Quaestio

Although the term vorpradikativ is only occasionally employed by Heidegger, it qualifies a central topic of his thinking from mid to late 1920s: the dimension of truth, both in its ontic and ontological meaning. Despite this specific use of the term, I will argue that even the more originary dimension of the truth of Being, that is the focus of Heidegger’s later thinking of Ereignis, can be defined as ≪pre-predicative≫ in various ways. In one sense, Being as Logos can be characterised as pre-predicative because it is neither predicative-assertive logos nor the possible object of theoretical assertions. Second, and more importantly, Being is pre-predicative in the sense that it is pre-linguistic (however, the term vorsprachlich is not part of Heidegger’s terminology). This specific status refers to a triple aspect: a) the meaning of Being is associated by Heidegger with the semantic field of voice (Stimme) and disposition (Stimmung); b) Being unfolds itself in a characteristic ≪lack of language≫ (Sprachlosigkeit); c) Being is the ground of language. Nevertheless, we should be aware that if we refer to Heidegger’s strictly literal use of the term vorpradikativ in the 20s, its meaning does not fully overlap with the semantic area of a conceptualized pre-linguistic dimension.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the technological animal, as explication of the metaphysical humanity, and the future ones [Zukunftigen] in Heidegger’s thought of Event. Through the exploration of some pages of Contribution on Philosophy (On the Event) I will show how this relation, in Heidegger’s considerations of this period, has not a dialectic form. Technological animal and Zukunftigen indicate two different way to name the same belonginess of human being to the Being. Through the figure of the Zukunftigen Heidegger tries to propose a ‘new form’ of humanity beyond the characterization of the metaphysics.

The treatise The Event, albeit in an esoteric tone, points to “the trails and paths of the enduring” [Austrag] of the difference. Here Heidegger asserts that the event is itself “beyng as the relation [Verhaltnis]”, as the “inaugural between” [Zwischen], overcoming the onto-theo-logical metaphysics, which thinks of beyng as the stable foundation of being. In the third section, which is titled The Difference [Der Unterschied], Heidegger highlights that the difference does not separate being as the supersensory world from beings as the sensory world; it is not the ontological difference [Differenz], which is “objectified” [vergegenstandlicht] in Being and Time, rather it traverses within beyng itself. Beyng is essentially difference, from which separations arise. Nevertheless, in his view, ontological difference, or rather the differentiation [Unterschiedung], remains an inevitable step to reach the inceptual thinking, i.e., the fundamental question of beyng as Unterschied. Such thinking is de-founding [Ent-stiften] toward the enduring of the difference as well as the saying of the event is a gainsaying [Ab-sage], as the thinkers must often speak in the mode of denial. Although the difference is unexperienceable for “metaphysical humanity”, Heidegger believes that there must be possible an experience of beyng itself, i.e., an experience of the difference, even if for a “transformed humanity”, which bear the pain of enduring. The difference appropriates “now and then” and the event dispropriates [enteignet], causing human being to experience his “dependence” and the “consignment” [Uber-eignung] in which his “self-arrogation” [Sich-zu-eigen] is grounded. Unfortunately, in Heidegger’s Denkweg the thought of difference remains a broken path, which other thinkers will tread. However, by asserting that at the origin there is no stable ground, but the movement of differentiation, by asserting that the ‘not’ is co-essential to beyng, or otherness to the self, Heidegger opens another beginning for the thinking.

The Heideggerian radicalization of the question of the world in the 1930s seems to us to be driven by the need for a double detrascendentalisation. It is not only a matter of freeing the thought of the world from modern subjectivism but also of overcoming the conceptual pairs a priori/a posteriori, condition/conditioned, transcendental/ empirical. Hence the proliferation, in the Heideggerian texts of the 1930s, of a lexicon of the establishment, of the institution, of the foundation (Einrichtung, Stiftung, Grundung): it is necessary to think of the evenemential institution of the world from a singular thing, according to the exemplary model of the work of art. However, what we would like to show is that this detrascendentalisation can only be fully understood within the framework of the thought of the Ereignis and, in particular, within the framework of one of the ≪junctures≫ of the Beitrage (and therefore of the Ereignis itself), the Bergung, which more generally indicates a sheltering and preservation of the truth of Being in the beings, more precisely in the different types of beings and in the different correlative types of the Dasein’s action. It is in this institution of the world, in all acting and in all things, in the multiplicity of our practices and of the things to which we relate, an institution that is made with us and beyond us, that one can see the theoretical perspective opened up by these reflections of Heidegger.

