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In his Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Siger of Brabant offers his first account of accidental events: an accidental event coincides with the defect of an agent, which achieves its effect in most but not all cases. Siger provides three examples of accidental events: the case of a cold and wintry weather during the dogdays; the case of a man finding treasure while digging a grave; and the meeting between a creditor and his debtor. I show that the last two examples are not fully consistent with Siger’s account since they do not reflect the idea of an accidental event as the defect of an agent that achieves its effect in most cases. A possible solution to this inconsistency can also be found in Siger’s Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, and precisely in what I call the second account of accidental events. According to this second account, an accidental event identifies every simultaneous concomitance between two items, which are not connected with each other by a per se causal relationship. This second account does not imply a rejection of the first account, but rather includes it: the relationship between (the action of) an agent for the most part and its defect may be considered a particular case of concomitance between two items, where one is not the per se cause of the other, and vice versa.