Quaestio

The article analyzes the Heideggerian notion of Ereignis from the point of view of the fourfold resonance of this distinctive word, which indicates both four meanings and four moments of thought. Subsequently, the essay proposes to approach the Ereignis to the theme of the Fourfold as the gathering of earth, sky, mortals and divinities, suggesting not only the cruciality of the language of the Fourfold for thinking about the Ereignis, but also showing in which way Heidegger himself expressly underlines this cruciality.

Starting with two enigmatic statements from the Thor Seminar (1969): ‘With the Ereignis, it is no longer Greek at all’; ‘One of the best ways to access the Ereignis would be to look into the essence of the Gestell’ (the enframing, the device, the whole constellation of the Stellen, Bestellen), this contribution critically examines the interpretations/translations of the Ereignis in terms of an event. While Heidegger still thinks of the Ereignis in terms of the ‘destinical sending’ (Geschick, Schicken), this, far from being inscribed in a temporal dimension, opens up a space of joined relationships (the Ereignis understood as Verhaltnis aller Verhaltnisse) brought together in the crossing (Vierung, in the sense of the crossing of ogives) which holds and maintains together the agreement of the Four: Earth - Heaven, Mortals - Immortals). This explains how the Ge-Stell can be seen as the (photographic) negative of the Ereignis.

The essay proposes a reconstruction of the authenticity of Being as a teleological instance of the Heideggerian question of Being, followed by an interpretation of existential analytics as a preliminary way of finding an ontological grounding for this authenticity of Being. According to Heidegger, modern thought has failed to arrive at this ontological grounding of the authenticity of Being because it has sought this grounding in the sphere of subjectivity and moral personality (Kant). Instead, existential analytics (the Zeitlichkeit of Being) would arrive at it in its rootedness in the truth of Being (the Temporalitat of Sein und Zeit). An ontological rootedness that is nevertheless reduced in the communal inauthenticity of the Heideggerian Dasein, which in its authenticity remains confined in the interrupted paths of its ontic and ontological solitude.

The article analyzes Heidegger’s thinking of Ereignis, with particular reference to the unpublished treatise entitled Das Ereignis, which dates back to the years 1941/42. First, I show that in this text Heidegger begins to take leave of the attitude that was still marked by the confrontation with metaphysics which was present in the previous writings. Instead, he places himself in a different disposition, in which terms such as ‘thanking’ and ‘releasement’ are taking on ever greater importance. Furthermore, I argue that in Das Ereignis thinking is thanking or gratitude for a self-giving that withdraws, remaining other than what is merely present, and that the attitude towards beings consists in the renunciation of attachment and possession.

The paper aims at an in-depth examination of the relationship between Ereignis and Enteignis with particular reference to the treatises of the third section of the Gesamtausgabe. Enteignis does not only name the mode of manifestation of Being [Wesung des Seyns] as Machenschaft, but indicates, the ex-propriating valence that constitutively belongs to the event-appropriation [Ereignis]. It indicates the suspension [das Ansichhalten], the retreat [Entzug], the detachment [Abgechiedenheit] and the sunset [Untergang] that prevail in the thinning/revealing dynamic of the event understood as the initiation of the beginning. Through this interpretation of the Ereignis as the retraction of Being [Sein] in the dynamic of destiny, it is possible to characterise the unfolding of the Lichtung as an abysmal event of giving and as difference. The being’s abandonment of Being [Seinsverlassenheit des Seineden] – in which lies the non-metaphysical root of nihilism – and the consequent unfolding of Being as difference, would conceal a kind of paradoxical donating foundation that suspends Being in the event of the Gabe, of the donation as Lichtung. Jacques Derrida has likened this paradoxical form of gift without donor and without donee to the concept of the holocaust, finding in it the very beginning of the history of Being. The Enteignis refers, that is to say, to an absolute oblivion, deeper and more original than the metaphysical oblivion of Being, to a Verwindung not only of metaphysics but of Being itself in the direction of abyssal donation. As Jean-Luc Nancy has suggested, it is possible to link the abandonment of being to the abundance of donation and to trace, therefore, the supra-metaphysical meaning of Enteignis in the abandonment of and to the possibility of the beginning and the future, in the germinating ‘catastrophe’ of the giving of Being.

Although Hegel has been often dismissed by Heidegger as a representative of metaphysical “ontotheology”, a sort of crypto-Hegelianism can be discovered in his “History of Being”, where Hegel is neither criticized nor even mentioned anyway. Both authors share the basic idea of a higher design, according to which all main positions regarding Being, resp. the Absolute, follow each other in their proper place. Such a logical unfolding is nothing but the Being, resp. the Absolute itself. Yet the process includes in both cases the negative moment, appearing as the historical phenomenon of modern godlessness. On the higher order, both Being and the Absolute allow somehow to endure a refusal. Hegel and Heidegger differ insofar the former advises a philosophical solution of the “speculative Good Friday”, whereas the latter emphasizes the disastrous outcome of the Metaphysics, just waiting that a radical change maybe could happen.

The article interrogates the reasons why phenomenology pushes Heideggerian thought towards the experience of the historicity of Being and later of its character as Ereignis. The answer is sought by insisting on the distinction between ‘the same’ and the ‘equal’ and on the possibility of not taking the obvious for granted.

According to Heidegger, with the circle we enter by asking about what is first, not only the way of proceeding changes, but also and above all the goal of philosophical investigation. The early awareness of the “metamorphosis” internal to the foundation of thought allows Heidegger to take up in an original way the metaphysical question of being qua being, that is “in itself” (the ousia). On the one hand, this results in a destabilization of the structure of philosophy: what is first enters in the thought as such, that is, distinguishing itself from it and escaping its grasp. But the result of this destabilization is neither the emancipation of philosophy from its task of foundation, nor the resignation to the impossibility of fulfiling it. Rather, it is the discovery that ≪asking arises from finding and develops “only” this≫; and that the principle of thought is essentially the “way to itself” and has its “proper” in “proximity”. Heidegger collects in the term Ereignis the internal logic of giving itself by the being, from which the philosophical question of the foundation arises.

This contribution bears witness to a path of semiotic-hermeneutic research aimed at addressing the notion of Event as firstness, in Peirce’s sense, and as retraction, in Heidegger’s sense. The ‘difference’ proper to the event is thought of starting from the concepts of ‘detachment’ and ‘rebound’ that allow us to think of its retroflexion and novelty, sameness and diversity at the same time, according to the ever-repeating figures of the Ancestor and the Infant. Truth itself must be thought of in this radical ambiguity, which nonetheless constitutes its irreducible life.

The article analyzes Heidegger’s notion of Ereignis as untranslatable. Based on the Heideggerian conception of translation, the article aims to clarify the meaning of the untranslatability of the word Ereignis and the unpublished 1941/42 treatise Das Ereignis. It is thus shown that the untranslatable is not that which is absolutely impossible to translate, but that which continues to (un)translate, that is, the condition of possibility of translation itself. In the conclusion, it is shown that the Ereignis as the untranslatable is rhythm and that is the relation that binds and disposes man for the truth of being.

This paper aims at questioning the possibility of thinking the Weg zur Sprache that characterizes Martin Heidegger’s thought after the turning/Kehre as a Weg zum Ereignis, i.e., the path towards language as a path towards the event in order to contextualize one of the fundamental theses of all of Heidegger’s Denkweg, ≪Das Ereignis wortet≫. The relationship between Ereignis and Sprache implies the conceptualization of fundamental linguistic plexuses such as those of Saying/Sagen, of Silence/Schweigen, and above all of Word/Wort. This is possible because the passage from the traditional Sprachphilosophie to a Wortdenken happens. From a methodological point of view, the question of the Wort will be treated in the light of an essential passage that takes place from the Zeichen of Sein und Zeit to the Zeige of Unterwegs zur Sprache. This passage is articulated in the Unpublished Essays, in which fundamental questions that Sein und Zeit left unanswered are explored in an extremely significant theoretical-conceptual laboratory that manages to elaborate the thesis ≪Das Ereignis wortet≫.

The contribution focuses on the Heideggerian tautology ‘Ereignis ereignet’ by meditating on the question Heidegger puts before it: ‘What is left to say?’ Emphasising the fundamental ‘positivity’ of the unconcealment of truth, the Author argues that in the Event, the world as such happens, in its indefinable mysteriousness and the extreme insecurity of its possibility. After the abandonment of metaphysics and the project of its overcoming, there is nothing more to be said.

As shown in Le principe d’anarchie. Heidegger et la question de l’agir (1982), Reiner Schurmann stands out as one of the few interpreters who consider Heidegger’s philosophy as a radical thought of praxis. This essay aims to highlight the relevance of the concept of praxis in relation to Ereignis by traversing some of the fundamental theoretical cores of Schurmann’s text. First, the transcendental dimension of Heidegger’s thought is emphasized, identifying the origin (Ursprung) of presence in Ereignis. Second, Schurmann’s interpretation of history as destiny (Seinsgeschichte) is examined, revealing the fundamental primacy of praxis over theory and thought. Finally, the anarchic sense of praxis corresponding to Ereignis is elucidated in light of the possibility of overcoming Geschichte, a possibility specifically given in the technological age.

Heidegger’s ontological reflection, throughout its development, focuses on some fundamental terms that are repeatedly elaborated and clarified by the author: λόγος is one of them. In fact, the German philosopher does not fail to tirelessly deal with this crucial concept of ancient philosophy, also for the repercussions it has on modern philosophy and on contemporary currents. On the other hand, the very term λόγος appears in one of the definitions that most characterize the human being from Aristotle onwards, i.e., ζῷον λόγον ἔχων, undergoing a stratification of meanings that gradually diverge more and more from the original. It is therefore possible to state that carefully following the development of the connotations provided by Heidegger on this topic represents to all intents and purposes a particularly profitable key to understanding the uniqueness of his thought. The Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), precisely due to the particular nature of its written form and its philosophical scope, is a crucial point both in the context of Kehre and, consequently, for understanding how the λόγος as an event is a significant and relational manifestation of Being. If we want to better understand the revolutionary scope of this position, it will be essential to briefly present what Heidegger means by λόγος in the first years of his philosophical production and, subsequently, to trace within the Contributions the changes with respect to the previous period. Finally, by showing the ripest fruits of his philosophical reflection in which thought and ποίησις are placed in intimate connection, it will be possible to highlight the important repercussions on the relationship between every human being, his own existence and philosophical reflection.

The article aims to shed light on Heidegger’s Ereignis by investigating it from the point of view of its ‘jointure’. Indeed, terms often associated with the Ereignis, such as Kehre, Kranz and Ring, are here read together from another fundamental concept, that of time-space. Thanks to the analysis of the spatio-temporal meaning of the ring structure that is outlined in this way, it is possible to exclude certain misunderstandings about the meaning of the Ereignis and to think adequately about its rigour.

This paper endeavors to explore the potential development of an ecology and an ethics tailored to the contemporary technological era, drawing upon Heidegger’s notion of Ereignis (Event). In pursuit of this objective, the study critically examines the alterations introduced by Heidegger’s work Beitrage zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) within the framework of his preceding ontological ideas and the interplay between Sein (Being) and Dasein (Existence). Furthermore, the paper engages with Heidegger’s perspective on the history of metaphysics and the question of technology, with an aim towards elucidating the possibility of a “new beginning” in philosophical thinking. The conceptual framework that emerges from this exploration forms the basis for a novel post-metaphysical understanding of the world, shedding light on an alternative mode of human-thing relations, distinct from the prevailing instrumentalism inherent in the technological age.

In this article we present and historically reconstruct the problem and meaning of history in its relation to the question of being in Heidegger’s thought, in particular from 1927 to the philosophy of the event, a period that extends to 1944. The main works of these decades are then specifically analysed, from Sein und Zeit to the unpublished treatises on the event, including also Vom Wesen des Grundes and Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, as well as the Black Notebooks, with an emphasis on their essential fragments. The problem of history is shown as early as 1927 in close connection with the phenomenon of being, and they develop together up to the Heideggerian philosophy of the event. The origin of the problem is to be found in the connection that Heidegger establishes between history, existence and philosophy as unitary phenomena in relation to being that explain each other, thus passing from the existential historicity of Being and time to the history of being as Ereignis (or vice versa, to the Ereignis as history of being).

The article focuses on Rorty’s interpretation of Heidegger’s Ereignis in light of his philosophy of language. Rorty considers Heidegger, along with Dewey and Wittgenstein, the most influential philosopher of the 20th century because he proposed a ‘poetic’ or ‘pragmatistic’ alternative to the traditional ‘scientific’ view of language, jumping out of the clash between ‘Gods’ and ‘Giants’. However, according to Rorty, after the Kehre Heidegger would undermine this discovery by making the Ereignis an entity superordinate to the discursive practices of human beings, falling back into a form of metaphysics that conceives of Sprache as the ultimate substitute for God. This error would be due to a general underestimation of the Darwinian conception of an ever-evolving language in which no metaphors are more worthy than others. Rather than as the Event of Being, the Ereignis should be conceived as a linguistic space open to plurality and confrontation between different vocabularies, as a Happening in which speakers converse to find the most meaningful words for the development and well-being of humanity. Exploring the main junctures of this reading, the paper aims to reconstruct Rorty’s historical interpretation of Heideggerian thought, identifying some internal inconsistencies and suggesting that it may derive from a selective or even deforming reading of Dewey’s evolutionary pragmatism.

This text analyses some stages in the genesis and development of the problem of chance (Zufall) in Heidegger’s thought, showing how it runs through the philosopher’s entire oeuvre. In particular, after tracing the theoretical formation of the concept in the author’s youthful philosophy (whose main sources are the Neo-Kantianism of the Southwest School and the hermeneutic-phenomenological interpretation of Aristotle), I come to examine some passages taken from the works devoted to the problem of the event (Ereignis), in which Heidegger reconfirms the speculative centrality of the Zufall and its importance for the Ereignis-Denken.

Although the term vorpradikativ is only occasionally employed by Heidegger, it qualifies a central topic of his thinking from mid to late 1920s: the dimension of truth, both in its ontic and ontological meaning. Despite this specific use of the term, I will argue that even the more originary dimension of the truth of Being, that is the focus of Heidegger’s later thinking of Ereignis, can be defined as ≪pre-predicative≫ in various ways. In one sense, Being as Logos can be characterised as pre-predicative because it is neither predicative-assertive logos nor the possible object of theoretical assertions. Second, and more importantly, Being is pre-predicative in the sense that it is pre-linguistic (however, the term vorsprachlich is not part of Heidegger’s terminology). This specific status refers to a triple aspect: a) the meaning of Being is associated by Heidegger with the semantic field of voice (Stimme) and disposition (Stimmung); b) Being unfolds itself in a characteristic ≪lack of language≫ (Sprachlosigkeit); c) Being is the ground of language. Nevertheless, we should be aware that if we refer to Heidegger’s strictly literal use of the term vorpradikativ in the 20s, its meaning does not fully overlap with the semantic area of a conceptualized pre-linguistic dimension.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the technological animal, as explication of the metaphysical humanity, and the future ones [Zukunftigen] in Heidegger’s thought of Event. Through the exploration of some pages of Contribution on Philosophy (On the Event) I will show how this relation, in Heidegger’s considerations of this period, has not a dialectic form. Technological animal and Zukunftigen indicate two different way to name the same belonginess of human being to the Being. Through the figure of the Zukunftigen Heidegger tries to propose a ‘new form’ of humanity beyond the characterization of the metaphysics.

The treatise The Event, albeit in an esoteric tone, points to “the trails and paths of the enduring” [Austrag] of the difference. Here Heidegger asserts that the event is itself “beyng as the relation [Verhaltnis]”, as the “inaugural between” [Zwischen], overcoming the onto-theo-logical metaphysics, which thinks of beyng as the stable foundation of being. In the third section, which is titled The Difference [Der Unterschied], Heidegger highlights that the difference does not separate being as the supersensory world from beings as the sensory world; it is not the ontological difference [Differenz], which is “objectified” [vergegenstandlicht] in Being and Time, rather it traverses within beyng itself. Beyng is essentially difference, from which separations arise. Nevertheless, in his view, ontological difference, or rather the differentiation [Unterschiedung], remains an inevitable step to reach the inceptual thinking, i.e., the fundamental question of beyng as Unterschied. Such thinking is de-founding [Ent-stiften] toward the enduring of the difference as well as the saying of the event is a gainsaying [Ab-sage], as the thinkers must often speak in the mode of denial. Although the difference is unexperienceable for “metaphysical humanity”, Heidegger believes that there must be possible an experience of beyng itself, i.e., an experience of the difference, even if for a “transformed humanity”, which bear the pain of enduring. The difference appropriates “now and then” and the event dispropriates [enteignet], causing human being to experience his “dependence” and the “consignment” [Uber-eignung] in which his “self-arrogation” [Sich-zu-eigen] is grounded. Unfortunately, in Heidegger’s Denkweg the thought of difference remains a broken path, which other thinkers will tread. However, by asserting that at the origin there is no stable ground, but the movement of differentiation, by asserting that the ‘not’ is co-essential to beyng, or otherness to the self, Heidegger opens another beginning for the thinking.