This article mainly aims to compare the reception of the Heideggerian notion of Ereignis with the presence and conceptual exploitation of the notion of evenement in the French phenomenological context. In this regard, the theses of Neue Phanomenologie in Frankreich prove to be a useful starting point, although they need to be corrected through a close comparison with the text and the indispensable philological research. Finally, following the previous analyses, a brief review of the explored and unexplored possibilities of phenomenological proposals on the theme of the event is proposed.

The aim of this essay is to highlight the persistent presence of the concepts of “Projection” (Entwurf) and “Letting-prevail” (Walten-lassen) introduced by Heidegger in his 1929-30 university course (The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World, Finitude, Solitude) in the works in which the author attempts to think the “Event” issue. The first part of the paper shows how within the same course of 1929-30 there is a paradigm shift on Heidegger’s part in his understanding of the topic of the projection; in the second part an attempt is made to show how the conception of Entwurf and Walten-lassen that he arrives at in the final part of the course are the same one that, although in a different theoretical context, he thematizes in the Contributions to Philosophy.

Moving from the consideration of divine omnipotence, Augustine’s philosophical and theological inquiry raises further questions. The aim of this paper is to deal with the inherently problematic features brought about by the notion of nature. Nature is seen by Augustine as a plastic and dynamic concept, which unifies various semantic frameworks. In this study, I will focus on nature as the broadly-recognized dimension where phaenomena take place following stable and calculated laws, arguing that the tension existing between such a notion and the divine omnipotence hardly finds a solution.

In his Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Siger of Brabant offers his first account of accidental events: an accidental event coincides with the defect of an agent, which achieves its effect in most but not all cases. Siger provides three examples of accidental events: the case of a cold and wintry weather during the dogdays; the case of a man finding treasure while digging a grave; and the meeting between a creditor and his debtor. I show that the last two examples are not fully consistent with Siger’s account since they do not reflect the idea of an accidental event as the defect of an agent that achieves its effect in most cases. A possible solution to this inconsistency can also be found in Siger’s Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, and precisely in what I call the second account of accidental events. According to this second account, an accidental event identifies every simultaneous concomitance between two items, which are not connected with each other by a per se causal relationship. This second account does not imply a rejection of the first account, but rather includes it: the relationship between (the action of) an agent for the most part and its defect may be considered a particular case of concomitance between two items, where one is not the per se cause of the other, and vice versa.

The paper examines the metaphysical fundament of Henry of Ghent’s doctrine of the res in Summa XXI and its twofold relation with Avicenna’s Metaphysics I, 5. Henry’s notion of res is linked to Avicenna Metaphysics I, ch. 5 where the Persian philosopher states which are the primary notions of the intellect, namely: res, ens et necesse. Avicenna discusses res and ens together and explains their status and relationship. In particular, he underlines their concomitance (comitantia): briefly, when we conceive an object, we refer to it in two different ontological modes, namely a definitional one (res) and an existential one (ens). Our focus is on the twofold use of Avicennian source in Henry’s text. He rejects Avicenna’s position in the prologue, but he presents several implicit references to the same position he refused. We remark that Henry refers to Met. I, 5 widely and correctly most the time. Hence, he knew the reference. Nonetheless, in Summa XXI prologue he omits the noun res when he quotes Avicenna. Subsequently, he refuses Avicenna’s account, stating that since Avicenna held for the univocity of being, he is not compatible with a Christian perspective (the being of God and the being of creature are incommensurable). Surprisingly, Henry introduces Avicenna’s res theory all along the solution, without mentioning Avicenna. Henry deliberately mirrors res lexicon to build the analogical account of the being. Since res has not any existential reference to the Being, it represents a key-concept for humankind to conceive God. The outcome of our inquiry is a twofold interpretation of a same authority. Firstly, the explicit Avicenna, dispossessed of the res, is refused in toto. Secondly, the invisible Avicenna, is re-integrated by Henry thorough the resumption of the noun res and its textual background and becomes the key-point of the solutio.

