On the Intentionality of the Emotions (and of Other Appetitive Acts)

In recent philosophical debates about the nature of human emotions the intentionality of emotions plays a key part. The article explores how medieval philosophers of the late 13^th and early 14^th centuries accounted for the fact that our emotions, such as love, hate, anger and the like, are intentional mental states, states that are ‘of’ or ‘about something’. Since medieval philosophers agree that emotions (passions of the soul) are essentially movements of the appetitive powers, the intentionality of emotions is part of the broader problem of the intentionality of our appetitive acts. Do emotions and other appetitive acts derive their intentionality from the relevant cognitive acts on which their occurrence depends? And if so, how? Are appetitive acts intrinsically intentional states? The contribution discusses these and similar questions, while special attention is given to authors such as Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, (Ps-)Thomas of Bailly, Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini.