome and the Earth-born Society, we can easily discern three interrelated elements or features of his doctrine of pride. The first of these is the fact that Romulus and Remus sought to imitate God by doing what He does, i.e. to « create » or « found ». This trait is illustrated by the use of the verb *condere* in our text. The second feature of *superbia* appears in the persons of the two co-founders of Rome because each attempted to secure complete sovereignty over persons and things in the capacity of a « sole master » (*ut totam dominationem haberet unus*)¹⁷⁴ — once again the manifest expression of a disordered desire to imitate God. Lastly, as with both Adam and Cain, the sin of pride involving Romulus and Remus resulted in the further sin of intentional and premeditated homicide.

From such strictures as these regarding the permanently divisive consequences of the abuse of power and sovereignty rampant among the first peoples of both « sacred » and « secular » history, one might be perhaps tempted to ask how Augustine (within the limits of his own doctrine) can defend his postulate of « love » as the specificatory principle of a state. Without anticipating future discussion, we shall for the moment merely recall that the order and being of every state depend, externally at least, upon the structure and exercise of legitimate political authority. And — as St. Augustine will repeatedly assert — the ultimate Source of such authority is God Himself, « through Whom kings reign and tyrants hold the land ». But because of man's fallen nature, conflicts inevitably arise, as history bears witness, from the clash of opposing interests and ambitions. These, either by reason of the magnitude of

S. ANGUS, *The Sources of the first ten Books of Augustine's de Civitate Dei*, dissert., Princeton, 1906, pp. 38, 52-57). The reason for this is doubtless that his writings were too large and cumbersome for ready consultation. On the other hand, Sallust is nearly always referred to by name and frequently quoted *verbatim*. This need cause no surprise, considering that in the first place he was the standard historian taught in the schools of Augustine's day (cf. *de civ. Dei* I, 5). A similar judgement had been previously affirmed by QUINTILIAN, *Inst. orat.* X, 1, 102, MARTIAL, *ep.* XIV, 190 and TACITUS himself, who spoke of Sallust as *rerum Romanarum florentissimus auctor* (*Ann.* III, 30). Moreover, the latter's gloomy description of persons and events in general, as also his scathing condemnation of the corrupt morals rife in the Roman people and Empire prior to the appearance of Christianity, made Sallust an excellent witness for St. Augustine to arraign against his own countrymen.

¹⁷⁴ *De civ. Dei* XV, 5 ; *PL* 41, 441.

the object desired or the rank and power of the contestants themselves, frequently disrupt not merely the simpler forms of human society but empires as well¹⁷⁵. Prominent among the evils that attend and follow in the wake of wars is slavery. Now this institution itself exemplifies but one aspect of the problem of ownership and private property which arises whenever greed and lust for power jointly threaten the unity and peace of the state. But men do not come together exclusively for social and political purposes : apart from, independent of and superior to all human communities stands the Church. Even as such, however, this Society is (in its earthly membership), far from immune to the evil consequences of pride. These notably include heresy and schism, which in various ways subvert the doctrine, order and discipline of the *mater catholica*, as Augustine delights to call her¹⁷⁶.

b) Within the social Order : Authority, Law, Slavery, Private Ownership

Turning first to the problem of *superbia* in its relation to the exercise of authority in the State, we may observe that Augustine defines two major forms of pride which forever threaten those who occupy positions of political or social responsibility. One of these is pride of place (*principandi superbia*), the vice that impels a man to seek the chief or highest position of command in a society. The second, closely allied therewith, is described by Augustine as the lust for lordship (*dominandi cupiditas*) over others¹⁷⁷ — often in a universal context. The resulting disorders amount in effect to so many infractions of the rule of justice — the foundation of all legitimate political authority — as well as of secular morality¹⁷⁸. Thus they undermine the institutions and the dictates of the temporal law in two ways : first, by subverting the day-to-day administration of state affairs, and secondly (on a wider front), by impairing the equilibrium, the permanence and the tranquillity of public order¹⁷⁹.

We next consider pride and disorder in their relation to Augustine's notion of « law » (*lex*). This, in its highest and most authentic form

175. *Ibid.* XV, 4 ; *PL* 41, 440 : « ...civitas ista (terrena) adversus se ipsam plerumque dividitur litigando, bellando, atque pugnando... Nam ex quacumque sui parte adversus alteram sui partem bellando surrexerit, quaerit esse victrix gentium, cum sit captiva vitiorum. » Cf. *ibid.* XVIII, 2, 1 ; *ibid.* col. 560.

176. *Serm.* 46, 8, 18 ; *PL* 38, 280 : « ...una mater nostra Catholica (genuit) omnes Christianos fideles toto orbe diffusos. »

177. *De civ. Dei* XIX, 14 ; *PL* 41, 643.

178. *Ibid.* II, 21, 1 ; *ibid.* col. 67 : « ...nisi magna iustitia geri aut stari (posse) rem publicam. » In substituting love as the pagan concept of justice, Augustine does not exclude the Christian virtue of justice. For justice is in fact proportional to charity : *de nat. et gr.* 70, 84 ; *PL* 44, 290 : « Charitas ergo inchoata, inchoata iustitia est ; charitas propecta, propecta iustitia est ; charitas magna, magna iustitia est ; charitas perfecta, perfecta iustitia est... » Cf. *de mor.* I, 15, 25 ; *PL* 32, 1322.

179. See fn. 175, above.

is none other than the reason and will of God Himself, Who thus assures the maintenance of the natural law and forbids its disturbance¹⁸⁰. God is hence the first and only true Legislator: His reason conceived the universal order, His will has brought it into being and by His providence it is both preserved and administered. The prescriptions of this eternal law (*lex aeterna*) are engraved upon the human conscience, so that by his reason man can know their content, and obey them by his will. The Divine precepts, whose detailed subject-matter may vary from time to time, are enshrined alike in Sacred Scripture and in the traditional wisdom of classical antiquity¹⁸¹. They can be briefly summarized as follows: first, to avoid doing to others what one does not wish to suffer oneself, and second, to render to every man that which is his due¹⁸². Had men always respected this law, the peace that it invariably creates would still reign throughout the world and the human family would have remained a single society speaking but one language. As a result, however, of Adam's pride, his issue have been subjected to a new penal regime, adapted to man's fallen nature. In this way vice experiences just punishment and excess of every sort suffers correction and restraint¹⁸³.

The temporal law, which differs from age to age and from country to country, is a more or less faithful reflection of the *lex aeterna*, adapted to the changing folk-ways of diverse empires and states. Nevertheless insofar as and to the extent that such enactments reflect the natural law, submission and obedience to them can — from Augustine's standpoint — be rightly demanded of all who live within the sphere of their jurisdiction¹⁸⁴.

The question of «slavery» (together with the related notions of «superiority», «inferiority») brings to the fore in our discussion a problem whose wider implications continue to divide students of St. Augustine's thought. With regard to slavery itself, the first step must clearly be to examine what the pertinent texts themselves

180. *C. Faust. Man.* XXII, 17; *PL* 42, 418: «Lex vero aeterna est ratio divina vel voluntas Dei, ordinem naturalem conservari iubens, perturbari vetans.»

181. Alike in his terminology and in the formulation of his philosophy of law, Augustine's debt to Cicero and the Stoic tradition seems evident. For details, see M. TESTARD, *Saint Augustin et Cicéron*. The one important development made here by our author consists in his equation of the Stoics' impersonal supreme World-Reason with the personal will and intellect of God as expressed in the Divine order and Providence. See further A. H. CHROUST, *The Philosophy of Law from St. Augustine to St. Thomas Aquinas*, in *the New Scholasticism*, XX, Washington, DC, 1946, pp. 26-71, and the refs. there given; also A. SCHUBERT, *op. cit.* pp. 21-39.

182. See *Tob.* 4, 16; *Math.* 7, 12; in *Iohan. ev. tr.* 49, 11, 12; *PL* 35, 1752; *Conf.* I, 18, 29; *PL* 32, 674; *enarr. in ps.* 57, 1; *PL* 36, 673-74; *Cic. de invent.* II, 53, 160; *de civ. Dei* XIX, 4, 4; *PL* 41, 629: «...iustitia, cuius munus est sua cuique tribuere...»

183. *De lib. arb.* III, 19, 54; *PL* 32, 1297.

184. *Ibid.* I, 6, 15; *ibid.* col. 1229.

have to say. The initial (and unchallenged) conclusion emerging from a study of these is that *servitus*, as an institution of recorded history, results in every instance from sin rather than from original human nature. The patriarchs and other 'just men' of Old Testament times, for example, are regularly depicted as shepherds of cattle and not kings over their fellows. This situation arises from the fact that God, in creating men in His own Image and Likeness, gave them lordship over irrational beasts alone, thus exempting fellow human beings, their natural equals¹⁸⁵.

