Objects and Relations in Correlational Theories of Intentionality. The Case of Franciscus de Mayronis

Which are the philosophical consequences for one’s theory of objects and relations if one posits that every intentional act is correlated with an intentional object? In what follows, I tackle that question in examining the case of Franciscus de Mayronis (d. c. 1326). After suggesting a typology of theories of intentionality distinguishing monadic, relational, and correlational theories, I go on to expose Franciscus’ ontology and his conception of relations. It turns out that Franciscus’ theory of intentionality exemplifies a pattern (also found in the Brentano of 1874) according to which certain epistemic-psychological constraints (to know or to believe x always amounts to stand in a certain relation to an object distinct from the mental act) have serious consequences on the ontology.