The Heideggerian radicalization of the question of the world in the 1930s seems to us to be driven by the need for a double detrascendentalisation. It is not only a matter of freeing the thought of the world from modern subjectivism but also of overcoming the conceptual pairs a priori/a posteriori, condition/conditioned, transcendental/ empirical. Hence the proliferation, in the Heideggerian texts of the 1930s, of a lexicon of the establishment, of the institution, of the foundation (Einrichtung, Stiftung, Grundung): it is necessary to think of the evenemential institution of the world from a singular thing, according to the exemplary model of the work of art. However, what we would like to show is that this detrascendentalisation can only be fully understood within the framework of the thought of the Ereignis and, in particular, within the framework of one of the ≪junctures≫ of the Beitrage (and therefore of the Ereignis itself), the Bergung, which more generally indicates a sheltering and preservation of the truth of Being in the beings, more precisely in the different types of beings and in the different correlative types of the Dasein’s action. It is in this institution of the world, in all acting and in all things, in the multiplicity of our practices and of the things to which we relate, an institution that is made with us and beyond us, that one can see the theoretical perspective opened up by these reflections of Heidegger.

This article mainly aims to compare the reception of the Heideggerian notion of Ereignis with the presence and conceptual exploitation of the notion of evenement in the French phenomenological context. In this regard, the theses of Neue Phanomenologie in Frankreich prove to be a useful starting point, although they need to be corrected through a close comparison with the text and the indispensable philological research. Finally, following the previous analyses, a brief review of the explored and unexplored possibilities of phenomenological proposals on the theme of the event is proposed.

The aim of this essay is to highlight the persistent presence of the concepts of “Projection” (Entwurf) and “Letting-prevail” (Walten-lassen) introduced by Heidegger in his 1929-30 university course (The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World, Finitude, Solitude) in the works in which the author attempts to think the “Event” issue. The first part of the paper shows how within the same course of 1929-30 there is a paradigm shift on Heidegger’s part in his understanding of the topic of the projection; in the second part an attempt is made to show how the conception of Entwurf and Walten-lassen that he arrives at in the final part of the course are the same one that, although in a different theoretical context, he thematizes in the Contributions to Philosophy.

Moving from the consideration of divine omnipotence, Augustine’s philosophical and theological inquiry raises further questions. The aim of this paper is to deal with the inherently problematic features brought about by the notion of nature. Nature is seen by Augustine as a plastic and dynamic concept, which unifies various semantic frameworks. In this study, I will focus on nature as the broadly-recognized dimension where phaenomena take place following stable and calculated laws, arguing that the tension existing between such a notion and the divine omnipotence hardly finds a solution.

In his Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Siger of Brabant offers his first account of accidental events: an accidental event coincides with the defect of an agent, which achieves its effect in most but not all cases. Siger provides three examples of accidental events: the case of a cold and wintry weather during the dogdays; the case of a man finding treasure while digging a grave; and the meeting between a creditor and his debtor. I show that the last two examples are not fully consistent with Siger’s account since they do not reflect the idea of an accidental event as the defect of an agent that achieves its effect in most cases. A possible solution to this inconsistency can also be found in Siger’s Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, and precisely in what I call the second account of accidental events. According to this second account, an accidental event identifies every simultaneous concomitance between two items, which are not connected with each other by a per se causal relationship. This second account does not imply a rejection of the first account, but rather includes it: the relationship between (the action of) an agent for the most part and its defect may be considered a particular case of concomitance between two items, where one is not the per se cause of the other, and vice versa.

The paper examines the metaphysical fundament of Henry of Ghent’s doctrine of the res in Summa XXI and its twofold relation with Avicenna’s Metaphysics I, 5. Henry’s notion of res is linked to Avicenna Metaphysics I, ch. 5 where the Persian philosopher states which are the primary notions of the intellect, namely: res, ens et necesse. Avicenna discusses res and ens together and explains their status and relationship. In particular, he underlines their concomitance (comitantia): briefly, when we conceive an object, we refer to it in two different ontological modes, namely a definitional one (res) and an existential one (ens). Our focus is on the twofold use of Avicennian source in Henry’s text. He rejects Avicenna’s position in the prologue, but he presents several implicit references to the same position he refused. We remark that Henry refers to Met. I, 5 widely and correctly most the time. Hence, he knew the reference. Nonetheless, in Summa XXI prologue he omits the noun res when he quotes Avicenna. Subsequently, he refuses Avicenna’s account, stating that since Avicenna held for the univocity of being, he is not compatible with a Christian perspective (the being of God and the being of creature are incommensurable). Surprisingly, Henry introduces Avicenna’s res theory all along the solution, without mentioning Avicenna. Henry deliberately mirrors res lexicon to build the analogical account of the being. Since res has not any existential reference to the Being, it represents a key-concept for humankind to conceive God. The outcome of our inquiry is a twofold interpretation of a same authority. Firstly, the explicit Avicenna, dispossessed of the res, is refused in toto. Secondly, the invisible Avicenna, is re-integrated by Henry thorough the resumption of the noun res and its textual background and becomes the key-point of the solutio.