Augustine's insistence that slavery is a result of, i.e. a punishment for, sin appears to introduce a note of ambiguity into his concept of *ordo naturalis* which calls, at this point, for further clarification of how he understands « nature ». What, in other words, does it mean for our author to say that, albeit (before his fall) Adam was subject to the 'natural' order of justice, God continues to use the 'natural' order to regulate hierarchical institutions like slavery and the secular state — both products (direct or indirect) of human sin and of fallen human society? We may here readily concede that Augustine's vocabulary lacks the technical precision and refinements which later reflection could impart to, e.g. a Thomas Aquinas or a Bonaventure. Nevertheless, it would not be difficult to shew that in the arena of catch-as-catch-can Pelagian polemics, Augustine did succeed in elaborating a consistent and coherent doctrine of human nature in terms of which both the above (and other) interrelated problems can be satisfactorily resolved. To support this contention, let us observe at the outset that he clearly specifies man's original nature — « human nature » in its true, distinctive and « historical » sense¹⁸⁶. Elsewhere, in a formula equally free from vagueness and ambiguity, the Bishop — referring to Adam's original endowment — writes of his *integra et sana hominis natura*¹⁸⁷. Secondly (and this distinction delimits an area of crucial disagreement among some commentators), he asserts without qualification that human nature was changed for the worse by original sin; the same statement, *verbis mutatis*, can (significantly enough) be matched as early as the *de libero arbitrio*, thus indicating that the basis for this discrimination had been established far in the past: « Thus we speak of 'nature' in two senses; first, with strict accuracy, when we refer to that nature in which Adam was created blameless and first of his kind; and secondly the nature wherein, condemned as a result of his punishment, men are

185. *De civ. Dei* XIX, 15; *PL* 41, 643: « Non enim itaque istud (servus) culpa meruit, non natura. » For *servus* see A. ERNOUT, A. MEILLET, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la Langue Latine*, Paris, 1959, pp. 620-21. Augustine's own suggested derivation may be found in *de civ. Dei* XIX, 15.

186. *Retr.* I, 10, 3; *PL* 32, 600: « ... (natura humana)... qualis sine vitio primitus condita est: ipsa enim vere ac proprie natura hominis dicitur. »

187. *De nat. et gr.* 48, 56; *PL* 44, 274.

born mortal, beset by ignorance, enslaved to the flesh »¹⁸⁸. Located within the framework of this distinction, our earlier text about *servitus* may be freely translated as follows : « slavery is enjoined by the very law which, in so doing, both punishes man's disorder and preserves the order essential even to his fallen nature. » So interpreted, this passage yields a sense that, in the present writer's opinion, at least, appears to satisfy the dual criteria of inner consistency and general conformity with our author's doctrine.

The problem of private ownership in St. Augustine's thought is one which, like slavery — itself a special instance of ownership — inevitably involves the consideration of many wider issues united only by the fact that each shares a common frontier with our present topic. To do justice to a theme of such complexity in a perhaps already over-long article is manifestly impossible. All that can be attempted, therefore, is to tabulate the following questions, which to us appear fundamental (and inescapable). We list them as follows :

- (a) does St. Augustine teach that there exists a right — derived from the natural law, and therefore inviolable — to the common (or *public*) possession of property ?
- (b) given that his reply is in the affirmative, what responsibility — if any — does he assign to individual peoples or states in its administration ?
- (c) does St. Augustine teach that there also exists a right to *private* property, derived from the natural law, and therefore inviolable ?
- (d) if his answer is again in the affirmative, what responsibility does he concede to the secular ruler in its administration ?
- (e) finally, does the natural law (as he understands it) recognize any meaningful difference, in the sphere of property ownership, as between *acquisition* (and distribution) on the one hand, and *use*, on the other ?

Our suggested answers to these questions, in the order given above, are as follows :

- (i) regarding (a) above, Augustine (in complete harmony with ancient Roman, Scriptural and patristic doctrine), unreservedly accepts possessions in common as founded upon and ratified by the natural law ;
- (ii) apart from the requirements of justice, in the absence of which kingdoms are but great robber-bands (*remota itaque iustitia, quid regna nisi magna latrocinia*^{188a} ?), and excepting the claims of religion and piety (annexed to justice) emperors, kings and

¹⁸⁸. See above, fn. 183.

^{188a}. *De civ. Dei* IV, 4 (*ad init.*) ; *PL* 41, 115.

princes possess within their several domains the Divinely-deputed power of administering public or state property ;

- (iii) taken in its totality, Augustine's doctrine can NOT be interpreted as asserting the existence of an unlimited right to private property deriving solely and immediately from the natural law. See (iv) below ;
- (iv) the context of his references (direct or indirect) to the *ius privatum* would indicate, rather, that he subsumes all purely individual rights and privileges under the common good (*bonum commune*) as reflected in the *ius humanum (ius fori)*, the latter being of course in turn transcended by the *ius Divinum (ius coeli)*. The right to private property (*ius privatum*) is thus neither absolute nor inviolable, but relative and conditional ; if, for example, a lawsuit arises involving contested property claims, it is the State which (subject to the provisions of (ii) above) always pronounces final judgement in accordance with *iura civilia*, i.e. the legislation enacted by the civil power in question (*ea iura oportet servare quae talibus habendis vel non habendis secundum civilem societatem sunt instituta*^{188b}).
- (v) St. Augustine unequivocally affirms that *iure Divino*, ownership depends not on valid title-deeds to property but on the just and appropriate *use* of possessions, first in relation to God, and then in relation to fellow men. As the *Summum Bonum* — God is the Supreme and Final End, to the enjoyment of Whom (*frui*) all other things exist in the role of so many means. And such means, rightly employed (*uti*), deliver their user from the binding constraints of the temporal law, thus enabling him to love and serve his Creator more freely. At the level of human relationships, Augustine introduces a further distinction in the domain of property ownership — this time between legal *acquisition* (*legitime, licite, acquirere ; possidere ; habere*) and right *use* (*bene uti*). For while anyone, not under religious vows, may legitimately possess goods, the *ius Divinum* permits no man to claim as unreservedly his what was given at the moment of Creation to all in common. Hence the duty of « communicating », or distributing from personal « wealth » — that is, superfluous possessions — to the poor and needy : *superflua divitum necessaria sunt pauperum. Res alienae possidentur, cum superflua possidentur*¹⁸⁹. The imperatives of the Divine Law — whose jurisdiction is universal — are no less mandatory than those of the secular state, and in case of conflict they demand prior obedience. It is inexact and therefore mislead-

188b. *Ep.* 83, 4 ; *PL* 33, 293.

189. *Enarr. in ps.* 147, 12 ; *PL* 37, 1922. Detailed refs. for pp. 53-57 may be found in my article, *St. Augustine's Concept of Property Ownership*, in *Recherches Augustiniennes*, vol. VIII, 1972, pp. 187-229.

ing to assert : ' St. Augustine is making a moral judgement and not formulating a legal rule when he says that those who use property badly possess it wrongfully »¹⁹⁰. No less perverse is the attempt to invalidate this equation (i.e. *bad* use of property = *wrongful* possession of property) by deriving it from a series of allegedly « *mauvais syllogismes* » which, if accepted at face value, would not only impugn their author's powers of logic but betray the actual meaning intended by him¹⁹¹. If our analysis of the pertinent texts be the correct one, Augustine was in fact never more self-consistent nor more in earnest than when he declares : *omne quod male possidetur, alienum est*, making the further point that many persons in the category of *male possidentes* would be obliged to return others' goods if even a few could be found to accept what really belongs to them¹⁹². There appears to be a general failure on the part of commentators to grasp the crucial issue here involved. For this reason, we emphasize that although Augustine's appeal is always to the individual conscience and not (except when religious unity and public order are threatened) to the civic authority, this fact in no way weakens the binding, even coercive character of such imperatives as he envisages them. Nor is a law or ' rule ' any less a law because it transcends the purely local and temporal ; in St. Augustine's eyes, the contrary is rather the case.

c) Within the Church

In the Catholic Church, which numbers many sinners within its fold¹⁹³, the disorder associated with pride is not uncommon. Here, as elsewhere, the consequences of this vice make for self-love and thus for disunity, separation, strife, and the substitution of the part for the whole. These aspects of pride within the Church are exemplified by heresy — in essence the exaltation of individual beliefs over against the doctrinal authority of the Body of Christ — and by schism, the sacrilegious will to sunder that Body's oneness in the interests of a single doctrine, person, or sect¹⁹⁴.

190. E. A. DEANE, *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine*, p. 107.

191. B. ROLAND-GOSSELIN, *La Morale de Saint Augustin*, p. 204.

192. *Ep.* 153, 26 ; *PL* 33, 665.

193. *Serm.* 71, 20, 33 ; *PL* 38, 463 ; *de mor.* I, 18, 3 ; *PL* 32, 1325. As the only community which works to recruit members for the Heavenly Society, the Catholic Church is *ipso facto* the Kingdom of Christ, with which He has promised to remain until the end of the world : *de civ. Dei* XX, 9, 1 ; *PL* 41, 673 : « *Ecclesia et nunc est regnum Christi, regnumque coelorum.* » For the problem of the relations between the Church, the Kingdom of God and the Heavenly Society, see E. GILSON, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, pp. 180-82 as well as fn. 63, pp. 332-33.

194. *Serm.* 46, 8 ; *PL* 38, 280 : « ...superbia parit discissionem, charitas unitatem » ; *de Gen. c. Man.* II, 8, 11 ; *PL* 34, 202 ; *enarr. in ps.* 49, 3 ; *PL* 36, 566 ; *c. Cresc.* II, 7, 9 ; *PL* 43, 471 : « ...haeresis autem, schisma inveteratum ».

d) Within the intellectual Order

Within the order of the intellect, the effects of pride upon the Earthly Society are manifold. Human reason is but a spark of Adam's original endowment. Consequently, while mankind at large enjoys a remarkable capacity for intellectual and cultural achievement, the doctrines of the pagan philosophers are in the main a mixture of falsehood and error¹⁹⁵. The dualism and exaggerated rationalism of the Manichaeans¹⁹⁶, the scepticism of the New Academy¹⁹⁷, the unqualified sensism alike of Epicurean and Stoic¹⁹⁸, all these errors testify to the ignorance stemming from Adam's pride. The neo-Platonists, indeed, approximate much more closely to Christian teaching in their beliefs about the being and attributes of God, as also the function and goal of philosophy¹⁹⁹. Yet even they failed to grasp the true nature of that Wisdom Which is the Incarnate Word, and as such both the True End of the search for happiness and the only Way thereto. This failure arose from the « Platonists' » typical contempt for the physical and the temporal, which led them to misconceive the meaning of Christ as not merely Saviour of men but the only intelligible principle of history²⁰⁰.

