Speech Act and Intentional Meaning in the Medieval Philosophy of Language

Important developments in logic and semantics were realized by the Arts Masters in the Middle Ages. Besides their interests in truth-conditions and the well-formedness of canonical sentences, they were also interested in semantic questions that require one to take into account the context of semantic usage, the moral and social dimensions of these uses, and the interplay between speaker and hearer. Such questions were also asked by theologians, who had a good knowledge of the disciplines of grammar and logic. In this essay I study examples that can be compared to modern speech act theory, namely deviant sentences in grammar, syncategorematic words in logic, and examples of sacramental formulas, promises, oaths, lies and perjuries in theology and law. An especially interesting issue is the discrepancy between intentional meaning and conventional meaning. Although for a modern reader the different of examples would be part of a theory of speech act as a whole, they were never merged in the medieval period.