The 16th and 17th centuries were a period of profound political, institutional, and doctrinal upheaval, largely sparked by the Protestant Reformation. Within this cultural and religious context, Francisco Suarez emerged as one of the most influential figures in Catholic thought. While scholarly interest in Suarez’s work has a well-established history, more recent studies have introduced different and previously unexplored perspectives on certain aspects of his thought. This paper aims to analyze key elements of Suarez’s metaphysics in light of these recent contributions, placing his work within its original doctrinal framework and assessing its enduring legacy in history of philosophy. Metaphysical themes – such as the object of metaphysics, the concept of being, the distinction between being and essence, the theory of transcendentals, the problem of individuation – are examined in relation to the medieval tradition that shaped Suarez’s thought, the doctrinal context of Second Scholasticism, and their subsequent reception, particularly in works of some notable 20th-century authors.

This study traces the fundamental stages of Benedetto Croce’s moral thought, focusing on the concept of ‘ethical-utility’ (etico-utile). In his texts, Croce understands utility as inseparable from morality. Moral action is good precisely because it is first and foremost useful. He distinguishes between a merely personal utility (which is the basis of all economic and moral action) and a utility that may develop into universal-utility (ethical- utility). Compared to the economic individual who aims at private profit, the moral person would instead tend to privilege the profit that concerns the ‘greater number’, going so far as to make his own individual interest coincide with interest in the universal good. The pursuit of common utility thus seems to be the distinctive attitude of morality (and also of politics). This utility, in favour of the interest of the community does not mean altruism; rather, the moral act requires to be put before any personal interest and the interest of others, in order to favour, ultimately, only that of the Spirit. This concept of ‘ethical-utility’, theorised by the Neapolitan thinker, seems to have been materialised in the only political-legislative act, promoted by Croce himself: the law for the protection of the Italian landscape heritage (no. 778 of 11 May 1922). Croce’s law is in fact characterised by a defence of the national cultural and environmental heritage motivated precisely by the concept of the latter’s ‘public interest’.

The concept of Creation from nothing is one of the most typical and relevant themes of the metaphysics of transcendence; this in particular from the moment in which this Principle entered the theological and philosophical panorama through the Jewish-Christian Revelation. In recent decades, one of the most relevant criticisms of this concept has come from the Italian philosopher Emanuele Severino: this latter, after having proposed an innovative ontological elaboration centered on the eternity of each being as such, has addressed objections to various typical themes of Western culture, considered as a whole forgetful of the sense of being: the Principle of creatio ex nihilo would not escape this relief, in particular because the Author assimilates the divine creation to the production technique of the craftsman, and therefore understands it as a variant of the demiurgic model present in the Platonic texts. After having exposed the Platonic doctrine of the Demiurge in its essential terms, the article intends to take this parallelism into consideration and verify whether Severinos’position on the subject under consideration is well founded or whether it is not the result of an incorrect interpretation. Secondly, we intend to provide some indications aimed at defining more precisely the authentic way of understanding the Principle of Creation

The article examines the relationship between evil, freedom, and divine necessity in Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, and how Schelling’s ideas seem to echo in Harry Frankfurt’s contemporary theory of moral responsibility. Schelling’s concept of evil arises from the ground of existence, revealing an intrinsic duality in which God requires an opposing principle (evil) for His self-revelation. Schelling denies that God can be the author of evil, instead locating its origin in human free will. This analysis draws a parallel between Schelling’s claim that evil is necessary for God’s revelation and Frankfurt’s rejection of the principle of alternative possibilities, arguing that moral responsibility does not require the ability to act otherwise. The article critically examines Schelling’s stance on the compatibility between necessity and freedom, focusing on the theological and metaphysical implications of felix culpa, which transforms human sin into a necessary condition for divine grace. By linking Schelling’s notion of freedom within necessity to Frankfurt’s compatibilist theory of moral responsibility, this article not only sheds light on Schelling’s position but also connects classical metaphysical concerns surrounding theodicy and free will with more contemporary issues, showing how these themes remain relevant in modern ethical debates, albeit through different conceptual frameworks.