Why — it may be asked — did the neo-Platonists so firmly persist in denying the possibility of historical change? The basic reason for such a negative standpoint undoubtedly lay in their fear that the interpretation of history as process would compromise God's essential changelessness. But to accept the reality of history considered as a sequence of 'free' and unpredictable events does not, to St. Augustine, necessarily imply the surrender of this fundamental attribute of divinity. For God, immutable as He is, created the world (together with time) « in the beginning ». Hence we may infer that just as each and every individual soul experiences a genuine 'history' of its own involving decision and change, so also does

195. *De civ. Dei* XVIII, 41, 1-2; *PL* 41, 600-01.

196. *Conf.* VIII, 10, 22; *PL* 32, 759; *ibid.* III, 6, 10; *ibid.* col. 687; *ibid.* V, 3, 6; *ibid.* col. 708; *de mor.* I, 2, 3-10, 16; *PL* 32, 1312-17. See F. C. BURKITT, *The Religion of The Manichees*.

197. *C. Acad.* II, 5, 11; *PL* 32, 924-25; *de civ. Dei* XIX, 18; *PL* 41, 646-47.

198. *Ibid.* VIII, 5; *ibid.* 230 especially: « Ei (Epicurei et Stoici)... id solum cogitare potuerunt, quod cum eis corda eorum obstricta carnis sensibus fabulata sunt. »

199. *Ibid.* VIII, 4-8; cols. 227-33.

200. *De vera rel.* 24, 45; *PL* 34, 141; *de civ. Dei* IX, 17; *PL* 41, 271-72; *enarr. in ps.* 8, 8; *PL* 36, 112: « ...per humilitatem historiae fidei, quae temporaliter gesta est, ad sublimitatem intelligentiae rerum aeternarum... »; *Conf.* V, 3, 5; *PL* 32, 708: « Non noverunt hanc viam, qua descendant ad illum a se, et per eum ascendant ad eum. » *Ibid.* VII, 21, 27; *ibid.* col. 748: « ...non habent illae paginae vultum pietatis huius, lacrimas confessionis. » Other major errors of the « Platonists » included polytheism, the cult of theurgy, belief in reincarnation and the eternity of the human soul, and denial of bodily resurrection: *ibid.* V, 3, 5; *ibid.* col. 708; *de civ. Dei* X, 10; *PL* 41, 288; *ibid.* X, 31; *ibid.* cols. 311-12; *ibid.* XXII, 5; 11; *ibid.* cols. 755-57; 773-76.

the wider arena of human affairs generally. The successive data observable in any era or epoch of history are thus at once unique and irreversible : *circuitus illi iam explosi sunt*²⁰¹. Like number, which though infinite is not without a beginning, both the human soul and its material surroundings are constantly susceptible to development and change²⁰². What happens in history may therefore be novel to the experiencing subject : nothing, however, is new or strange to God because His creative act escapes the meshes of time even as His unmeasurable understanding can alone comprehend the infinite and the contingent. Such, then, for Augustine is the total import of those pregnant words : *in principio fecit Deus coelum et terram*²⁰³.

The Stoics were no less resolute than neo-Platonism itself in affirming that the Divine immutability remains intact throughout the unending series of worlds postulated by their cosmological theories. The mere notion of the infinite and unlimited is strictly unthinkable — even to the God of Stoicism²⁰⁴. During any given period of time the world must therefore contain a specific number of persons and things combined in exactly the same manner and sequence. The Stoics accordingly held, for example, that the city of Athens, the Academy, Plato and his disciples have « happened » at fixed intervals in the past and will continue so to recur through innumerable ages^{204a}. In St. Augustine's apologetic this concept is completely excluded from the realm of the possible by the « once-and-for-all » character of certain turning-points in history, as well as by the existence of certain corollaries deducible from these. Thus it is a fact — decisive for Augustine in any dialogue with pagan philosophy — that because of the unique event of Christ's death to atone for human sin, the saints are destined after their resurrection to be « ever with the Lord »²⁰⁵. Here is indeed the ultimate, triumphantly affirmative fact of facts, since at a single blow it demolishes the entire

201. *Ibid.* XII, 20, 4 ; *ibid.* col. 371. Classical theories posited time as a ceaseless rotation of happiness and misery. PLATO, for example (*Timaeus* 22, *Leges* 677), taught a cyclic theory according to which the world, even if never totally destroyed, would be visited from time to time by floods and conflagrations. He also believed in a cycle of rebirths for the individual, although the sage might win eventual escape from rebirth. Cf. also *Phaedrus* 247-249, *Phaedo* 70 ff. and *Timaeus* 38 E - 39 E. Other philosophers affirmed an unending cycle of cosmic destructions and restorations. This view appears to have been advanced by Anaximander (ZELLER, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, pp. 256-61), Empedocles, Heraclitus (ARIST. *de cael.* 280^a 14), the Stoics (DIOG. LAERT. *Zeno*, VII, 137 : cf. ZELLER, *The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, pp. 164-69), and even by the Christian author ORIGEN (*de principiis* III, 5, 3). See R. D. HICKS, *Stoic and Epicurean*, pp. 32-38, 364, 367 ; also J. CALLAHAN, *Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy*.

202. *Ibid.* XI, 4, 2 ; *ibid.* cols. 319-20.

203. *Gen.* I, 1 ; *de civ. Dei* XII, 17, 2 ; *PL.* 41, 367.

204. *Ibid.* XII, 18 ; *ibid.* cols. 367-68.

204a. *Ibid.* XII, 13, 2, *ibid.* cols. 361-62.

205. *Ibid.* XII, 13, 2 ; *ibid.* col. 362.

fabric of belief in historical cycles : *fit ergo aliquid novi in tempore, quod finem non habet temporis*²⁰⁶.

In the field of science and particularly of physics and astronomy, pride once again vitiates the undoubted exploits of human reason. Specifically it offends against the order of studies or liberal disciplines which, duly observed, conduces to a knowledge of God²⁰⁷. But instead of attaining this, the scientist within the Earth-born Society typically yields to a perverse self-exaltation and curiosity²⁰⁸. In so doing, he loses his awareness of spiritual realities by subordinating the higher reason to the lower, wisdom to science and therefore contemplation to action²⁰⁹. What is worse, such « science » often degenerates into a virtual self-deification which utterly degrades the very notion of divinity by reducing God, on occasion, to even an infra-human level²¹⁰. But creature-worship of this sort is not the effect of human ignorance alone : it also results, in part, from the pride of the demons who control the Earthly Society. These malevolent spirits seek by every means to secure Divine honours both for themselves and for other created things. It is they also whose influence explains the appearance of pagan oracles and of magic among mankind²¹¹.

e) Within the Moral Order

The consequences of pride in the moral order virtually embrace every consequence of this vice, granted the relative primacy of the will, or desire, even within the domain of the intellect itself. Now the ultimate goal common to the search alike for wisdom, for knowledge and for goodness, is beatitude : hence the pre-occupation of all classical philosophers with the problem of ends²¹². But these philosophers believed that beatitude lies within the reach of unaided human effort. Such an attitude — shared by both Stoic and Epicurean — reflects a proud self-sufficiency that opposes itself to God because it seeks complete happiness in time and through man's nature alone, without the aid of grace²¹³.

206. *Ibid.* XII, 13, 1 ; *ibid.* col. 361.

207. *Ench.* 9, 3 ; *PL* 40, 235-36 ; *de Trin.* XII, 8, 13 ; *PL* 42, 1005. The liberal disciplines are discussed in *de ord.* II, 9, 26-19, 51 ; *de doct. chr.* II, 7, 9-11 ; *de quant. an.* 33 ; 70-76.

208. *Conf.* X, 35, 54-57 ; *PL* 32, 802-03 ; *de vera rel.* 49, 94 ; *PL* 34, 164. For Adam's *audax et avida curiositas*, see *de Gen. ad litt.* XI, 31, 41 ; *PL* 34, 446.

209. See above, fn. 114 : *de Trin.* XII, 4, 4 ; *PL* 42, 1000 ; *ibid.* XII, 10, 15 ; *ibid.* col. 1006 ; *ibid.* XII, 15, 25 ; *ibid.* col. 1012.

210. *Conf.* V, 3, 5 ; *PL* 32, 708.

211. *De civ. Dei* VIII, 19 ; *ibid.* X, 1 ; *PL* 41, 243-44 ; 277. *Serm.* 197, 4, 1 ; *PL* 38, 1022-23.

212. See above, fn. 58.

213. *De civ. Dei* XIX, 4, 1 ; *PL* 41, 627 : « Illi autem qui in ista vita fines bonorum et malorum esse putaverunt... *hic* beati esse, et *a se ipsis* beati fieri mira vanitate voluerunt. » (italics added). Cf. *ibid.* VIII, 8 ; *PL* 41, 253 : « Ita bonum hominis... nihil aliud quam ab homine expetendum esse putaverunt... »

In fact, however, the Stoic sage is no happier than anyone else, for the pretended virtues of fortitude and « apathy » do not really shield him from afflictions, as his defence of suicide proves²¹⁴. Indeed no pagan « virtue » has any real merit or salvific efficacy, since it is not sought from God in piety, faith and love²¹⁵. Even the « Platonists » shew the effects of pride within the moral order. They too betray an exaggerated intellectualism as well as a characteristic contempt for space and time. Scorning the Incarnate Saviour, they seek eternal reality within the resources of fallen human nature alone²¹⁶.