The 16th and 17th centuries were a period of profound political, institutional, and doctrinal upheaval, largely sparked by the Protestant Reformation. Within this cultural and religious context, Francisco Suarez emerged as one of the most influential figures in Catholic thought. While scholarly interest in Suarez’s work has a well-established history, more recent studies have introduced different and previously unexplored perspectives on certain aspects of his thought. This paper aims to analyze key elements of Suarez’s metaphysics in light of these recent contributions, placing his work within its original doctrinal framework and assessing its enduring legacy in history of philosophy. Metaphysical themes – such as the object of metaphysics, the concept of being, the distinction between being and essence, the theory of transcendentals, the problem of individuation – are examined in relation to the medieval tradition that shaped Suarez’s thought, the doctrinal context of Second Scholasticism, and their subsequent reception, particularly in works of some notable 20th-century authors.

This study traces the fundamental stages of Benedetto Croce’s moral thought, focusing on the concept of ‘ethical-utility’ (etico-utile). In his texts, Croce understands utility as inseparable from morality. Moral action is good precisely because it is first and foremost useful. He distinguishes between a merely personal utility (which is the basis of all economic and moral action) and a utility that may develop into universal-utility (ethical- utility). Compared to the economic individual who aims at private profit, the moral person would instead tend to privilege the profit that concerns the ‘greater number’, going so far as to make his own individual interest coincide with interest in the universal good. The pursuit of common utility thus seems to be the distinctive attitude of morality (and also of politics). This utility, in favour of the interest of the community does not mean altruism; rather, the moral act requires to be put before any personal interest and the interest of others, in order to favour, ultimately, only that of the Spirit. This concept of ‘ethical-utility’, theorised by the Neapolitan thinker, seems to have been materialised in the only political-legislative act, promoted by Croce himself: the law for the protection of the Italian landscape heritage (no. 778 of 11 May 1922). Croce’s law is in fact characterised by a defence of the national cultural and environmental heritage motivated precisely by the concept of the latter’s ‘public interest’.

The concept of Creation from nothing is one of the most typical and relevant themes of the metaphysics of transcendence; this in particular from the moment in which this Principle entered the theological and philosophical panorama through the Jewish-Christian Revelation. In recent decades, one of the most relevant criticisms of this concept has come from the Italian philosopher Emanuele Severino: this latter, after having proposed an innovative ontological elaboration centered on the eternity of each being as such, has addressed objections to various typical themes of Western culture, considered as a whole forgetful of the sense of being: the Principle of creatio ex nihilo would not escape this relief, in particular because the Author assimilates the divine creation to the production technique of the craftsman, and therefore understands it as a variant of the demiurgic model present in the Platonic texts. After having exposed the Platonic doctrine of the Demiurge in its essential terms, the article intends to take this parallelism into consideration and verify whether Severinos’position on the subject under consideration is well founded or whether it is not the result of an incorrect interpretation. Secondly, we intend to provide some indications aimed at defining more precisely the authentic way of understanding the Principle of Creation

The article examines the relationship between evil, freedom, and divine necessity in Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, and how Schelling’s ideas seem to echo in Harry Frankfurt’s contemporary theory of moral responsibility. Schelling’s concept of evil arises from the ground of existence, revealing an intrinsic duality in which God requires an opposing principle (evil) for His self-revelation. Schelling denies that God can be the author of evil, instead locating its origin in human free will. This analysis draws a parallel between Schelling’s claim that evil is necessary for God’s revelation and Frankfurt’s rejection of the principle of alternative possibilities, arguing that moral responsibility does not require the ability to act otherwise. The article critically examines Schelling’s stance on the compatibility between necessity and freedom, focusing on the theological and metaphysical implications of felix culpa, which transforms human sin into a necessary condition for divine grace. By linking Schelling’s notion of freedom within necessity to Frankfurt’s compatibilist theory of moral responsibility, this article not only sheds light on Schelling’s position but also connects classical metaphysical concerns surrounding theodicy and free will with more contemporary issues, showing how these themes remain relevant in modern ethical debates, albeit through different conceptual frameworks.