[…] intelligit se intelligere rem intellectam. Henry of Ghent on Thought and Reflexivity

In this essay I examine Henry of Ghent’s views on our mind’s ability to think and to understand something, and to reflect on its own acts and their contents. Henry explains our acquisition of mental content as a sequence of receptive and productive stages. He identifies a general principle of cognitive presence: for an object to be actually intelligible it must be actually separated from matter and cognitively present to a thinker or cognizer. Sensible, material objects that cannot be immediately present in this way must be represented via functional intermediaries in our cognitive capacities. The two main capacities of the mind are intellect and will, and in Henry’s view each of these mental powers has a reflexive ability. Henry discusses our intellect’s ability to reflect on its acts and their contents in his analysis of mental words. A complete mental word is the product of our inquiry into a thing’s essence. The inquiry is driven by our rational desire for complete cognition and based on intellect’s reflection on a first-order act and its conceptual content. This higher-order awareness of ourselves as cognitive agents enables us to assess the progression of our intellectual inquiry. Henry stresses that our natural cognitive powers are strengthened through divine exemplary standards, which continually correct the concepts we form and complete their structural resemblance with the objects of cognition in extramental reality.