To balance Augustine's verdict upon the Earth-born Society, we must recall that according to him, Rome (its centre) was the greatest of the secular empires; God Himself prepared her mission, giving her many great statesmen endowed with praiseworthy qualities like love of freedom, patriotism, and disciplined devotion to duty²¹⁷. Yet in the course of time these same attributes tended more and more frequently to subserve the aims of a proud ambition, not less jealous for world conquest and worldly acclaim than for complete autonomy as an individual state²¹⁸. From our author's viewpoint, Rome is thus a paradigm of the Devil's Society and her lust for power merely an actualized form of the pride that identifies the *corpus diaboli*, taken as a whole²¹⁹.

214. *Ibid.* XIV, 9, 4; *ibid.* col. 415: cf. *enarr. in ps.* 55, 6; *PL* 36, 650-51; *ibid.* XIX, 4, 4; *ibid.* cols. 629-30.

215. *De civ. Dei* V, 19; *PL* 41, 166: «...neminem sine vera pietate, id est veri Dei vero cultu, veram posse habere virtutem; nec eam veram esse, quando gloriae servit humanae...» Cf. *ibid.* XIX, 25; *ibid.* col. 656; *de div. quaest.* 83, 66, 5; *PL* 40, 63. All the texts are discussed in J. MAUSBACH, *Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus*, II, pp. 258-94. J. ROHMER (*op. cit.*) argues that according to St. Augustine, no good act is possible without the inspiration of charity (pp. 20 ff.). P. J. WANG, *Saint Augustin et les Vertus des Patiens*, differentiates between what he calls « false virtues » — those originated by cupidity and the love of glory, for example — and virtues which are « illusory » (*décevantes*) in the sense that they do not reach their proper ultimate object or end (pp. 31 ff.). The present writer believes that, on balance, the latter interpretation is to be preferred. He affirms, in other words, a radical distinction in St. Augustine between genuinely virtuous acts, i.e. those motivated remotely, by not immediately, by a disinterested love of God or neighbour, and what he calls *virtutes civiles* (*ep.* 138, 3, 17) — i.e. those prompted by such qualities as patriotism, magnanimity, or love of glory, but not inspired by charity.

216. See, above, fn. 200, and cf. *Conf.* VII, 9, 14; *PL* 32, 741: « (Platonici) cothurno tanquam doctrinae sublimioris elati non audiunt dicentem, Discite a me quoniam mitis sum et humilis corde (*Matth.* 11, 29)... »

217. *De civ. Dei* XVIII, 2, 1; *PL* 41, 560; *ibid.* V, 1; *ibid.* col. 141; *ibid.* V, 12-15; *ibid.* cols. 154-160. Cf. SALLUST, *Catil.* 53. Augustine also refers to and praises « a certain Roman characteristic uprightness » (*quandam sui generis probitatem*), a quality which, though its source was the One True God, did not result from belief in Him (*ep.* 138, 3, 17). Among the distinguished statesmen of ancient Rome whom our author singles out for especial mention are: Regulus (*de civ. Dei* I, 15; III, 18; V, 18), Scipio (*ibid.* III, 21), Cato (*ibid.* V, 12), Caesar (*ibid.* V, 12), Quinctius Cincinnatus and Fabricius (*ibid.* V, 18).

218. *Ibid.* V, 18; 12; *PL* 41, 162; 154: « Ipsam denique patriam suam... prius omni studio liberam, deinde dominam concupierunt (Romani). »

219. *Ibid.* I, *prae fat*; *ibid.* cols. 13-14.

THE REMEDIES FOR PRIDE : HUMILITY, CHARITY

Re-Formation

Superbia as the soul's chief sickness, demands a remedy²²⁰,—or rather, remedies—capable of restoring both within the individual and in society at large the order subverted by this vice. For Augustine, the fundamental constituent in such a remedy is « re-formation »²²¹. The latter summarizes the entire process of transition from pride to humility, from sin to grace (through faith), and therefore from disorder to order. Alike in the realms of being, of action and of the intellect, pride may be opposed point by point to humility, corner-stone and foundation of the Christian life.

Humility as Grandeur

The Bishop regards this same virtue as an indispensable channel through which the Society of God gains access to all the blessings that grace bestows upon it²²². Humility has therefore nothing in common with the abject self-abasement of those who refuse to look beyond the limitations of a human nature corrupted by sin and radically incapable of doing good. Augustine affirms, on the contrary, that this same virtue is quite compatible with a true grandeur, itself the only means of acquiring Divine Wisdom²²³. In this sense, then, we are entitled to say that our author recognizes the existence of a distinctively Christian notion of « magnanimity ». So completely however, does he subordinate the latter to humility that in his eyes it is to be accounted the measuring rod, so to speak, of genuine greatness, as well as the touchstone of moral strength and endurance²²⁴.

220. See above, fn. 58, last ref : *serm.* 140, 5 ; *PL* 38, 780-81 : « ...(*superbia*) conatur ingredi, impedit tumor... ergo detumescat. Unde detumescit ? Accipiat humilitatis medicamentum : bibat contra tumorem poculum amarum, sed salubre ; bibat poculum humilitatis. »

221. On this concept see G.-B. LADNER, *St. Augustine's Conception of the Reformation of Man to the Image of God*, in *Aug. Mag.* 1954, I, pp. 867-878. Cf. *de Trin.* XIV, 16, 22 ; *PL* 42, 1053 ff.

222. *Serm.* 69, 1, 2 ; *PL* 38, 441 : « Magnus esse vis, a minimo incipe. Cogitas magnam fabricam construere celsitudinis, de fundamento prius cogita humilitatis. » Cf. *serm.* 117, 10, 17 ; *PL* 38, 671.

223. *Enarr. in ps.* 130, 12 ; *PL* 37, 1713 : « Certe explicatum est... ubi nos Deus voluit esse humiles, ubi altos : humiles, propter cavendam *superbiam* ; altos, propter capiendam sapientiam. »

224. *De sanct. virg.* 31, 31 ; *PL* 40, 413 : « Mensura humilitatis cuique ex mensura ipsius magnitudinis data est... »

The Uniqueness of Christian Humility

Augustine insists that humility was completely unknown to even the most advanced speculation of pre-Christian antiquity. He further maintains that this fact did not result from any mere chance or accident of history. According to him, indeed, humility as a standard of perfection is strictly inconceivable within a universe of pagan moral values precisely because no unaided human intellect could either apprehend or appreciate the condescension of the Divine love as the Incarnation was one day to reveal it²²⁵. Now here Augustine has surely contributed on a major scale to the historical evolution of the theology of humility. For he appears to be the first among the Church Fathers of both West and East to have perceived the latter's absolute originality and uniqueness. Previous to his period, it would seem, the general opinion was that classical philosophers had known of and inculcated this virtue just as certainly as they taught and practised « magnanimity » or « independence ». As early as the second century A.D., for example, the renowned

225. *Enarr. in ps.* 31, 18; *PL* 36, 270: « ...Bibe aquam de tuis vasis... (*Prov.* 5, 15)... Quae est illa aqua, nisi quae docet hanc vocem... Ego dixi, Domine, miserere mei, sana animam meam, quoniam peccavi ibi? Haec aqua confessionis peccatorum, haec aqua humiliationis cordis, haec aqua vitae salutaris, abiciens se, nihil de se praesumentis, nihil suae potentiae superbe tribuentis. Haec aqua in nullis alienigenarum libris est, non in epicureis, non in stoicis, non in manichaeis, non in platoniciis. Ubi cumque etiam inveniuntur optima praecepta morum et disciplinae, humilitas tamen ista non invenitur. Via humilitatis huius aliunde manat: a Christo venit. » Cf. *Conf.* VII, 18, 24; *PL* 32, 745-46. It is scarcely questionable that the explicit ideal of « humility », in any sense consonant with the Christian virtue so named, was unknown in the pagan world. To ARISTOTLE, for example, the lowly state designated by him as ταπεινότης is a shameful disposition identifiable for all purposes of classification with the vice of « pusillanimity » (μικροψυχία: *Rhet.* 1384^e 4). SENECA in similar fashion opposes the humilitas animi of the pusillanimous to the magnanimity of the sage who recognizes the measure of his own greatness at its true worth (*de constant. sapient.* X, 2-3). PLUTARCH does not hesitate to contrast the magnanimous man (μεγαλόψυχος) with the humble (ταπεινόφρων) to the implied detriment of the latter (*de tranquill. an.* XVII, 475^{c-f}). There are nevertheless traces in later Stoicism (particularly in the first and second centuries, A.D.) of an attitude towards the Divine which betrays at least some of the notes characteristic of Christian humility. Already in Epictetus, for example, we find one example of a prayer of petition — a practice wholly inconsistent with the Stoic belief that man is by nature and endowment the equal and therefore the companion of the gods: *dissert.* II, 18. Cf. *SEN. ep.* 31, 8. MARCUS AURELIUS, who in general deprecates prayer for material blessings, repeatedly recommends the habit of asking the gods for help in becoming indifferent to such attractions (*e.g. medit.* IX, 40). Finally, our catena of refs. would be incomplete without mention of CLEANTHES' moving hymn to Zeus. For the complete text see E. D. HICKS, *Stoic and Epicurean*, pp. 14-16. The problem of how Cleanthes, as a Stoic sage, resolved the seeming paradox of such a prayer on the lips (or from the pen) of a professed μεγαλόψυχος does not concern us now. My particular attention was first drawn to this author and his work in the year 1958 by Professor G.M.A. Grube, then Chairman of the Graduate School of Classics, Toronto: to him I remain grateful for this and many other kindnesses.

pagan controversialist Celsus was claiming that the Christians had not merely stolen « humility » from a Graeco-Roman source, but also seriously misinterpreted it in the process²²⁶. To document his charge, Celsus singled out a familiar passage in the *Laws* where Plato depicts justice as a virtue to be followed in humble and well-ordered fashion (ταπεινός... καὶ κεκοσμημένος) by those desirous of true happiness²²⁷. Celsus' opponents, notably Clement of Alexandria, were in turn not slow to make the countercharge that Plato had borrowed the doctrine from Sacred Scripture²²⁸. Origen, while in agreement with this assumption regarding Plato, further maintained that the Stoics had also explicitly recognized and idealized humility as an ethical norm. According to him, however, they named it not ταπεινότης, because the word has a markedly pejorative sense in Classical Greek, but ἀτυφία, « freedom from the presumption which blinds a man's head and heart », or μετριότης, « due measure », 'moderation'²²⁹. Now there can, of course, be no question that these two qualities (insofar as they admit of a clear-cut distinction) were considered normative in current philosophical circles²³⁰. Concretely and in point of historical fact, however, the vice of pride — to which such virtues had been opposed — gradually lost its original theocentric orientation and reference. We can thus appreciate how the contrary virtues of freedom from arrogance and of moderation, or temperance, became limited in turn to an exclusively human (or even anthropocentric) sphere of applicability. It may be added in parentheses that this opacity concerning the significance and relationship of pride and humility in classical thought appears to have prevailed, without exception, among all the Eastern Fathers. Even St. John Chrysostom, so hostile in general to the pagan philosophers²³¹, credited them with belief in and approval of a concept of humility akin to that formulated and taught by the Church²³².

