Early Medieval Philosophy (c. 650-1100)

These volumes present a selection of papers delivered in Paris at the XV International Congress of the Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale August 22-26 2022. The appearance of the term radix positionis in medieval debates inspired the contributors to investigate whether there was something that could be considered radical thought in the Middle Ages and if so what the roots of this radical thought were in the different philosophical traditions in various geographical cultural religious and linguistic contexts (Arabic Greek Hebrew Latin).

Medieval philosophy often engaged in a quest for origins but it could also be radical in its methodology or in its attitude when it refused any compromise on its principles or basic concepts be they innovative or rediscovered. Radicalism could be conceived as extremism in pushing a hypothesis procedure or line of inquiry to its limits leading to extreme positions. Radical thought could mean being intellectually inflexible on principles obstinate in embracing theses that broke from tradition progressive but also extremist. The contributions in these volumes thus analyse case-studies of doctrinal conflict dogmatic struggle and condemnation by religious or academic institutions presenting examples of both intellectual courage and philosophical intransigence.

The article analyzes the occurrences and meaning of the expression ratio practica in the works of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. A lexicographical survey shows that ratio practica appears in the philosophical vocabulary of Latin medieval philosophy starting from the second quarter of the thirteenth century. In particular it occurs with some frequency in the early works of Albertus Magnus (before 1250) who uses ratio practica in connection with Augustine of Hippo’s theory of the double reason (ratio superior and ratio inferior). Albertus seems to abandon the use of ratio practica when he begins to engage with the exegesis of Aristotle. Notably he uses it negligibly in the two commentaries on the complete version of the Nicomachean Ethics of which before 1250 he only knew the fi rst three books (Ethica nova and vetus). In contrast Thomas Aquinas frequently uses the expression ratio practica but only in contexts related to the psychological process preceding action which Aristotle had primarily described in the Nicomachean Ethics. In short thanks to Thomas ratio practica is characterized as an Aristotelian notion while Albertus’s merit lies in introducing it into the philosophical vocabulary.

In 1972 Kurt Flasch broke new ground with his contentious thesis that Dietrich von Freiberg as early as 1300 had formulated a theory of productive subjectivity. Flasch argues that Dietrich recognized the object-constituting function of the mind conceived in transcendental terms much in the same vein as Immanuel Kant’s so-called Copernican Revolution. Despite the ongoing controversy surrounding this thesis Kant has been noticeably neglected in the relevant scholarly discussion. The following paper will address this oversight through a comparative analysis of Dietrich’s and Kant’s theories on mental constitution and intellect. While there are general similarities between the two philosophers closer inspection reveals critical discrepancies in their core theoretical constructs. Additionally their respective methodologies are fundamentally incompatible. Dietrich’s approach does offer a reorientation in medieval thinking yet its underpinnings of metaphysics and theocentricism clash with the experimental nature of Kant’s transcendental refl ections.

From Hippocrates and Galen meteorological medicine studied the impact of environmental factors and weather phenomena on mental and bodily health. This theory has been largely diffused by medical works and encyclopaedias such as those of Vincentius de Beauvais and Bartholomeus Anglicus. However its reception within mediaeval meteorology still remains to be fully inquired partly because it was not a traditional topic to be discussed in the question commentaries on the Meteorologica of Aristotle. This article aims to focus on three Parisian quaestiones on the Meteorologica in which Radulphus Brito and Themo Iudaei de Monasterio utilised concepts of meteorological medicine as a tool to explain meteorological principles. The medical theory is used to clarify how antiperistasis works within animals’ bellies and its impacts on their general health; and in the second one to describe the harmful impacts water has on human and animal bodies; and then thirdly to explain the process of generating rain.

This reexamination of documents purporting to show that Henry of Ghent served on a commission of 16 theologians that compiled the 219 articles condemned in 1277 produces a different picture. It shows that Henry did not serve on a special commission appointed by bishop Tempier but was present at a meeting of all masters who condemned the articles. It also shows that Tempier did not bypass masters in the faculty of theology but had them vote on the articles.

Recent scholarship has focused on the notion of ‘rationality’ and the consequences of different conceptions to the characterization of the human-animal divide. In this article I attempt to further muddle the waters by considering examples of stricter requirements being imposed on what counts to be rational. I argue that whereas many medieval authors were willing to identify similarities in the way humans and non-human animals behave and process information they also tended to emphasize the differences in those processes: human processes are inherently rational (or rational-oriented) while those of other animals may resemble rational processes but are not rational. I further claim that this evidence should lead scholars to be less generous in their attribution of rationality to non-human animals to avoid trivializing that notion.