226. ORIGEN, *c. Cels.* VI, 15.

227. *Leg.* IV, 715^e — 716^a.

228. *Strom.* II, 22 ; II (ed. Staehlin), 185-86.

229. *In Lucam hom.* VIII, *Origines Werke*, GCS IX, 58-59.

230. The notion of a « mean » between two « extremes » (cf. our « golden mean ») is rooted deep in the gnostic wisdom of both the Greek and the Roman literary traditions : in philosophy it also occupied a central position from the earliest times. The twin precepts, μηδὲν ἄγαν and *ne quid nimis* enshrine this proverbial counsel, which was first formalized by ARISTOTLE in the *Nichomachean Ethics* (Book Two, 6 1106^b8 — 1107^a6).

231. Cf. L. MEYER, *Saint Jean Chrysostome, Maître de Perfection chrétienne*, pp. 188-90, and refs.

232. IOAN. CHRYSOST., *in act. apost. hom.* XXXVI, 2 ; IV, 3, 4 ; PG 60, 261 ; 47-50.

Christ, the Perfect Exemplar of Humility

According to Augustine, then, humility as a moral norm remained at all times alien and incomprehensible to the pagan world. Hence that men might come to acknowledge this ideal and to seek it as a virtue, there was required a Model Who by a Life of perfect obedience and complete submission to God could demonstrate both the merits and the only Source of true humility. This indeed, so Augustine affirms, was one of the chief purposes of the Incarnation and it is in these terms that he habitually presents the person and work of Jesus. From manger to cross, His life, teaching and witness were all, in effect, one continuous « acted lesson » about humility. Hence the titles *magister, doctor humilitatis*²³³ which the Bishop applies to Him as pre-eminent in the practice of a virtue common alike to saints exalted by God and to One Who, unlike them, condescends — by a gratuitous act of self-abasement — to accept the frailties of human nature²³⁴. Within this perspective, the whole body of Christ's moral doctrine might be fittingly epitomized in His own words : *discite a me quoniam mitis sum et humilis corde*²³⁵. Humility presided, so to speak, at the opening chapter of the God-Man's earthly life. The Incarnation was, in Itself, an incredible event, flouting or scandalizing all the most firmly-held prejudices of the Schools²³⁶.

But the second act of this great drama proved scarcely less momentous in its effects upon the economy of human redemption than Jesus' actual birth. For immediately prior to the beginning of His public ministry, and as a preliminary trial of strength between the two protagonists involved, the Devil issued a challenge in the wilderness by offering to his intended victim the possession of all worldly kingdoms. The price demanded was an act of obeisant adoration to the Satanic presence. In rejecting this proud bid to put His own mission and allegiance to the test, the Son of God affirmed by His example three important principles. First, pride is always identical in essence with and therefore an expression of the Devil's most characteristic vice. Second, temptations to pride originate in every case from one and the same diabolical source. Third, the above encounter shews that the only efficacious weapon and antidote against pride was there, as now, humility : *Ita calcata est superbia*^{236a}.

233. *In Ioan. ev. tr.* 59, 1 ; *PL* 35, 1795 : « Magister humilitatis verbo et exemplo. » See also *ibid.* 25, 16 ; 18 ; cols. 1604 ; 1605 ; *de sanct. virg.* 33, 33 ; *PL* 40, 414-15 ; *serm.* 62, 1, 1 ; *PL* 38, 415.

234. *De Trin.* XIII, 17, 22-18, 23 ; *PL* 42, 1031-33.

235. *Sermo* Wilmart, XI, 14, in *Misc. Agost.* I, p. 705 : « Quid est, sequere Dominum, Quid est, imitare Dominum, Discite a me quoniam mitis sum et humilis corde. » Cf. *de vera rel.* 16, 32 ; *PL*, 34, 135. For a useful (and compendious) summary of St. Augustine's interpretation of Christian humility as Christ Himself preached and practised it, see *de sanct. virg.* 32, 32-36, 36 ; *PL* 40, 413-17.

236. *Fns.* 216, 225, above.

236a. *De vera rel.* 38, 71 ; *PL* 34, 153 ; cf. *enarr. in ps.* 93, 22 ; *PL* 37, 210.

To summarize : by conquering this fateful enticement, which so significantly re-echoed the promise of preternatural power made in the Garden, Jesus heralded an era of new life won by perfect obedience to the Divine will rather than to His own^{236b}. Victorious pride brought ruin and death to mankind through the first Adam's disobedience : vanquished pride, through Christ's unique example of obedient humility, inaugurates a dispensation wherein all men can live again in and because of the Second Adam.

Every subsequent feature of the Saviour's ministry serves both to reveal and to enjoin this same virtue : His humble parentage, the obscure town where He was born in a stable, His poverty, the baptism of Master by servant, the washing of the disciples' feet — a ceremony performed with the express purpose of illustrating and commending humility²³⁷. Nowhere — according to Augustine — do these considerations apply with greater force or point than to the closing chapters of Christ's life on earth, as shewn by His sufferings, and not least the insults and rebuffs to which He was subjected, all culminating in an ignominious and shameful death by crucifixion. Was not this to run the entire gamut of injustice and injury²³⁸ ? Yet the Divine medicine of humility triumphed over every **weakness** and tribulation ; the Divine Physician offers it as such to the sick in soul, to the weary and heavy-laden of this world, but more than any others, to the proud who, at the furthest remove from true lowliness of heart and mind, are therefore in the greatest need of its healing and transforming efficacy²³⁹.

Conversion from Pride to Humility through Grace and Free Will

To know — by a purely intellectual process — the nature of the remedy required for a specific disease is one thing : to obtain the remedy in question, quite another. Thus it follows that neither the doctrine taught by Christ nor the example which He Himself gave thereof can *per se* transform the vice of pride into the virtue of humility. In order to achieve this goal, a sinner needs the help of Divine grace. Now the effect of grace is such that what was formerly an *evil* will become a *good* will, since only a good will can choose and love the good²⁴⁰. On the other hand, it is of the essence of Augustine's thought regarding « conversion » and

236^b. *De Gen. ad litt.* VIII, 14, 32 ; *PL* 34, 385.

237. *De cat. rud.* 22, 40 ; *PL* 40, 339 ; *serm.* 52, 1, 1 ; *PL* 37, 354-55 ; in *Iohan. ev. tr.* 58, 4 ; *PL* 35, 1794.

238. *De vera rel.* 16, 31 ; *PL* 34, 135 ; in *Iohan. ev. tr.* 36, 4 ; *PL* 35, 1664-65 ; *c. ep. Parm.* III, 2, 5 ; *PL* 43, 87.

239. In *Iohan. ev. tr.* 25, 18 ; *PL* 35, 1606 : « Humilitatem doceo, ad me venire non potest nisi humilis. Non mittit foras nisi superbia... » Cf. *de sanct. virg.* 35, 35 (*ad fin.*) — 36, 36 ; *PL* 40, 416-17.

240. *De gr. et lib. arb.* 15, 31 ; *PL* 44, 899 : « Gratia Dei semper est bona, et per hanc fit ut sit homo bonae voluntatis, qui prius fuit voluntatis malae. »

« re-formation » that this power of choice, which alone determines the qualification of the moral act, cannot exist without the endowment of free will. In considering the case of a proud man who has acquired the virtue of humility our problem is therefore to discover how Augustine reconciles the unlimited sovereignty of God with the freedom of the human agent. But before attempting to answer this question, we must make quite certain that we understand the precise meaning of the two separate propositions that it contains. Let us now proceed to examine the first of these.

By His grace God is Supreme Master of the human will, which — although it receives every virtuous inclination from Him — nevertheless remains subject to Divine Providence and power in evil no less than in good²⁴¹. On the other hand, even after the Fall man has retained freedom of choice, at least to the extent that all human, i.e. moral conduct implies the ability to perceive (and choose between) varying alternatives²⁴². But the number and quality of the graces that God bestows upon any given person depend in the last resort upon whether he is numbered among those self-condemned to everlasting reprobation, or among the elect — and therefore predestined to everlasting happiness²⁴³. In the former instance, man receives « sufficient grace », i.e. a grace that would « suffice » for salvation if he willed to accept and co-operate with it in the interests of his eternal welfare²⁴⁴. In the latter instance, man receives « efficacious grace » by which (without violating free will), God presents such aids and attractions as He infallibly knows will assure salvation. The concept of efficacious grace cannot be understood apart from Augustine's psychological doctrine, which in characteristic fashion emphasizes the importance of man's prevailing love or desire for the orientation of his life and conduct. But in the concrete, the objects of such love are always suggested by a particular pattern of ideas, motives and other solicitations. It is then because in His unerring fore-knowledge God selects the influences most certain to gain the entire (though voluntary) assent of the will that He procures the salvation of the elect²⁴⁵.

241. *De corr. et gr.* 14, 45 ; *PL* 44, 943-44 ; *de praed. sanct.* 8, 13 ; *PL* 44, 971 ; *de div. quaest. ad Simpl.* I, 2, 14 ; *PL* 40, 119.

242. See above, fn. 158. Cf. *serm.* 156, 11, 12 ; *PL* 38, 856 ; *de corr. et gr.* 11, 31-32 ; *PL* 44, 935-37.

243. For Augustine's definition of « predestination », which involves both God's preparation of man's will as also His choice of an infallibly effective *beneficium*, see *de don. pers.* 14, 35 ; 17, 41-42 ; *PL* 45, 1014 ; 1019 ; also below, fn. 245, first ref.

244. *De pecc. mer. et rem.* II, 17, 26 ; *PL* 44, 167 : « ...gratia Dei est, quae homini adiuuat voluntates : qua ut non adiuventur, in ipsis itidem causa est, non in Deo... » Cf. *de corr. et gr.* 12, 34 ; *PL* 44, 936-37 ; *de spir. et litt.* 34, 60 c *PL* 44, 240 ; *de dom. pers.* 6, 10 ; *PL* 45, 999.

245. *De gr. et lib. arb.* 16, 32-17, 33 ; *PL* 44, 900-01 : « Certum est enim nos mandata servare, si volumus : sed quia praeparatur voluntas a Domino (*Prov.* 8, 35, sec. LXX), ab illo petendum est ut tantum velimus, quantum sufficit ut volendo faciamus. Certum est nos velle, cum volumus : sed ille facit ut velimus bonum... Certum

Now the love by which the elect seek and obtain efficacious grace is called charity — a love of God that so far from robbing the human will of moral freedom, actually restores its true liberty of choice, i.e. the whole-hearted and spontaneous love of good rather than evil²⁴⁶. It is important to note that the liberty here in question results not only from grace, but from the highest, the flower of all graces, i.e. charity. For charity is alike the gift of God and God Himself.²⁴⁷ Just then as pride embodies self-love in its most developed and perverse form, so too humility, which in a subordinate mode opposes this vice both by nature and in its effects, is compared by the Bishop with charity as means to end, root to tree-top and foundation to summit²⁴⁸. Seen in such a light, humility may indeed be considered the very perfection of Christian discipline and character²⁴⁹. For it both includes and recapitulates all the stages of the long and painful journey leading from sin to grace : knowledge of the law and of self ; faith ; penance ; confession ; and prayer for Divine aid. Viewed as obedience (from one aspect its most characteristic expression), humility denotes an attitude of subjection appropriate and necessary in all rational creatures, since these must conform to the law and the power of their Creator²⁵⁰.

Considered in its essence, then, this virtue represents an ordered submission and orientation of the will to God. As such, to be sure, it is already a first sign of love, for love is nothing but an intensified form of the will. On the other hand, however, we can now surely appreciate the fact that — in St. Augustine's eyes — humility cannot be equated with love in its fully actualized and perfected state. For although self-examinat-

est nos facere cum facimus : sed ille facit ut faciamus, praebendo vires efficacissimas voluntati... Ut ergo velimus, sine nobis operatur ; cum autem volumus, et sic volumus ut faciamus, nobiscum cooperatur... » Cf. *de spir. et litt.* 34, 00 ; *PL* 44, 240-41 ; *de corr. et gr.* 14, *PL* 44, 942 : « Sic enim velle seu nolle in volentis aut nolentis est potestate, ut divinam voluntatem non impediatur, nec superet potestatem. » But this power does not present itself to the recipient as an irresistible force : it is rather a « gracious » gift which solicits and persuades. Cf. *in Iohan. ev. tr.* 20, 4 ; *PL* 35, 1608 : « Noli te cogitare invitum trahi. Trahitur animus et amore... non necessitas, sed voluntas ; non obligatio, sed delectatio (trahit animum). » Cf. *ibid.* 16, 5 (col. 1609) where this attraction is compared to the effect of offering green leaves to a sheep or nuts to a boy.

246. *Ep.* 157, 2, 7-8 ; *PL* 33, 676 ; *c. duas ep. Pel.* I, 10, 22 ; *PL* 44, 561 : « ... ipsa delectatio boni, qua etiam non consentit ad malum, non timore poenae, sed amore iustitiae... nonnisi gratia deputanda (est). » Cf. *de mor.* I, 12, 21 ; *PL* 32, 1320 ; *de corr. et gr.* 12, 35 ; *PL* 44, 937 : « Maior libertas est necessaria adversus tot et tantas tentationes, quae in paradiso non fuerunt, dono perseverantiae munita atque firmata, ut cum omnibus amoribus, terroribus suis vincatur hic mundus... »

247. *Ep.* 180, 3, 7, *PL* 33, 818 : « ... charitas autem usque adeo donum Dei est, ut Deus dicatur » (*I Iohan.* 4, 8).

248. Cf. *serm.* 69, 1, 2 ; *PL* 38, 441 ; *ibid.* 117, 10, 17 ; *ibid.* col. 671.

249. *Serm.* 351, 3, 4 ; *PL* 39, 1538-39 ; *enarr. in ps.* 130, 14 ; *PL* 37, 1714 ; *ep.* 118, 3, 22 ; *PL* 33, 442.

250. Cf. above, fn. 72.

ion and penance chasten and purify the humble, enabling them to scale the heights separating creature from Creator — heights inaccessible to the proud — this virtue is but the dawn of that splendour of union with God essential to the fulfilment of human nature itself. Negatively, indeed, humility does prepare the way, so to speak, for this union by totally eradicating the vices and propensities immediately opposed thereto. Positively, as has also been shewn, it produces within the repentant sinner not only an attitude of due conformity to the Divine law and the Divine omnipotence, but an actual elevation of soul²⁵¹. Yet God is more than absolute Law and Power; He is also — and supremely — Love. Because of His nature, God loves man and demands his love in return. The unity which lovers seek is therefore here achieved by the crowning grace of charity. We may further deduce with St. Augustine himself that while humility is always latent in the glowing ardour of this virtue, its true nature only appears in retrospect — that is, against the background of *charitas purgatissima et consummata*. Let us express this truth in terms of other metaphors congenial to our author by remarking that for all its grandeur, charity invariably presupposes the presence of humility as root and base, guardian and strengthening bastion²⁵².

The Crowning Grace of Charity

In contrasting *superbia* and *humilitas*, we have noted that pride is the most heinous and 'general' of sins, for under it all other cupidities are subsumed, and in it they exhibit a monstrous unity. Such, indeed, has been the nature of this vice from the beginning. Charity, on the other hand, is now revealed in its nobility as the most « general » of virtues. For to begin with, its own essence embodies and conjoins their several distinctive qualities, which it ordines, in accordance with the dignity of each, to one common Final End. Secondly, it both destroys and cancels the effects of every moral transgression²⁵³. But what gives to the queen of graces its pre-eminent character is the fact that as the unifying link between creature and Creator, charity involves an unmediated participation in the Divine life itself. This is precisely the reason why, as Augustine will repeatedly insist, no virtue can be truly so called unless in

251. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 13, 1; *PL* 41, 421: « Est igitur aliquid humilitatis miro modo quod sursum faciat cor... »

252. *De sanct. virg.* 53, 54 (*ad fin.*); *PL* 40, 427; *ibid.* 31, 31; *ibid.* col. 413; *enarr. in ps.* 141, 7; *PL* 37, 1837: « Nihil excelsius via charitatis, et non in illa ambulant nisi humiles »; *in ep. Iohan. ad Parth. tr.* 1, 5; *PL* 35, 1982.

253. *Ench.* 121, 32; *PL* 40, 288: « Omnis itaque praecepti finis est charitas: id est, ad charitatem refertur omne praeceptum »; *enarr. in ps.* 90, 1, 8; *PL* 37, 1154; « Quo modo enim radix omnium bonorum charitas est »; *de doct. chr.* III, 10, 16 (*ad init.*); *PL* 34, 72; *in ep. Iohan. ad Parth.* 1, 6; *PL* 35, 1982: « ...sola charitas exstinguit delicta. »

some degree and measure it reflects a love of God²⁵⁴. Pride, which founded Babylon, dominates its corporate life — a life lived according to the flesh, i.e. according to the principles of a Society organized apart from and in opposition to God ; the Divine love founded Jerusalem, which lives according to Him²⁵⁵. The perverse lust for glory and for praise stems from pride, whereas charity is the love of God — man's greatest glory. Lastly, pride, the original cause of bodily death, leads in the end to eternal condemnation ; it is the humble alone who win access, through charity, to the beatitude of an eternity with Him²⁵⁶.

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

In terminating our study of St. Augustine's doctrine of charity, we have reached not only the end of our own particular inquiry, but also the very heart and focus of his entire thought. For our central purpose in the foregoing sections was to demonstrate that from Augustine's viewpoint the Devil, who always apes God, is, like Him, no respecter of persons. Whether overt or covert, whether in the cloister or the hearth, pride can find a home anywhere — and everywhere. But regardless of the variables of place or time, this vice reduces essentially to a perverse love of self — a « cupidity », as our author frequently (and so aptly) calls it. Contrary in its effects and opposed by nature to pride stands charity, the very ' life-line ' of the human soul : for what is life without love ? As such, this virtue provides the sovereign instrumentality by means of which rational beings can ascend, through the right use of creatures, to the contemplation and pious love of God in and for Himself. Thus cupidity (or avarice) and charity express between them the two mutually exclusive categories of dynamic desire which govern and shape the corporate lives, and determine the ultimate destinies, of the two great Societies occupying the stage of universal history²⁵⁷. More precisely, we may

254. *De civ. Dei* XIV, 13, 2 ; *PL* 41, 421-22 : « Dii enim creati, non sua veritate, sed Dei veri participatione sunt dii » ; *in ep. Iohan. ad Parth. tr.* 2, 14 ; *PL* 35, 1997 : « Deum diligis ? Quid dicam ? Deus eris. » Cf. *de mor.* I, 15, 25 ; *PL* 32, 1322. Cf. also this remarkable text : (*enarr. in ps.* 35, 14 ; *PL* 36, 351) : « ...cum accepta fuerit illa ineffabilis laetitia, perit quodammodo humana mens, et fit divina, et inebriatur ab ubertate domus Dei. »

255. See above, fns. 77, 130 ; *de civ. Dei* XIV, 9, 0 ; 13, 1 (*ad fin.*) ; *PL* 41, 416 ; 412 ; *enarr. in ps.* 86, 6 ; *PL* 37, 1106 ; *de Gen. ad litt.* XI, 15, 20 ; *PL* 34, 437.

256. *Serm.* 123, 3, 3 ; *PL* 38, 685 : « Ista est via : ambula per humilitatem, tu venias ad aeternitatem. » Cf. above, fn. 252, third ref.

257. *Ench.* 117, 31 ; *PL* 40, 287 : « Regnat... carnalis cupiditas, ubi non est Dei charitas. » *de doct. chr.* III, 10, 10 ; *PL* 34, 72 : « Quanto autem magis regnum cupiditatis destruitur, tanto charitatis augetur » ; *de div. quaest.* 83, 36 ; *PL* 40, 25 : « Nutrimentum (charitatis) est, imminutio cupiditatis ; perfectio, nulla cupiditas. »

conclude with Augustine himself that in the final analysis, every rational act is ultimately motivated — and its morality defined — by one or other of these all-embracing forms of appetite. The first (*cupiditas*) perverts order and hence inclines to nothingness, to folly and to evil. The second (*charitas*) preserves or restores order, and therefore tends to being, to wisdom and to the good. It is then in the contrary notions of cupidity (the essence of disorder) and of charity (the perfection of order) as both humble love of God and God Himself, *Causa subsistendi*, *Ratio intelligendi*, *Ordo vivendi*²⁵⁸, that we alone discover the key to St. Augustine's doctrinal synthesis regarding pride.

EPILOGUE

St. Augustine's theodicy has persisted intact through the span of more than fifteen hundred years which separates us from him. Further, his attempted vindication of God's ways with man did not merely survive, but remained dominant in the Christian tradition generally until recent times. A new era, however, dawned with the publication (1821-22) of FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER'S *Der christliche Glaube*. This vast speculative enterprise, including as it did a full-scale attack on previously entrenched theological assumptions, was the prelude to a whole « literature of dissent ». In the sequel, many of Augustine's major postulates have come under such heavy fire that contemporary theologians engaged upon the reconstruction of a « viable » theodicy tend by and large to challenge, if not reject, them outright as self-contradictory, absurd, and even blasphemous. Among the more articulate and persuasive of recent critics in this camp, John Hick undeniably occupies a privileged place. His important book, *Evil And The God Of Love* (1966), has taken issue with and argued at length against a number of St. Augustine's basic « positions ». The latter notably include angelic and human Creation as well as the problem of Universalism in the light of God's attributes and ultimate designs²⁵⁹. I accordingly propose, first to examine very briefly the adverse comments in this work which bear upon the main body of our foregoing discussion, and then to offer a thumbnail *essai de synthèse*.

Let us begin with what in my opinion remains the most astonishing of all Hick's stated difficulties. We refer to those pages (*op. cit.* 314-15) which censure Augustine's explanation of how and why, on his own premisses, it could have been conceivable that unfallen angels,

258. *De civ. Dei* VIII, 4 ; *PL* 41, 228-29.

259. *Op. cit.* pp. 49-68 ; 377-85. Because it does not bear directly on our major interest, we have omitted all consideration of « universalism », a problem about which Augustine himself apparently never reached complete and final certainty.

for instance, would wish and be actually able to fall from their previous state of unclouded beatitude. Given an original face-to-face relationship between created beings and the Omnipotent God of limitless Love, our critic is moved to castigate the « absurdity... of (a creature's) seeing rebellion as a possibility, and hence... its even constituting a temptation to him... Surely, in order for there to be any impulse or temptation in this direction, he must either be stupid to the point of being less than human, or else he must be already possessed by... pride... The first of these possibilities is incompatible with the perfect goodness and the second with the... sovereignty of God ».

My initial reaction to the above is one of utter bewilderment. How does Hick conceptualize the creaturely estate if not in terms of *Angst* (*op. cit.* p. 189) — i.e. an inborn and therefore inevitable sense of insecurity and finitude, a pervasive lack of stability and freedom as compared with the Creator? In two words, created beings are essentially *other* than, and hence *inferior* to, Him. What (*pace* Hick) could therefore be more calculated, at the very dawn of Creation, to bring home to them the overwhelming disparity of their purely contingent status *vis-a-vis* God than an immediate encounter with the Divine omnipotence and aseity? Again, might not these same innate characteristics all too easily generate in them a consuming desire to redress the balance, as it were, between creature and Creator through a restless search for autonomy and power? How, we ask, could an unprejudiced critic qualify the inordinate appetite motivating such conduct by the epithets *stupid* or *irrational*? On any count, these would surely have been the terms *least* applicable to the behaviour here incriminated, of which in fact the sole adequate description is clearly « pride ».

The mention of « pride » brings us to Hick's second major criticism. For the possibility of such a flaw in, say, a blessed angel could not be sufficiently explained « merely by attributing to him a *pure freedom of spontaneous creativity* » (italics added). Rather, it must represent an act of sinful volition through which evil somehow created itself *ex nihilo*, thus absurdly negating God's sovereignty. We can of course agree at once that the very notion of « evil self-generated from nothing » implies an evident absurdity. But neither this concept nor the resulting implication can be laid at Augustine's door, since Hick has himself already borne witness to the Bishop's own doctrine of evil as precisely a *privatio* rather than a *creatio*²⁶⁰. It remains, therefore, to seek enlightenment about the meaning of the phrase « a pure freedom of spontaneous creativity ».

A number of clues to the apparent sense of this far from unambiguous formula can be found at successive intervals in the exposition of our author's general theme. The earliest hint occurs in his statement (*op.*

260. Pp. 44-46; 52-54; 59-75; 93-95; 185-197; 200-201; 262.

cit. p. 69) that « if the angels are finitely perfect, then even though *they are in some important sense free to sin*²⁶¹, they will never in fact do so » (italics ours). Much later, in offering a « theodicy for today » (*op. cit.* pp. 285-314), Hick lets the cat out of the bag with a vengeance « ...men (or angels) cannot be meaningfully thought of as finitely perfect creatures who fall out of *the full glory and the blessedness of God's Kingdom*. Sin... can only have come about in creatures placed in an environment other than the direct Divine presence... Surely his (an unfallen creature's) state would be that defined by Augustine as *non posse peccare* » (italics added).

The above critique could be answered in various ways. It is, to begin with, obvious that John Hick has succeeded in « out-Pelagianizing » Pelagius, who explicitly attributes to Adam's earlier volitional powers a state of perfect equilibrium between the polarities of virtue and vice²⁶². And what reason (or authority) is there for equating the Divine presence in Paradise with God's *Kingdom* ? — where alone at the *end* of time, the will of the elect shall be forever fixed in unchanging love and perfect service²⁶³ (*op. cit.* p. 316 ; cf. 376). Again, Hick makes much of the fact that *God* does not treat men as either pets or puppets : yet this is precisely how *he* views, or would view unfallen rational creatures and their operations²⁶⁴, if he accepted as genuine the traditional account of angelic and human creation ! How, otherwise, is one to interpret the following ? « ...It is impossible to conceive of wholly good beings in a wholly good world becoming sinful... creaturely freedom in itself and in the absence of temptation cannot lead to sin²⁶⁵ ». With this let us contrast a refreshingly different statement (*op. cit.* pp. 306-07) : « A creature not subject to temptation, or to fear, lust, envy, panic, anxiety or any other demoralizing condition, would no doubt be innocent, but could not justifiably be praised as being morally good. In order to possess positive goodness men must be mutable creatures, subject to at least some form of temptation. This is the valid conclusion of (Ninian) Smart's reasoning ». Exactly, John Hick, and we have no wish to challenge the finality of your self-inflicted *coup de grâce*. Once more, it seems, « theodicy (for today) collapses into a radical incoherence... » (cf. *op. cit.* p. 286).

In his *Emergence Of Man*²⁶⁶, J.E. PFEIFFER refers to an estimate that early, but not the earliest specimens, of *homo sapiens* began to exist as much as 250,000 years ago. Against this staggering background of human

261. So far as I can discover, we are never told — as regards the angels, at least — what this « important sense » is. See, however, *op. cit.* p. 303.

262. Fn. 154, above.

263. *De corr. et gr.* 12, 33 ; *PL* 34, 936 : « ...novissima (libertas) erit... non posse peccare... ».

264. *Op. cit.*, pp. 293-94 ; 302-03 ; 310, 379.

265. *Op. cit.*, p. 286 ; cf. p. 302.

266. Thomas Nelson, London, 1970 ; p. 156.

longevity, ample scope exists, so we believe, for a reasoned defence of what the Bible teaches, in essence²⁶⁷, about Adam's fall. Thus, very simply, let us assume that at a given moment of time during its almost endless « prehistory », God infused a rational soul into the body of one member of a sub-human hominid species. In connexion with this creative act, He also imposed a trial or test upon the first man who, in the event, misused his free will so as to reject and repudiate the Divine sovereignty. Can « such a speculation ... be excluded *ab initio* as impossible » ? (*op. cit.* p. 288). Here, however, is Hick's pontifical pronouncement : « ... The fall is a mythic concept which does not describe an actual event... it is not a happening in the chronological past, whether six thousand or sixty thousand or six hundred thousand or any number of years ago »²⁶⁸. I challenge the author of this quite unwarranted assertion to adduce just one proven fact in rebuttal of the above.

There is no need to linger over our critic's repeated attacks upon the « wanton paradoxes » of Augustine's predestinarian teaching. For these all share a common *idée fixe* : « The appalling doctrine that God creates persons who He knows will merit damnation and who He is content shall be damned » (*op. cit.* p. 184 ; cf. also pp. 119-20). We in turn can only retort that this charge embodies the most appalling travesty of the Bishop's actual viewpoint which has come our way for many a year.

The truth is that at the very heart of his thought lies a moral psychology summarized by an imperative which reminds one (incongruously) of Rabelais : « *Dilige, et quod vis fac* »²⁶⁹. The setting wherein Augustine develops his theme is above all pastoral and homiletic—an atmosphere far removed from the ruthless cut-and-thrust of religious controversy. As a preacher, he would often have to deal with the importunities of those who, however assiduous in the practice of virtue, could not exorcise a haunting dread of final preterition. To them, Augustine will offer firm assurance²⁷⁰, and always with reference to the deontological framework elsewhere called « responsibility in love »²⁷¹. We may here add that this phrase was chosen because it suggests an appropriate creaturely reaction to one supreme fact : men « live, move, and exist » in a God of love Who, in giving Himself, demands from them nothing less than their

267. We here also exclude from discussion, as not strictly relevant to our central concern, the interrelated problems of mankind's « unitary origin » and « biological monogenism ». The intriguing question of how God created the first *woman* is referred to those more at ease in protology than I !

268. *Op. cit.* p. 181.

269. In *ep. Iohan. ad Parth. tr.* 7, 4, 8 ; *PL* 35, 2033.

270. Cf. *enarr. in ps.* 85 ; 8 ; *PL* 37, 1087-88 : « *Invocas quidquid amas ; invocas quidquid in te vocas, invocas quidquid vis ut veniat ad te... Si ergo tu invocas Deum tanquam Deum, securus esto, exaudiris ; pertines ad istum (quintum) versum, Et multum misericors omnibus invocantibus se.* »

271. See above, p. 260.

all. « *Totum exigit te, qui fecit te* »²⁷². In a sermon on the predestinarian-sounding text, « No man can come to Me except the Father, Which hath sent Me, draw him », Augustine asks « *nondum traheris ? ora ut traharis* »²⁷³. So far is this from mere rhetoric that the same message re-echoes like a bell throughout his Scriptural commentaries²⁷⁴. A critic might now object : every impulse to pray is, like virtuous behaviour in general, the fruit of a grace which the presumptuous alone would look for without antecedent petition. But the latter, as at first, also requires the inspiration of a prior grace, thus entailing, so to speak, an uninterrupted sequence of Divine action and human assent (or refusal). Given such a chain of causality, the first link can only be God, Who in the role of Master Chess Player or Hypnotist, retains a controlling initiative from beginning to end²⁷⁵. So stated, the objection contains a partial truth, because the Bishop will always affirm that He is the sole Agent in the realm of absolutely prevenient grace²⁷⁶. From Augustine's standpoint, however, the above analogies break down just where they appear most dramatically telling. Understood, that is, in the light of what has immediately preceded, « sufficient grace » demolishes the central argument by truly « sufficing » for those who freely choose to accept, as its own greatest gift, the indefectible power of humility at prayer : « *Hoc Dei donum (perseverantiae) suppliciter emereri potest* »²⁷⁷.

Amid the parodies of St. Augustine's thought already noted in connexion with our present inquiry, two charges appear to contain a certain

272. *Serm.* 34, 4, 7 ; *PL* 38, 211-12. Cf. *ibid.* 91, 3, 3 ; *ibid.* col. 568, and *ep.* 155, 4, 4, 15-14 ; *PL* 33, 672-73.

273. *In Iohan. ev. tr.* 26, 6, 2 ; *PL* 35, 1607 ; *enarr. in ps.* 36, 1 ; *PL* 36, 356 ; « *Quid autem hominum duorum (fidelium aut infidelium) esse velis... nunc est in potestate... Elige ergo cum tempus est...* » For Augustine's reconciliation of this « pouvoir parfait de tout homme de devenir un élu » (*Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, I, 2401) with the closed list of the elect (*de corr. et gr.* 13, 39) see above, p. 284-286 and refs.

274. E.g. *enarr. in ps.* 52, 8 ; *ibid.* 67, 18 (*ad fin.*) ; *ibid.* 83, 3 ; *ibid.* 97, 9 (*ad fin.*).

275. Cf. *Evil And The God Of Love*, pp. 380 ; 308-9.

276. *Ep.* 217, 30 ; *PL* 33, 989 ; « ...oportet sine dubitatione fatearis voluntates hominum Dei gratia praeveniri... » Cf. *retr.* I, 9, 6 ; *PL* 32, 598.

277. *De don. pers.* 6, 10 ; *PL* 45, 999 ; *enarr. in ps.* 95, 3 (*vers.* 2, 3) ; *PL* 37, 1229 : « *Dominus enim dicit : Ego sum ianua ; per me intratur...* Qui per ianuam intrat, humilis est ; qui per aliam partem ascendit, superbus est : ideo illum dixit intrare, illum ascendere. Sed ille intrando recipitur ; ille ascendendo praecipitatur. » It can thus be seen once again that humility is the touchstone, the veritable *clavis Augustiniana* of our author's teaching about predestination, and indeed Christian perfection in general. « *Haec est doctrina christiana, humilitatis praeceptum, humilitatis commendatio...* » (*serm.* 160, 5 ; *PL* 38, 876). Compare also the celebrated passage in *ep.* 118, 3, 22 (*PL* 33, 442). JOHN HICK's complete failure (*in Evil And The God Of Love*) to appreciate this all-important aspect of Augustine's thought vitiates his entire approach and constitutes one of the major disappointments (not to say, irritations), of an otherwise stimulating work. Traces of a similar tendency appear in PETER BROWN, *Augustine Of Hippo* ; see, particularly, pp. 49-50 ; 123 ; 385 ; 391 ; 397.

admixture of fact. We refer, in the first place, to a frequent complaint : theodicies inspired by him do not present a Creator Who values and loves man « for his own sake as finite personal life capable of personal relationship with the infinite divine Person ». Rather, they suggest that man « has been created because without him there would be a gap in the great chain of being²⁷⁸... ». Now this « principle of plenitude²⁷⁹ » undeniably forms one important feature of the background against which Augustine constructs his cosmogony and anthropology : but to pursue our metaphor, the back-drop does not occupy the centre of the stage, reserved for the data of Revelation alone. Lack of space precludes further discussion, but apart from the foregoing paragraphs, it may be recalled that an earlier section of this article also examines, as integral to the same context, both the modalities of God's dealings with men and the responses which He seeks from them²⁸⁰.

The second major charge relevant to our present concern is that Augustine — unlike St. Paul — seems to view the operation of grace in terms of a « metaphysical force », thus depersonalizing the Creator's « kindly » and « gracious » encounter with His children²⁸¹. Here again we indeed agree that some texts, if taken in isolation from the overall trend of the evidence, can be interpreted in favour of Hick's criticism. But it is also possible to cite other, and key, passages which virtually equate the gift of final perseverance with the grace of charity and both in turn with their Giver : « *si charitas (in conscientia) habitat, Deus ibi habitat*²⁸² ». Seen within such a perspective — and, as a pastor²⁸³, this is in fact Augustine's prevailing vision — what could be more personally gracious, what more tenderly intimate than the unique relationship by which God imparts His own life and love to the soul²⁸⁴ ?

D.J. MACQUEEN
University of Ghana
Legon, Accra

278. *Op. cit.* p. 200.

279. *Op. cit.* pp. 78-9 ; 85-88 ; 350.

280. Above, pp. 255-256.

281. *Op. cit.* pp. 201-03.

282. *Enarr. in ps.* 149, 4 ; *PL* 37, 1951 ; *Serm.* 156, 5 ; *PL* 38, 852 : « Charitas usque adeo est donum Dei, ut Deus vocetur » ; *ibid.* 144, 1 ; *PL* 38, 788 : « gratia quippe Dei, donum Dei est. Donum autem maximum ipse Spiritus sanctus est ; et ideo gratia dicitur ». The appropriation of charity to the Holy Ghost is also clearly set forth in *de Trin.* XV, 19, 37 ; *PL* 42, 1086. See, further, *de spir. et lit.* 3, 5 ; also *quaest. in Hept.* II, 25.

283. In polemics with those who habitually exaggerate the role of God's omnipotence and justice to the detriment of His love and mercy, Augustine never hesitates to make the obvious retort.

284. Cf. *enarr. in ps.* 26, 2, 18 ; *PL* 36, 208 : « (Deus) pater est, quia condidit, quia vocat, quia iubet, quia regit : mater, quia fovet, quia nutrit, quia lactat, quia continet ».